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An interpretation of how Aristotle explains the value of worldly goods within the terms 
of his ethical theory in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle claims that to live in a 
worthwhile and subjectively satisfying way—that is, to achieve eudaimonia—one needs 
such things as honor, wealth, friends, and political power. He groups these things 
together as the external goods, since they are all external in a spatial sense from the 
perspective of any given person. It is clear that people almost always attach value to such 
things, but it is less clear why Aristotle should. My aim is to explain why Aristotle 
regards these things as important, and—in a more formal sense—how far his definition of 
eudaimonia explains their value. On Aristotle’s formal theory, the external goods ought 
to gain value through some relation to excellent rational activity, but fleshing out the 
details of this relation raises problems. Chapter 2 assesses Aristotle’s formal argument for 
the value of such goods at NE I.1099a31-b8, chapter 1 develops an account of Aristotle’s 
method in order to support this assessment, and chapter 3 considers the kinds of 
explanations for the value of the external goods available to Aristotle in terms of his 
account of action. Chapter 4 draws on the results of the earlier chapters to assess 
Aristotle’s position on moral luck—that is, how Aristotle regards his various categories 
of value as depending upon factors outside of the agent’s control. My aim throughout is 
to consider how successfully Aristotle draws on his formal theory in order to explain the 
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In Nicomachean Ethics I, Aristotle first defines eudaimonia as the highest practical good 
before going on to offer a more conceptually specified, formal account of what it is. Part 
of this more specified account consists in two criteria that eudaimonia must satisfy—
finality and self-sufficiency. This good must be final, in the sense that it is chosen for its 
own sake and all other goods are chosen for its sake. And it must be self-sufficient in the 
sense that it is a complete good that is not improved by the addition of any other goods. 
In the well-known function argument, Aristotle then further identifies eudaimonia with 
the purpose or function of man, and determines this function to be a certain exercise or 
activation of the intellect in accord with excellence. At this point, then, Aristotle has 
worked out a partly but incompletely specified definition of the highest human good as a 
certain kind of excellent rational activity that is both final and self-sufficient. Since it is 
final and self-sufficient, it must in some sense subsume other genuine goods—they must 
be choiceworthy for its sake (since it is final) and if they are goods at all, they must not 
be entirely separate from it (since it is self-sufficient).  
To take a relatively neat case of the part that another good plays within eudaimonia, 
Aristotle explains in NE I that pleasure is contained within the life of excellent activity, 
since the man of excellence is a lover of the fine (philokalos) and therefore takes pleasure 
in performing fine actions (1099a7-21). Aristotle here regards his theory as explaining 
something that most people already believe—that pleasure is part of what makes a man 
eudaimōn—which is to say, living in a happy, flourishing, and worthwhile way. Aristotle 
also offers this account of how pleasure is included within eudaimonia in a section of the 
2 
 
NE that explicitly deals with the views of others and tries to explain their relation to the 
formal definition of eudaimonia (1098b9-1099b8). And it seems clear that he regards 
himself as having offered a plausible explanation of how pleasure satisfies the formal 
criteria of finality and self-sufficiency. Thus Aristotle remarks here that the life of the 
lovers-of-the-fine (philokaloi) does not need pleasure “as some kind of additional 
appendage” (ὥσpiερ piεριάpiτου τινός) but contains pleasure “in itself” (ἐν ἑαυτῷ) 
(1099a16-16). Likewise, the lover-of-the-fine’s love of fine actions seems prior to the 
pleasure that accrues to such actions for him, so that such pleasure can be said to derive 
from the fineness of such acts, rather than the other way around. In this sense, then, such 
pleasure also satisfies finality—being choiceworthy because of excellent activity. The 
major wrinkle is that there are other kinds of pleasures (i.e., bodily or appetitive 
pleasures) that are less easily subsumed within Aristotle’s scheme. But what matters for 
my purposes here is that Aristotle is fairly successful at explaining how his formal 
definition of eudaimonia accommodates pleasure, and also that he regards himself as 
being successful at explaining this. 
Aristotle’s treatment of the external goods is more strained, and it is his argument for 
why eudaimonia needs the external goods that forms the immediate impetus for this 
dissertation. The external goods are defined spatially—as those goods physically outside 
of the agent’s body or soul (Aristotle seems to alternate on this point), and they include 
such things as wealth, honor, political power, and even one’s friends. Since people quite 
obviously ordinarily ascribe so much value to these things, giving an account of what 
kind of value they have in terms of his theory is a pressing matter for Aristotle. This is 
especially so, because Aristotle’s theory is in a sense a theory of value—that is, of how 
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value is to be correctly assigned to different kinds of things by a person with perfected 
practical reason, as well as perfected appetitive and emotional tendencies. 
After discussing several non-philosophical views about eudaimonia, and explaining 
how they support his definition of eudaimonia—including the view that eudaimonia 
involves pleasure that I have just discussed—Aristotle then turns to the external goods. 
At this point, he remarks that eudaimonia “evidently has a further need of the external 
goods” (φαίνεται…τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν piροσδεοµένη) (1099a31-32). What is striking 
here, is that Aristotle calls this view “evident,” which suggests a stronger source of 
authority than the other views he has just been surveying. Furthermore, Aristotle calls 
this a further need (piροσδέοµαι), using the Greek prefix pros-, where he had previously 
said of pleasure specifically that it is not needed as something additional, using the same 
Greek verb (1099a15-16). This suggests a violation of self-sufficiency. Furthermore, 
Aristotle offers an argument that seems intended to explain the value of the external 
goods in terms of the promotion of excellent activity, but which falters. Thus on the 
surface Aristotle seems to be insisting on the value of a certain conventional class of 
goods, and on eudaimonia’s need for these things, while at the same time failing to 
explain how his formal definition of eudaimonia can accommodate such value. 
Examining this fault line in Aristotle’s theory is the chief motive for this dissertation. 
Part of the interest in Aristotle’s theory is that it promises a middle ground between 
the Socratic and Stoic view that virtue is sufficient for or even identical to a satisfying 
and worthwhile existence, and the more commonplace view that such human flourishing 
or well-being rests primarily in the hands of fortune, wealth, and other worldly goods that 
4 
 
are not always in our control.1 In particular, the Socratic view seems to have a trace of 
asceticism that may seem inhumane given the evident value that all or almost all of 
mankind does attach to such things. Aristotle, then, may seem to be offering an ethical 
theory that goes further toward accommodating people as they really are. But, as I have 
begun to indicate, when one tries to determine what kind of value Aristotle assigns to the 
external goods in a more fine grained way, things become murky. My aim throughout 
will be to try to clarify how Aristotle supposes value should be distributed between 
excellent activity, the external goods, and the broader class of external things that lie 





This dissertation will open up a series of interpretive problems in the Nicomachean 
Ethics through a focused examination of how Aristotle’s formal theory comes to grips 
with the externals goods. While the driving motivation of this thesis will be to clarify 
how successful Aristotle’s theory is in explaining the value of the external goods in 
particular, in the course of this examination, I shall consider a number of closely related 
problems that bear on this question, each of which has some independent interest of its 
own. 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Herodotus I.32.4, where Solon remarks that “man is wholly an accident” (Hdt. 
I.32.4). Achilles also famously describes Zeus as giving out goods and ills to mortals from two 
urns (Iliad 24.527-533), suggesting at any rate an external source for those things that matter 
most in life.  
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Thus one question raised by examining Aristotle’s argument for the value of the 
external goods is the degree to which Aristotle’s definition of eudaimonia should be 
taken as an exceptionless and finalized explanatory principle. That is, does it explain all 
of the data that Aristotle uses it to make sense of? In particular, Aristotle’s formal 
definition of eudaimonia ought to be reflected in the subjective evaluative attitude of the 
ideal practical agent. There are some limitations on what kind of evaluative attitudes can 
plausibly be ascribed to any person whatsoever (no matter how excellent), so these must 
also function as limits upon what kind of theory Aristotle can plausibly advance. 
Furthermore, Aristotle recognizes a variety of goods as goods, and one can test to what 
degree his theory succeeds in explaining the value of these various goods. While I cannot 
pursue these questions exhaustively in this dissertation, my contention that Aristotle fails 
to offer a fully successful explanation for the value of the external goods in terms of his 
formal theory could serve as a starting point for further investigation of the limits of the 
explanatory power of Aristotle’s theory. This dissertation thus also raises the often-
ignored question of whether Aristotle himself regards his theory as completely 
successful. As I discuss below, interpreters often take charity to demand extracting a 
maximally consistent and successful theory. I suppose, instead, that the true interest of 
Aristotle’s theory lies in identifying its weaknesses as well as its explanatory power.  
The external goods can also be differentiated from a number of other goods that play 
a part in eudaimonia. Here, I engage in the work of this differentiation for two reasons: 
first, to clarify the definition of the external goods, and secondly to help determine the 
kind of value that should be ascribed to the external goods in contradistinction to these 
various other related goods. In particular, I argue that the external goods should be 
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differentiated from good luck, because each individual external good carries some 
particular conception of value with it. Thus honor, for example, is defined as a favorable 
evaluation by others, and if it is reckoned to be a good, it is reckoned to be a good in this 
particular way—that is, as good reputation. What kind of luck counts as good luck, on the 
other hand, waits upon some particular account of goodness, or at least upon the 
specification of some particular respect in which something may be good or bad. This is 
significant because if each external good presupposes some particular kind of value, then 
the external goods as a whole pose an explanatory challenge for Aristotle’s theory, since 
the particular kind of value presupposed by each external good must be separately 
reckoned with. Recognizing this distinction between the external goods and good luck 
would help to form a fuller picture of the kinds of value that Aristotle ascribes to the 
range of things outside of the agent’s control. 
The results or consequences which ensue from an action have also sometimes been 
taken to belong to the external goods. But this too must be wrong. The virtuous agent 
must specify the results at which his action aims, so those results have a closer relation to 
his own practical reason than the external goods—which are things that stand outside of 
the agent and in relation to which he may choose to act in a certain way or not. But the 
external goods are not goods created by him, in the way that the consequences of actions 
are. Differentiating the external goods from the consequences of action in this way raises 
a further interpretive question about Aristotle’s account of action, and the degree to 
which he regards action as internal or external—that is, as a bare process within the soul, 
or instead also as a series of bodily motions and the results that issue from them. In 
chapter 3, I offer strong evidence that Aristotle regards results or consequences as partly 
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determining the worth of actions. While I pursue this question in order to reach a more 
precise view about how Aristotle’s theory explains the value of the external goods, it is 
clearly fundamental.  
In particular, better determining how Aristotle would evaluate results or 
consequences in terms of his own theory would allow the historian of philosophy to 
situate Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics more precisely in relation to other ethical theories. 
Thus Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals denies that consequences or 
results have any moral significance at all. And Utilitarian moral theories, on the other 
hand, suppose that all value in questions of ethics and politics derives from the well-
being of others—a particular kind of consequence. While my concern here is not to 
position Aristotle in relation to Kantian and Utilitarian moral theories, my discussion in 
chapter 3 about the role of results and consequences in action has direct implications for 
any scholar seeking to do so. Furthermore, it has implications for how Aristotle should be 
situated along the traditional division between virtue, deolontological, and Utilitarian 
ethical theories. 
My final chapter also has a particularly clear interest, since here I pursue the question 
of how to evaluate Aristotle’s position on an idea in contemporary moral philosophy—
namely, moral luck. Moral luck consists in whatever moral value lies outside of the 
agent’s control. This is a particularly important notion, because if moral luck exists, it 
undermines the possibility of the moral as a category of value that is equally within the 
reach of all human agents. The idea of the moral as a category of worth insulated from 
luck might seem appealing, because it offers a kind of moral democracy, but (as Thomas 
Nagel and Bernard Williams argue) it is also implausible. Since the notion raises 
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fundamental questions for any ethical theory, and has stirred such interest among 
scholars, it is useful to be able to offer a clear account of Aristotle’s position on moral 
luck. Furthermore, since the external goods play a part in both eudaimonia and also in 
particular kinds of virtuous actions, this chapter offers another angle from which to view 
many of the arguments and problems dealt with in the earlier chapters of this dissertation. 
Here, in the fourth and final chapter, I argue that earlier attempts to reckon with 
Aristotle’s position on moral luck have been flawed, insofar as they assume that one can 
ignore the question of what moral value is, and how it relates to Aristotle’s own 
categories of value. After debunking these previous approaches, I draw on the work of 
the first three chapters in order to assess the degree to which Aristotle regards his own 
categories of value as resting within the control of the agent.  
 
 
The Politics and the External Goods 
 
Now that I have introduced the general problem that drives this dissertation, I shall 
consider a few selected topics that form a background for this study, before explaining 
what I plan to do in each of the individual chapters. While this dissertation aims only to 
interpret Aristotle’s account of the external goods within the Nicomachean Ethics itself, 
nevertheless the Politics raises some problems explicitly that are implicit in the NE 
treatment, and which are relevant to this investigation. It also provides alternative 
treatments of some of the positions that Aristotle works out in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
which are nevertheless informed by some of the same concerns that drive the NE (as well 
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as some distinct concerns). Thus throughout this dissertation it will occasionally be useful 
to look at an NE view in relation to a similar view set forward in the Politics. 
Accordingly, I shall comment briefly here on what the Politics has to say about the 
external goods and some related issues. 
Thus, for example, Aristotle’s accounts of certain particular virtues in the 
Nicomachean Ethics presuppose that the ideal moral agent possesses private property, but 
the institution of private property is never discussed in any systematic way in the NE. In 
the Politics, on the other hand, Aristotle explicitly deals with the question of whether 
property should be redistributed or leveled in order to create wealth equality—as Plato 
argues in the Republic—or whether, instead, the more familiar institution of private 
property should be retained. And in fact, Aristotle argues that private property (as well as 
private marriage) can be defended partly on the basis of the virtues that such institutions 
facilitate. Thus Aristotle remarks that those who try to make the city excessively unified, 
“clearly destroy the deeds of two virtues, for the work of temperance is in respect to 
women…and [the work] of generosity [is] in respect to property…for the work of 
generosity lies in the use of property [ἐν τῇ γὰρ χρήσει τῶν κτηµάτων τὸ τῆς 
ἐλευθεριότητος ἔργον ἐστίν]” (II.1263b7-14). Thus Aristotle defends private property, 
and hence differences in wealth, partly on the basis of its value for the promotion of 
virtue. As a more general point, this means that Aristotle thinks that forms of social 
organization can be defended by their role in optimizing or promoting the activities of 
excellence of certain individuals—where a modern political philosopher might be more 
likely to emphasize the just distribution of material resources. Nevertheless, Aristotle also 
offers more pragmatic arguments for private property—such as that the ills blamed upon 
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private property are actually due to vice, that those sharing property are more likely to 
quarrel than those possessing it privately, and that such a life of shared property is 
“impossible” (ἀδύνατος) (1263b15-29).  
Aristotle also remarks—in the same discussion—that pleasure depends upon holding 
property in private, since love of oneself is natural, and since men take pleasure in doing 
good things for their friends. Aristotle seems to regard this as a somewhat separate point 
from the one he makes immediately after it about the dependence of temperance and 
generosity upon private marriage and private property, respectively (1263b7-14). The 
idea here can perhaps be linked to a discussion in NE IX that likewise joins enlightened 
self-love with virtuous activity. Aristotle here argues that the one who loves himself most 
will aim to distribute “the fine” (τὸ καλόν) to himself rather than “money, honor, and all 
those goods men fight over” (χρήµατα καὶ τιµὰς καὶ ὅλως τὰ piεριµάχητα ἀγαθά) 
(1169a17-29). Such a person “distributes the greater good to himself” (1169a28-29). 
Thus Aristotle insists on carving out a place for a self-love that he regards as natural, and 
which is expressed (in part) through the use of one’s own property to perform voluntary 
acts that one regards as one’s own, and which accordingly augment one’s worth. Without 
private property, there are no private actions, and without private acts there is no room 
for the expression of enlightened self-love. 
In the Politics, Aristotle not only situates value in excellent practical activity, but he 
also regards the slaves (δοῦλοι) and vulgar craftsmen (βάναυσοι) who perform “what is 
necessary” (τὰ ἀναγκαῖα) as standing outside of the city-state, and only indirectly 
supporting it, but not directly instantiating the good life of excellent activity at which it 
aims. Thus Aristotle regards the slave as “animate property” (I.1253b30-33), and as a 
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“tool for action” (ὄργανον piρακτικὸν) (I.1254a17). This entails that slaves possess an 
instrumental worth that derives more or less entirely from the excellent activity that they 
make possible. And Aristotle praises cities that do not make a citizen of the “vulgar 
craftsman” (βάναυσος), arguing that citizens should hold off from “necessary tasks” 
(III.1278a8-13). Thus in the Politics, Aristotle draws a hard and explicit distinction 
between the worth of different kinds of men in terms of their place in the social hierarchy 
and their realization of excellent activity in terms of a socially specific definition. One 
may legitimately set aside these troubling features of Aristotle’s political and ethical 
thought and work out a sanitized neo-Aristotelian position, but at the same time it is 
important for the interpreter to see Aristotle’s view for what it is. The question of who, 
exactly, Aristotle regards as capable of excellent activity is especially pertinent to chapter 
4, where I assess Aristotle’s position on moral luck. In particular, if a woman, slave, or 
vulgar craftsmen is judged unable to engage in such activity fully, then this might be 
thought to be a kind of moral luck (though I will point out problems with analyzing 
Aristotle’s position this way).  
 
 
The Text and Transmission of the Nicomachean Ethics 
 
A thorough examination of the text of our Nicomachean Ethics and the evidence for how 
it was transmitted to us is well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Yet insofar as any 
interpretation of the NE rests on some view about the nature of the text being interpreted, 
it is important to venture some brief observations here. First, scholars do not agree on 
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whether Aristotle himself is responsible for the Nicomachean Ethics in roughly the form 
that it has been handed down to us. Thus Jonathan Barnes remarks in a detailed study of 
the transmission of the Aristotelian corpus, “That our EN is not a unity is beyond 
controversy—the existence of two treatments of pleasure is enough to prove the fact. The 
only questions concern who invented our text, and when, and from what materials, and 
for what motives.”2 In fact, his claim is highly controversial; many scholars who set out 
to interpret the Nicomachean Ethics do simply assume without comment that it can be 
read as a unity. After all, most scholars see the NE as Aristotle’s classic work of moral 
theory, and is often referred to simply as the Ethics.3 It is also often included in survey 
courses in western intellectual thought as well as surveys of moral philosophy. 
The evidence for the origin of our Nicomachean Ethics can be divided into two main 
categories—ancient testimony outside the text of the NE, and internal evidence. External 
evidence would include, for example, ancient references to the content of the NE that 
refer to it by name. The internal evidence in turn may be divided into cross-references 
within the text of the NE, the style of the work, and finally the degree of consistency 
between the various philosophical positions set forward. One difficulty that arises 
immediately in the case of internal evidence, however, is that it is not at all clear what 
standard should be applied to determining whether the work is sufficiently consistent to 
have been edited by Aristotle himself. And, making matters still more delicate, this 
question blurs into the question of Aristotle’s method. Thus an interpreter who attributes 
a dialectical method to Aristotle, in which Aristotle need not endorse all of the 
conclusions of his arguments, might be able to explain away inconsistencies as perfectly 
                                                 
2
 Barnes (1997) 59 n. 252. 
3
 Despite Kenny’s (1978) attempt to reclaim ground for the Eudemian Ethics. 
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natural in that context.4 Other scholars, meanwhile, might offer a textual rather than 
methodological explanation for such inconsistencies—supposing that doublets or 
inconsistencies resulted from Aristotle’s way of composing his treatises, according to 
which he might have revised a given work over a period of years.5 Apart from these 
different ways of explaining inconsistencies when they do arise, there is also little 
agreement about exactly what qualifies as a genuine inconsistency of the sort that cannot 
be reasonably attributed to Aristotle. Ideally one would be able to rely on a fixed standard 
from outside of the NE itself in order to judge whether the substance of the views being 
advanced therein is sufficiently consistent or coherent to count as the product of 
Aristotle’s own authorship or editorship. But it is hard to know where to look for such a 
standard, and views that appear baldly contradictory to one scholar, are reckoned by 
others simply to belie a more subtle underlying view that has not been expressed 
explicitly and directly.6  
Despite the difficulty of reaching agreement upon a single standard against which to 
judge a text ascribed to Aristotle as genuine or not on internal grounds, there are at any 
rate good grounds for skepticism that Aristotle intended our Nicomachean Ethics to be 
read as a unity, even if a definitive answer here is not possible. I shall briefly offer 
                                                 
4
 Burnet (1988) xvi-xvii identifies Aristotle’s NE method as dialectical in this specific sense—of 
posing solutions to problems without committing himself to those conclusions. Dialectical is used 
by other scholars, however, to describe a method that arrives at fixed conclusions. 
5
 See Barnes (1995) 6-15. 
6
 This is particularly evident in Aristotle’s two apparently disparate treatments of pleasure in the 
NE. Strohl (2008) 7 n. 7 & 33 ff. does not even countenance the possibility of a genuine 
inconsistency arising from a textual problem, instead arguing for an interpretation that 
encompasses characterizations of pleasure that baldly contradict one another, at least if they are 
read literally. Barnes (1997) 59 n. 252, on the other hand, regards the two different accounts of 




evidence in support of this skepticism, without aiming to prove that our NE was not 
intended by Aristotle—perhaps an impossible task given the evidence. The most glaring 
problem is that the Nicomachean Ethics shares three books with the Eudemian Ethics—
the so-called common books. Many scholars now suppose that these so-called Common 
Books (NE V-VII = EE IV-VI) were originally part of the Eudemian Ethics, and that 
Aristotle edited them for inclusion in the Nicomachean Ethics.7 While this solution is, of 
course, possible, if scholars are in agreement that the books were originally Eudemian, 
but seem to have been edited for the Nicomachean context, it remains to be shown that 
Aristotle himself did the editing. An equally plausible explanation is that part of the NE 
was lost and replaced by a later editor with books from the Eudemian Ethics that covered 
similar subject matter. Here, cross-references and philosophical consistency come into 
play, and more detailed analysis than I can present here is required even to approach 
reaching a firm conclusion. But I will venture a few observations about the evidence for 
the place of the common books. 
The evidence of Aristotle’s commentator Aspasius from the second century AD is 
interesting. His commentary on the NE, which survives only in parts, deals continuously 
with the text across the boundary between the Common Books and the exclusively 
Nicomachean books. Thus it is taken as an important piece of evidence for the existence 
of something more or less resembling our Nicomachean Ethics at least by the time of his 
commentary. Nevertheless, things are more complex than this. Aspasius interprets a cross 
reference at NE VIII.1155b15-16 to an unidentifiable passage as a reference to “the lost 
parts of the Nicomachean Ethics” (ἐν τοῖς ἐκpiεpiτωκόσι τῶν Νικοµαχείων) (CAG 19.1, 
                                                 
7
 See, for example, Cooper (1981). 
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161.9-10). Of course, Aspasius might simply be inventing an ad hoc explanation for the 
dead-end cross-reference.8 On the other hand, this remark might rest on greater 
knowledge of the textual tradition than we now possess. These “missing parts” to which 
Aspasius refers do not necessarily coincide with all three Common Books, so they do not 
necessarily resolve the question of why those Common Books were placed in the NE.9 
On the other hand, the reference does come near the beginning of NE VIII, and thus near 
the beginning of where the common books leave off and the exclusively Nicomachean 
material returns—lending some plausibility to the interpretation that Aspasius is referring 
to the section of the NE that has been replaced with three books of the Eudemian Ethics. 
In reference to NE VII.1153b1 ff., Aspasius also comments on the differences in 
different accounts of pleasure as suggesting that the passage in question may belong to 
Eudemus rather than Aristotle. The two remarks together—about “the lost parts of the 
Nicomacheans” in a comment on early NE VIII, and about inconsistent accounts of 
pleasure between a passage from the Common Books and other parts of the NE—shows 
that Aspasius was doubtful about whether the text that he was commenting on was 
exactly what Aristotle had written and edited. Since Aspasius may have known more 
about the history of the text than we do, this seems to provide good reason to be cautious 
about assuming that Aristotle himself edited the text that we have.  
Setting aside Aspasius, one can turn to the substance of Aristotle’s treatments of 
different subjects within the text of the NE as we have it. Considering the two distinct 
discussions of pleasure in NE VII and NE X shows just how varied critical assessments of 
the NE are. Thus at least one scholar takes the two discussions to be a sufficient reason by 
                                                 
8
 As Irwin (1980b) 341 suggests in his review of Kenny (1978). 
9
 As Kenny (1978) 34 suggests that it does. 
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itself to regard the Nicomachean Ethics as the work of a later editor,10 while another 
simply takes the apparently conflicting definitions of pleasure as the starting point for a 
charitable interpretation that reconciles the two, without so much as addressing the 
question of the textual transmission or unity of the NE.11 NE VII defines pleasure as “an 
unimpeded activity” (1153a12-15; 1153b9-12), whereas NE X defines pleasure as 
something that supervenes upon activity and perfects it (1174b31-1175a1). At issue, of 
course, are what exactly Aristotle means by these definitions.12 But it should be clear that 
a style of interpretation which assumes textual unity, and then favors the interpretation of 
any view that renders it compatible with another view on that topic found in the same text 
is hopelessly flawed. And the further point that one can make, is that neither discussion 
of pleasure shows any explicit awareness of the other, so that aside from the problem of 
the philosophical substance of the two treatments of pleasure, the lack of cross-references 
to different discussions of the same subject is surprising.  
NE III poses problems as well—which again depend upon how great of a gap one 
sees between two different philosophical positions, and thus here too textual questions 
are intertwined with interpretive ones. Thus the argument offered at NE III.5 that virtue 
and vice are “up to us” seems to conflict with Aristotle’s repeated insistence on the 
importance of rearing to habituation and (thereby) to the correct development of character 
throughout NE I-II (I.1095b4-6; II.1103b22-25; II.1104b1.). It seems a bit odd that if 
Aristotle had worked his way through the subjects of NE I-III one by one, or even if he 
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had revised the NE I-III to form a continuous text, that he would not have had this very 
major tension in mind as he developed the position that he sets out in NE III.5. 
Furthermore, the NE II.1105a31-33 definition of excellent practical activity requires that 
an action be done “knowingly,” rather than requiring that it be “voluntary”—seemingly 
ignoring NE III at just that point where it would be most relevant to defining virtuous 
action. After all, the NE III account of the voluntary contains a detailed discussion of the 
role of knowledge in rendering action voluntary. Finally—to point out a slightly more 
subtle tension—in NE I, Aristotle argues that the good man “will never do anything 
hateful and wicked” (1100b34-35), but the NE III discussion of action that is involuntary 
because of ignorance seems to identify just such a case where the virtuous man would 
perform an act of this kind. And, in turn, the NE III discussion is also silent on how 
mixed and involuntary actions influence the eudaimonia of the man who commits them. 
And, setting aside the internal evidence, there is at least some external evidence that 
corroborates suspicion about a separate origin. Namely, two of the ancient catalogs list a 
single-volume work titled, “on the voluntary,”13 suggesting the possibility that our NE 
III.1-5 was originally a separate Aristotelian treatise.  
While conclusions of this kind wait upon a far more exhaustive study than I can offer 
here, the evidence I have sketched is sufficient to support caution about the assumption 
that the Nicomachean Ethics represents a treatise intended by Aristotle to be read as a 
unity. And in any case, Sarah Broadie, independently of textual concerns, has already 
shown that reading Aristotle’s extant ethical writings together rather than focusing on the 
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discussion of the evidence of the catalogs for the transmission of the ethical treatises. 
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interpretation of either the NE or EE exclusively can be very fruitful.14 Here, I shall 
examine certain ideas and arguments set forward in the NE as it has been handed down to 
us. But I shall not assume from the start that it offers a fully consistent or fully coherent 
system, both because of my skepticism about its status as a unity created by Aristotle, and 
also for some of the reasons that I shall put forward now in a critical discussion of the 
principle of charity. 
 
 
Charity as an Interpretive Principle 
 
The principle of charity is often associated with Donald Davidson’s 1973 paper, “Radical 
Interpretation,” which proposes a method for making sense of written statements or 
utterances in the imagined absence of any prior knowledge of their meaning (this is the 
sense in which “radical” is meant, drawing on Quine’s use of the same term in the phrase 
“radical translation”).15 Davidson proposes interpreting statements in a way that renders 
them true, “as often as plausibly possible,” arguing that doing so facilitates interpretation 
by constraining interpretation in the direction of the truth and intelligibility, as it were.16 
Davidson further claims that such a style of interpretation does not depend upon the 
presumption of rationality, since a thinker may reasonably be judged irrational if his 
views simply cannot be interpreted as “largely consistent and true by our own 
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 Davidson (1973) 324. 
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standards.”17 Yet while Davidson thus claims that his interpretive method does not 
depend upon the presumption of rationality, he seems to view the failure to reach an 
interpretation yielding true and consistent claims as exceptional. And elsewhere he does 
in fact speak of himself as advocating “the principle of charity.”18 Yet if one formulates 
some idealized rationality, and favors interpretations that preserve that kind of rationality, 
then this ascribes some particular exercise of rationality to a thinker in advance, whereas 
there might well be failures of rationality that can only be detected if such assumptions 
are set aside. 
Historians of ancient philosophy, at any rate, tend to invoke the principle of charity to 
justify favoring interpretations that yield valid deductive or syllogistic arguments,19 or 
consistency among a set of claims.20 Thus, in the name of charity, they tend to favor 
interpretations that yield successful exercises of certain aspects of reason. And whereas 
Davidson thinks that the principle of charity can ground ascriptions of true statements, 
historians of ancient philosophy often defer the question of truth, and instead rely on 
charity to justify interpretations that preserve consistency and deductive validity in 
particular. But this is to assume a priori success in exercising certain aspects of 
rationality. Yet given the extreme demands of the kind of idealized rationality against 
which charity can in principle be used to measure any possible interpretation, there do not 
appear to be any a priori grounds for preferring an interpretation that preserves one 
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particular feature of such an idealized rationality over another—consistency over truth, 
for example. Or, to give another example, there is no a priori reason to suppose that a 
philosopher favors deductive rationality over less formal argument.  
Furthermore, Michael Frede has argued that the historian of philosophy will ask, “not 
whether the view is true or the reasons are adequate, but rather whether the view would 
have seemed to be true or plausible at the time, whether at that point in the past the 
reasons offered would have been taken to be adequate or conclusive.”21 This, itself, runs 
contrary to Davidson’s notion of radical interpretation, which supposes that an interpreter 
ought so far as possible to interpret views as true and consistent according to his own 
standards. Frede is advocating something like historically specific charity, where the 
arguments a philosopher makes for some view should be taken seriously in terms of the 
standards of philosophy at the time they were worked out. Furthermore, while Frede 
favors interpretations that take a philosopher’s own arguments seriously on their own 
terms, he nevertheless admits that at times historically specific “extra-philosophical” 
considerations may offer the best explanation for why a philosopher held some view—if, 
for example, the argument offered for that view is one that would not have been 
persuasive according to the canons of that time.22 It is hard to see on what grounds 
someone would prefer Davidson’s approach to interpretation over Frede’s, given that 
historical factors quite clearly play a role in the kinds of arguments that are found 
convincing. (To see this, simply imagine how interpreters would regard the NE if it had 
been written today.) 
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Setting aside the more abstract questions about the principle of charity, applying the 
principle of charity to Aristotle in particular raises some specific problems. There are in 
fact some grounds for supposing that Aristotle regards deductive or syllogistic argument 
and consistency as marks of rationality. I shall take consistency first. It is true that 
Aristotle himself argues for the principle of non-contradiction (PNC)—that something 
cannot both be true and false at the same time and in the same respect (Metaphysics 
IV.4). Thus one might suppose that there are particularly good grounds for interpreting 
Aristotle’s own views as avoiding contradiction with one another. Nevertheless, some 
mental labor is required for any speaker or writer to satisfy the demands of PNC, 
especially when that writer is a philosopher working through dense and difficult 
problems, and advancing claims that require considerable reflection to grasp fully or to 
see what they imply. And given some economy of mental effort, the strict demands of 
PNC upon a series of related propositions may not always get the full attention that some 
historians of ancient philosophy might suppose them to deserve. Furthermore, it has been 
plausibly suggested that the extant treatises of Aristotle as we have them were the product 
of a process of continuous revision extending over a period of time.23 If this hypothesis is 
accurate, then inconsistent beliefs held by Aristotle at different times might make their 
way into a single treatise. Thus the question of the origin of a text cannot be separated 
from the justifiable principles of its interpretation.   
Charity is also sometimes used to justify a style of interpretation that yields deductive 
or syllogistic arguments, in which premises are meant to guarantee the conclusion, and in 
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which that particular standard of inferential certainty is assumed.24 Furthermore, charity 
is sometimes used to defend a style of interpretation that not only yields deductive or 
syllogistic arguments, but valid deductions where the premises do indeed guarantee the 
conclusion.25 While it is true that Aristotle supposes scientific knowledge to be structured 
deductively,26 this is hardly sufficient to show that this is the kind of reasoning that he 
actually uses in the extant treatises. In any case, scholars generally agree that the Topics 
was originally ignorant of syllogistic, so that at one point in his intellectual biography, at 
any rate, Aristotle apparently did not yet know syllogistic.27 And furthermore, many 
scholars have observed that in practice Aristotle rarely argues in syllogisms.28  What 
distinguishes deductive or syllogistic inference is that the premises by themselves 
guarantee the conclusion. Yet clearly not all arguments are of this kind. In particular, it is 
quite possible for a certain thesis to have some plausibility prior to any explicit argument 
made on its behalf, and for the considerations given in its defense to be offered because 
they seem to provide some additional support for that conclusion over and above the 
intuitive or prima facie plausibility of that thesis. Such considerations might support 
rather than guarantee the thesis that they are used to defend, or even seek to offer a 
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tentative and hypothesized explanation for a thesis already known to be true. Thus there 
is good reason to be skeptical of interpretations of Aristotle that rely on the presumption 
that all explicit arguments are meant to be syllogistic or deductive. Furthermore, 
arguments may sometimes be offered to explain why something is true, which is already 
known to be true, rather than to prove that it is true. And while explanation and proof 
need not be mutually exclusive aims of argument, at least the aim of explanation does not 
seem to imply the aim of offering a deductively valid proof.  
Some have, in fact, tried to explain why Aristotle rarely offers deductive arguments. 
Barnes suggests that Aristotle’s theory of scientific knowledge is intended to explain a 
didactic procedure for presenting finalized knowledge about some subject, whereas the 
extant treatises aim to inquire rather than to instruct.29 And Reviel Netz observes that 
Aristotle’s habit of argument is to state a thesis first, and then provide considerations that 
support that thesis.30 Of course, simply because Aristotle tends to state a thesis first, this 
does not at all guarantee that he regards the thesis as plausible by itself apart from the 
argument that follows it. And a syllogism is of course still a syllogism, even if it is 
presented conclusion-first. Nevertheless, Netz has tried to show that when Aristotle’s 
backward-facing arguments are rearranged with the premises put first and the conclusion 
stated later, the arguments look weaker—and the premises do not seem to guarantee the 
conclusion. Netz explains this by claiming that Aristotle’s order of presentation puts the 
reader’s primary attention on the thesis, and puts less weight on the argument which 
follows. To an interpreter looking for a deductive inference, this may seem like a 
disingenuous way of presenting arguments. On the other hand, if Aristotle is aware that 
                                                 
29
 Barnes (1969). 
30
 Netz (2001). 
24 
 
he is not always in a position to offer deductive proofs, then this style of argument can be 
defended as correct for his position as an inquirer working through problems rather than 
as a master presenting a finalized axiomatic science. 
To make the point more general, consistency among a set of propositions and a 
deductive style of argument from known or hypothesized premises to conclusions 
guaranteed by those premises, are two possible features of an idealized rationality among 
a number of others, and there is no prima facie reason to suppose that Aristotle’s extant 
texts adhere more strictly to these two aspects of such rationality than others. And one is 
not necessarily justified in appealing to Aristotle’s own view of rationality as a final 
authority here either, since his practice of argument and his theory of knowledge need not 
coincide with one another. Indeed, adhering rigidly to a theory or definition when other 
evidence contradicts that theory is surely a mark of irrationality. Of course, in this case, 
the rational thing might be to examine such evidence more closely, reject the theory, or 
modify it in some way that accounts for the new evidence. But this would already 
presuppose that consistency were itself favored over other aims in an economy of mental 





Now that I have discussed some of my underlying views about how one is justified in 
interpreting Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, I shall briefly describe the aims of my 
chapters, as well as the overall plan of this dissertation. The aim of the first chapter is to 
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draw some conclusions about Aristotle’s method, which I shall use later, in order to better 
make sense of the difficult argument that Aristotle offers at NE I.1099a31-b8 for the 
value of the external goods. Thus in the first chapter, I consider Aristotle’s own accounts 
of his method, as well as his actual, on-the-ground practice of method in Nicomachean 
Ethics I. First, I try to get clear on the right way to think about Aristotle’s method—
emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between Aristotle’s own account of his 
method, and how he actually forms arguments, rather than simply assuming that his 
theory and practice of method coincide. Next, I consider Aristotle’s own accounts of 
three different methods that scholars have often supposed are general, in the sense that 
they are not limited to use in a single treatise—the scientific, dialectical, and endoxic 
methods. Then, I consider Aristotle’s own remarks on method within in NE I—and 
whether these remarks justify viewing his method as adhering to one of these general 
methods. Finally, I examine Aristotle’s own on-the-ground method of arguing for 
conclusions in NE I. Rather than trying to develop a comprehensive account of Aristotle’s 
theory and practice of method in NE I, however, I focus both on how he regards himself 
as drawing upon the views of others, and also on how he actually does so. The aim here is 
to draw some general conclusions that can be used in chapter 2 in order to assess whether 
Aristotle is relying on the beliefs of others to justify his assertion that eudaimonia needs 
the external goods. 
In an appendix to the first chapter, I then extend the work of the chapter proper into a 
detailed consideration of the endoxic method and its application in NE VII. In the second 
part of the appendix, I then consider Aristotle’s treatment of Solon’s dictum that no man 
can be reckoned happy until he has died (NE I.1100a10 ff). My examination of 
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Aristotle’s NE VII application of the endoxic method to akrasia supports some of my 
earlier chapter 1 conclusions about the importance of distinguishing Aristotle’s own 
accounts of method from his practice of method. Thus I show that attempts to find a 
general statement of Aristotle’s philosophical method at NE VII.1145b2-7 are baseless. 
Indeed, even when Aristotle enumerates a series of endoxa initially at NE VII.1145b8-20, 
they seem to be shaped by his own view of the subject, as he works it out elsewhere 
without any explicit reliance upon endoxa. And throughout his inquiry into akrasia, 
Aristotle draws upon his own views from elsewhere. But if both the data, and the process 
for developing a view from that data, are informed by Aristotle’s own view of the 
question at hand, then the endoxic procedure described at NE VII.1145b2-7 does not 
seem to constrain Aristotle’s argument much. In the second part of the appendix, this 
suggestion is confirmed by an analysis of Aristotle’s treatment of Solon’s dictum—which 
shows Aristotle’s willingness to reinterpret a particular endoxon in a way that reduces its 





In the second chapter, I apply my observations about Aristotle’s method to examining his 
argument for the claim that eudaimonia needs the external goods—the “external goods 
requirement,” as I call it. In particular, I ask why Aristotle regards such goods as 
necessary for eudaimonia, since his argument at 1099a31-b8 is notoriously obscure. Is 
Aristotle able to defend the external goods requirement strictly in terms of his formal 
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definition of eudaimonia? Or is the belief that such things are necessary for eudaimonia 
itself an endoxon—a reputable opinion potentially forming the premise of a dialectical 
syllogism? Or does Aristotle have some stronger reason for supposing that such things 
are good—which cannot be explained either in terms of his formal definition of 
eudaimonia as a kind of rational activity, or in terms of his dialectical or endoxic 
method?  
Aristotle does several things to reveal how he regards the external goods requirement. 
For one thing, Aristotle’s introduction of the external goods, and his formal argument for 
eudaimonia’s need for such goods, both occur within an examination of eudaimonia that 
Aristotle describes as “not only from our conclusion, but also from what has been said 
about happiness” (1098b9-11). And not only does Aristotle frame this whole section of 
NE I in this way, his formal argument for the external goods requirement also occurs as 
the final element in a series of brief discussions of legomena about eudaimonia, each of 
which he either uses to support his definition of eudaimonia, or, failing that, rejects. Thus 
the context for the argument leads one to expect Aristotle to treat the external goods 
requirement as a legomenon, which he will either use to support his definition of 
eudaimonia or set aside. 
Yet despite this seemingly endoxic context, the external goods requirement itself is 
not stated in the manner typical of endoxa. After rejecting the separation of different 
goods expressed in the Delian epigram, and saying “all of these belong to the best 
activities,” Aristotle then shortly declares: “But nevertheless there is evidently also 
further need of the external goods, just as we have said” (φαίνεται δ’ ὅµως καὶ τῶν 
ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν piροσδεοµένη, καθάpiερ εἴpiοµεν) (1099a29-32). Yet Aristotle has not 
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said this, despite what he claims here, and more importantly for my purposes, endoxa are 
subject to modification or rejection, yet something that is “evident” is apparently not 
provisional in this way.  
One might suppose that Aristotle is simply relying upon the (unstated) universal 
agreement that such goods are needed for eudaimonia. Yet, as I show in chapter 1, 
Aristotle normally relies upon universal agreement only to support a schematic and pre-
philosophical claim, not in order to support a claim about the substance of his own theory 
in its fully worked-out specificity. Why then, does Aristotle, at least initially, give an 
argument that draws on his formal definition of eudaimonia? This seems to imply that the 
initial statement that the need for such goods is evident is also made in terms of that 
formal definition. Yet Aristotle in fact vacillates between theory-specific and theory-
independent justifications for the initial claim, creating some confusion about the precise 
authority on which it rests. This is the puzzle I work on in chapter 2. At stake here, is the 
general question of how Aristotle justifies ethical claims, and more specifically what 





While in chapter 2 I consider the nature of the argument that Aristotle actually advances 
at NE 1099a31-b8 for the claim that eudaimonia “has further need” for the external 
goods, in chapter 3 I consider the kind of argument available to Aristotle at 1099a31-b8 
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in terms of the account of action that he works out in the books that follow. Thus this 
chapter at points goes beyond Aristotle’s own text in ways that chapter 2 does not.  
Chapter 2 argues that Aristotle recognizes a non-instrumental contribution of the 
external goods to eudaimonia, and—furthermore—that he recognizes that their value 
cannot be explained strictly in terms of promoting excellent activity. In chapter 3, I ask 
instead just how far Aristotle’s account of action can go in explaining how things beyond 
the control of an agent can impinge upon the worth of his activity. In particular, I ask, is 
there room for some non-instrumental contribution of things outside an agent’s control to 
his excellent practical activity?  
If eudaimonia consists in excellent practical activity, and if eudaimonia is both a final 
and self-sufficient good, then the external goods seemingly can only contribute value to 
eudaimonia if that contribution is in some way mediated through activity. The aim of this 
chapter, then, is to interpret Aristotle’s account of action with a view to explaining what 
role those things outside the control of the virtuous agent play in determining the worth 
of such action. Thus here, especially, I draw on a distinction between the external goods 
on Aristotle’s usage, and the external things in a broader sense—including all those 
things that lie outside of an agent’s full control and yet impinge upon his ability to realize 
excellent practical activity or eudaimonia. While Aristotle never explicitly acknowledges 
a broader category of this sort within his philosophical terminology, nevertheless he does 
occasionally seem to have something like this broad category in mind as a concern—as, 
for example, when he remarks that the blessed man will never become “wretched” 
(ἄθλιος) (I.1100b34). That is, this remark seems to amount to the claim that nothing 
beyond the control of the blessed man can render him wretched, and thus implicitly refers 
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to this broader category of those things beyond the control of a person and what influence 
they can have upon his life.  
In chapter 3, then, I try to work out answers to several distinct questions—first, what 
kinds of external things (in the broad sense) does Aristotle reckon excellent practical 
activity to rely upon? Second, why does Aristotle regard virtuous action as relying upon 
such things? Namely, what value do these kinds of things have to contribute to such 
activity? Third, how do the external goods in particular contribute worth to virtuous 
action? It is this final question that in essence provides a solution to the problem posed 
earlier—of what kind of explanation for eudaimonia’s need for the external good is 





In my fourth chapter, I assess the NE’s position on moral luck—a notion developed by 
Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in a pair of papers delivered jointly in 1976. Moral 
luck picks out whatever area of moral worth is subject to luck, in the specific sense that it 
falls outside of an agent’s control. Nagel and Williams argue that moral luck is in tension 
with the very idea of morality, since morality is normally defined as a category of value 
that is both supremely valuable and also equally accessible to all. They regard this 
aspiration as attractive, but ultimately unfulfilled and unfulfillable. If correct, their 
analysis of moral luck exposes the impossibility of moral worth to realize its pretension 
to offer a category of value that is at once supreme and equally accessible to all. In 
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particular, if moral worth depends upon forces outside of one’s control, then it cannot be 
equally accessible to all.  
Aristotle, however, has no such category of value that aspires to be both equally 
accessible to all and at the same time of supreme worth. He regards eudaimonia as 
supreme, but he does not suppose it to be equally accessible to all—excluding women, 
children, and slaves from realizing the excellent rational activity that brings about 
eudaimonia, and furthermore requiring that an agent possess external goods in order to 
realize various particular kinds of excellent practical activity. Thus one may only speak 
loosely of Aristotle as having a position on moral luck at all. And, accordingly, asking 
about Aristotle’s position on moral luck amounts to posing a broad question, about the 
degree to which Aristotle supposes his various categories of value to stand outside of the 
agent’s control. One must, then, examine Aristotle’s categories of value on their own 
terms. 
Several scholars have already tried to assess Aristotle’s position on moral luck. Yet 
each of these attempts is marred by a failure to begin from Aristotle’s own categories of 
value. After a critical examination of previous studies of Aristotle’s position on moral 
luck, I turn to examining the different kinds of value that Aristotle distinguishes, and ask 
both how closely each approximates moral worth, and to what degree Aristotle regards 




Chapter 1: Aristotle’s Theory and Practice of Method in NE I 
 
 
How to Think About Aristotle’s Method 
 
Developing a picture of Aristotle’s method in the NE is crucial for my project, since often 
the content of a particular theory is inseparable from the argument used to defend it. In 
particular, when I turn to a more focused examination of the external goods in the next 
chapter, it will become clear that it makes a great deal of difference whether Aristotle (1) 
derives the content of the external goods from his definition of eudaimonia as virtuous 
activity, (2) adopts some kind of conventional or endoxic view of their content, or (3) 
tries to fuse an explanation of their value derived from his own theory of eudaimonia 
together with an extra-theoretical account of their value. Thus it is important to think 
about Aristotle’s method for drawing on endoxa and legomena, and the views of others 
more generally, before proceeding to try to give an account of his view about the role of 
the external goods in his theory of eudaimonia. I shall begin by considering how one 
ought to develop an account of Aristotle’s method before attempting to do so. There are 
several different questions one can ask, which are sometimes conflated in work on 
Aristotle: 
 
1) How does Aristotle justify particular claims that he puts forward? (Aristotle’s 
own explicit explanation for why he holds specific views.) 
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2) What unexpressed assumptions, motives, and arguments explain why Aristotle 
puts forward particular claims? (Scholarly interpretation of why Aristotle holds 
certain views.) 
3) How does Aristotle explain his own method? What kind of truth and accuracy 
does Aristotle claim to attribute to particular kinds of arguments and data? More 
broadly, how does Aristotle explain his approach to solving problems and 
developing theories? (Aristotle’s own account of his method of argument.) 
4) What patterns actually occur in Aristotle’s technique of argument? To what extent 
does he actually depend on particular kinds of data? How does Aristotle tend to 
form arguments? What kinds of things does he tend to assume? What kind of 
status does he grant to the views of other philosophers? To poets? To common 
wisdom? (Scholarly account of Aristotle’s method of argument.) 
 
These questions are not always fully separable, but it is worth distinguishing them 
whenever possible, since an answer to one question does not necessarily indicate an 
answer to another. In this way I shall work to avoid what I take to be a common scholarly 
error in assuming that an answer to one question (e.g., Aristotle’s own theory of method) 
automatically answers another (e.g., Aristotle’s actual practice of method). Now, I shall 
expand on what I have in mind with each of these questions, using the numbering that I 
just introduced to refer back to the compressed formulations above. 
(1) Much of the time, Aristotle gives an explicit justification for a thesis that he puts 
forward, and when he does I shall look at this argument before trying to give second-
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order explanations for his view.31 If one looks at Aristotle’s actual arguments on their 
own terms, his actual philosophical technique in the NE seems to be more varied than his 
remarks about method would suggest.32 Thus relying on Aristotle’s own remarks on 
method might lead one to misinterpret Aristotle’s explicit arguments so as to make them 
follow his stated method. For example, it is often observed that Aristotle rarely ever 
presents his own arguments in syllogistic form.33 The apparent absence of such 
syllogistic reasoning ought to raise a question about whether, when Aristotle argues for a 
particular thesis, he means to give a deductive proof of that thesis, rather than something 
weaker—namely, supporting considerations.34 Close attention to Aristotle’s use of 
language—especially particles such as adverbs indicating logical relations—is crucial 
here. Thus the particle δή, for example, can mean “therefore,” thereby indicating that a 
conclusion is being drawn from what precedes; on the other hand, it can also mean 
something more like “indeed,” indicating that the remark it qualifies confirms or 
corresponds to what that precedes it, not that it offers a syllogistic conclusion of what 
precedes.35 To whatever extent is possible, one must take Aristotle’s arguments on their 
own terms in the language in which they are expressed, and remain agnostic about their 
relation to his theory of method until there is at least some reason to suppose the two 
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coincide. This is especially true when there is no explicit textual warrant for supposing 
that Aristotle means to adhere to a particular theory of method in a given treatise. 
(2) In some cases, however, when Aristotle is putting forward a particular thesis, he 
either fails to give an explicit justification for it at all, or such justification as he provides 
seems inadequate to explain fully why he accepts it—and no other relevant view 
expressed by Aristotle seems to complete the argument. In such cases it is reasonable to 
suppose that Aristotle might have some unexpressed motive or argument for holding that 
thesis. This is how Wolfgang Mann understands Aristotle’s Categories.36 Although 
Aristotle does not refer explicitly to the views of other philosophers in that work, Mann 
proposes that it is best understood as a critical engagement with his predecessors, and 
especially with Plato’s metaphysics. It is also possible that the reason a philosopher holds 
a particular view is not a philosophical reason at all. Thus Michael Frede speaks of cases 
in which the reasons that a philosopher offers explicitly to justify a view are inadequate 
even by the standards of the philosophy of his own time, and a historian of philosophy is 
thus justified in explaining that view as being held for “extra-philosophical” reasons.37 To 
give a particularly obvious example, Aristotle probably reached the conclusion that some 
men are slaves by nature partly or entirely under the influence of the prejudices of his 
own age, rather than purely because of the force of his own arguments.  
(3) Aristotle also gives his own accounts of different ways that a philosopher can 
acquire or grasp knowledge, though interpretations of what such accounts amount to 
remain disputed. I shall use the term “method” broadly, since the English word normally 
implies a procedure of inquiry rather than a manner of grasping perfected or finalized 
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knowledge—and it is sometimes disputed whether a particular account of method that 
Aristotle offers is of the first or the second type. First, Aristotle offers methods not 
intended to describe his approach to any one subject or inquiry. Thus within the texts 
comprising the Organon, the Posterior Analytics describes a scientific method, and the 
Topics a dialectical method. And, outside of the Organon, at NE VII.1145b2-7 Aristotle 
describes a method for using endoxa to develop a view and then uses that method to 
investigate akrasia, weakness of the will. It is disputed, however, whether this endoxic 
method coincides with the dialectical method that Aristotle describes in the Topics. Thus 
in working with Aristotle’s remarks on method the scholar faces several problems: 
interpreting these remarks; determining the relation between Aristotle’s theories of 
method that are not specific to any one inquiry (scientific, dialectical, endoxic), and those 
that are (the theory of method of the NE); and then finally figuring out what Aristotle’s 
remarks on method tell us and what they fail to tell us about how Aristotle actually argues 
in any particular work. 
(4) Scholars may also try to draw their own conclusions about Aristotle’s method of 
argument throughout his writings, which may or may not coincide with Aristotle’s own 
formal accounts of method. Thus Reviel Netz, for example, observes that Aristotle 
usually puts forward a thesis first, and then proceeds to offer a justification for that 
thesis.38 This is a habit of argument that Aristotle himself never comments upon directly, 
so that if a scholar confined himself to Aristotle’s remarks on his method, he would have 
to be silent on this. I shall also argue here that throughout NE I Aristotle often relies upon 
universal agreement to defend an as-yet-unspecified form of some claim. And, while this 
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habit partly corresponds to a remark that Aristotle makes about the reliability of universal 
consensus at NE X.1172b36-1173a1, it is still separable from that remark. Thus, Aristotle 
might have some habits in how he draws upon universal consensus that can only be 
detected by observing specific arguments of this kind that he advances, which are passed 
over completely in his own characterization of his method. In this way, the scholar’s 
understanding of Aristotle’s technique of argument and Aristotle’s own account of his 
method are likely to be mutually illuminating, but it is misguided to assume a simple 
identity between the two and then to interpret particular arguments according to this 
alleged identity.  
There are, of course, cases in which the distinction between theory and practice of 
method is less hard than others. In some cases, for example, it is clear that Aristotle is 
self-consciously using a method that he has described, in which case it is reasonable to 
consider Aristotle’s theory and practice of method together. Thus the well-known NE VII 
inquiry into akrasia, for example, states a method, and then very clearly follows at least 
some features of that method. And the NE I “things said” section (1098b9 ff.) says that it 
will inquire into its subject using the views of others, and it in fact does so. Furthermore, 
it is sometimes impossible to reach a satisfactory interpretation of an unclear argument or 
a vague remark on method without seeking some corroborating support in actual 
argument. Thus in such cases, when I think the independent evidence is inadequate, I 
shall interpret a remark on method with reference to an argument, or an argument with 




This discussion so far has set aside the question of the nature and origin of Aristotle’s 
texts, but this adds another important consideration for how best to interpret Aristotle’s 
treatises. Unfortunately, their origin is obscure, and must be judged largely on the basis 
of the internal evidence of the texts themselves. But if they are understood as “working 
drafts” in which Aristotle thought through a series of connected problems, then this tends 
to presuppose a certain method too.39 While historians of philosophy are often hesitant to 
engage in this line of thinking, from this point of view, Aristotle’s day-to-day habits of 
writing and constructing his treatises might have played just as important a role in 
determining the nature of those texts and his arguments, as his own theory of method. 
Furthermore, if certain individual treatises were unified by a later editor, then this too 
changes how one should understand the train of argument in a given text, and the degree 
of consistency one should expect between different parts of a treatise.40 If, on the other 
hand, they are supposed to be relatively polished treatises joined together by Aristotle 
himself, then this justifies a different kind of interpretation. I very briefly dealt with the 
problems posed by the text of the Nicomachean Ethics in the introduction. But a fuller 
study of the textual transmission of the Nicomachean Ethics would be useful in 
determining how it is best to be interpreted. 
This examination into Aristotle’s method in the first chapter will ultimately serve as a 
means to understanding his view about the role of the external goods in eudaimonia more 
clearly. Aristotle remarks that it is “evident” that eudaimonia needs the external goods 
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(1099a31-2). But why is it evident? Does this mean that Aristotle is simply borrowing a 
received view here?41 This suggestion is made more reasonable, of course, by the obvious 
fact that most people do in fact regard such things as valuable. If this is right, does the 
strength of this received view provide the sole authority for Aristotle’s endorsement of 
this claim? Aristotle also first introduces the tripartite division of goods at 1098b12-14 
within a section of the NE that considers eudaimonia “from the things that are said” 
beginning just prior at 1098b9, strengthening the impression that he regards the alleged 
value of the external goods as resting upon the views of others. For this reason, it is 
crucial to determine both how Aristotle sees himself as relying upon the views of others, 
and how—in his practice of argument—he actually does draw upon such views. Thus my 
chief aim here is to delineate more clearly the relation between Aristotle’s theories, and 
the views of others. When, if ever, do the views of others help to form the substance of 
Aristotle’s own theories? If this does happen, does Aristotle’s formal account of his own 
method leave room for such integration of the views of others into his theories? Or does 
he suppose himself to be drawing his conclusions independently of such views? It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to undertake a general examination of Aristotle’s 
practice of method. Thus—after considering Aristotle’s own account of his method, both 
within the Organon and also the NE—I shall consider specifically how Aristotle draws 
on the views of others in order to develop the substance of his own theories. 
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Aristotle’s Own Accounts of the Scientific, Dialectical, and Endoxic Methods 
 
Scholars often suppose that Aristotle’s investigations follow one of three methods that he 
himself describes. Thus, treatises are often identified as following either the scientific 
method of the Posterior Analytics, or the dialectical method of the Topics. And, since G. 
E. L. Owen’s well-known 1961 article on the method described in the beginning of NE 
VII, scholars have also sometimes identified treatises as following this method, which is 
sometimes understood as a particular type of dialectical method, sometimes not. The 
nature of each of these three methods—scientific, dialectical, and endoxic—is a subject 
of debate in contemporary Aristotle studies.  
Scholars also disagree about whether Aristotle intends each of these methods to 
describe a method that he pursues in his extant investigations, or rather an ingredient or 
aspect of such investigation, or even simply a theory of how one grasps a body of 
knowledge that has already been acquired. Yet very often it is simply assumed that the 
extant Aristotelian treatises must adhere to one of these methods. Thus Burnet, for 
example, takes the Nicomachean Ethics to be a dialectical work.42 And likewise another 
recent scholar insists that it is not dialectical, but rather patterned off of the method 
described in the Posterior Analytics (often dubbed the scientific method)—thus implicitly 
assuming that the Topics or the Posterior Analytics provides the model for Aristotle’s 
method in a particular treatise.43  
In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle describes a science as an axiomatized body of 
knowledge consisting in a set of explanatory syllogisms (that is, deductions from known 
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premises) known as demonstrations (sing., ἀpiόδειξις). This body of knowledge 
corresponds to a state of knowledge—i.e, scientific knowledge. Several criteria 
distinguish the demonstration from other syllogisms: the premises must be true, primary, 
immediate, better known than, prior to, and explanatory of the conclusion (συµpiέρασµα) 
(PA I.71b18-22). Aristotle supposes that reason (nous) may directly grasp such premises 
through induction (PA II.100b3-5).  
Scholars disagree on whether Aristotle means the Posterior Analytics to describe his 
method in his extant philosophical investigations. Jonathan Barnes, for example, has 
repeatedly argued that demonstration is meant to describe the perfected state of 
knowledge that results from a completed investigation, rather than the process of 
investigation itself.44 If Barnes is right, then there is an explanation for why syllogistic 
reasoning generally and demonstration in particular seem to be absent from the extant 
treatises. A general solution to this issue lies well beyond the scope of the present project. 
My concern in the next section, rather, will be to examine Aristotle’s remarks on method 
in the Nicomachean Method and to assess whether his own account of his method in the 
NE correspond to the scientific, endoxic, or dialectic methods, or whether instead 
Aristotle describes himself as using a method peculiar to the NE. This approach is similar 
to that taken by some recent scholars who, for example, have argued that the 
Nicomachean Ethics approximates the method of the Posterior Analytics.45  
Aristotle undertakes a systematic treatment of dialectic in the Topics, and refers to 
dialectic throughout his writings. He describes dialectic as able to argue about any topic 
and deal with any subject matter (I.101a1-3). He also remarks that it is unable to offer the 
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same definitive proof appropriate to philosophy proper (I.105b30-31). In both the Topics 
and the Sophistic Refutations, Aristotle says that dialectic argument is “from reputable 
opinions [ἐξ ἐνδόξων].”46  
Just as there is a scientific syllogism (i.e., demonstration or ἀpiόδειξις), so too there is 
a kind of dialectical syllogism. While a demonstration is from true and primary premises 
(ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ piρώτων), a dialectical syllogism is from reputable opinions (ἐξ 
ἐνδόξων). One major difficulty in understanding Aristotle’s notion of a dialectical 
syllogism, however, is that Aristotle presents no theory of syllogistic in the Topics—that 
is, of the formal features that make syllogisms into valid deductions, which are worked 
out in the Prior Analytics. And scholars generally agree that when Aristotle uses 
συλλογισµός in the Topics, he does so either not in the technical sense developed in the 
Prior Analytics, or that (if it does carry such a technical sense) these instances are later 
additions to the Topics rather than part of its deep fabric.47 But if Aristotle does not rely 
upon a theory of deductive inference in the Topics, then it is unclear what standard of 
validity he has in mind. (Aristotle also mentions dialectical induction at Topics I.105a10-
19, but this is generally taken to be a less important aspect of his theory of dialectic.)  
One specific aspect of Aristotle’s account of dialectic that is useful for thinking about 
his own practice of method is that of pressing one’s interlocutor to reformulate his views 
(Topics I.101a33-4). This remark falls within Aristotle’s discussion of the third of three 
different uses of dialectic—encounters with people (the other two being intellectual 
exercise and philosophy). The idea seems to be that in encountering people in debate, the 
dialectician can press his interlocutors to clarify their views, and can then use these 
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refined or reformulated views in order to form arguments for the sought-after conclusion. 
Aristotle thus formalizes a basic technique of Socratic dialectic. Even though this aspect 
of dialectic falls within its use for encounters with people rather than philosophy, one 
might suppose that these boundaries need not be completely hard. Thus one might 
suppose that even if an interlocutor is not actually present—as when a philosopher is 
composing a treatise—the dialectician might clarify the views of his opponents in a 
similar way, though of course without the absent party’s permission. And in fact Aristotle 
does often reformulate and reinterpret others’ views in this way. Thus, for example, after 
describing Solon’s view about the need to judge happiness after death, Aristotle 
reinterprets his position, saying “Solon does not intend this,” of one formulation of 
Solon’s claim (NE 1100a15). This feature of Aristotle’s practice of method is important, 
since if he does in fact reinterpret legomena in order to use them to argue for his own 
theories, then it might compromise their status as at least partially independent from such 
theories.  
Just as scholars debate the relevance of the Posterior Analytics for Aristotle’s 
treatises, so too they debate whether Aristotle means his own account of dialectic to 
describe the method of some of his extant treatises. Thus, as Salmieri has recently pointed 
out, it is not clear that Aristotle thinks that there is such a thing as “dialectical inquiry,” in 
the sense of an inquiry conducted exclusively dialectically.48 Salmieri’s suggestion is 
vindicated by the Topics itself. Here Aristotle remarks that dialectic is useful for 
philosophical knowledge (piρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐpiιστήµας), first of all since it 
allows one to work through puzzles and see what is true and false “more easily” (ῥᾷον) 
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(I.101a34-36). But the comparative qualification “more easily” suggests that it does not 
offer the final word, and thus might serve as one method among others for advancing an 
inquiry. Aristotle also offers a second use of dialectic for philosophical knowledge, for 
reaching the first principles of the particular sciences (I.101a36-b4). Again, this seems to 
leave open the possibility of relying upon some other method for working out the 
implications of those principles after they have been grasped—perhaps demonstration, if 
one follows the Posterior Analytics view.  
Thus Aristotle may not intend any given treatise to be exclusively dialectical, or not, 
since he appears to regard this as one possible aspect of an inquiry. This possibility is 
supported by the fact that Aristotle never characterizes his general method of inquiry in 
any treatise as being dialectical (as far as I know), despite frequent remarks on how he 
intends to pursue some particular inquiry. Nevertheless, scholars very often assume that 
Aristotle’s treatises should be assessed as following either the dialectical method or the 
scientific method. Thus (exemplifying this assumption) one recent scholar insists that the 
NE is not dialectical, but rather patterned off of the method described in the Posterior 
Analytics (usually dubbed the scientific method)—as if these were mutually exclusive 
alternatives.49  
Scholars who do characterize the NE as dialectical also often mean this in different 
senses—as I remarked in the introduction. (And at any rate it is clear that the Topics VIII 
account of dialectic as an exchange between a questioner and an answerer, where the 
questioner poses yes-or-no questions to the answerer cannot describe the substance of 
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Aristotle’s treatises.50) Thus in his well-known commentary, Burnet supposes the 
Nicomachean Ethics to be a dialectical work, in the sense that it is an aporetic 
investigation offering tentative solutions rather than a body of finalized doctrine.51 
Meanwhile, Terence Irwin’s Aristotle’s First Principles posits something he calls “strong 
dialectic” which he regards as able to discover the first principles in any field of inquiry 
whatsoever, and thus as able to ground the claims regarding the function and essence of 
man that undergird the whole argumentative structure of the NE.52 And others regard the 
NE as dialectic in a sense influenced by Aristotle’s NE VII methodological introduction 
to his inquiry into akrasia—to which I will now turn.53 
In addition to Aristotle’s own theory of dialectic as developed in the Topics, scholars 
have also shown great interest in the so-called endoxic method of NE VII. Thus, in his 
1961 article, Owen begins by pointing out that the Posterior Analytics fails to explain the 
actual method of investigation that we find in the Physics, and his solution to this puzzle 
is that Aristotle’s Physics instead follows more closely the endoxic method described at 
NE VII.1145b2-7. The brief account of the endoxic method at NE VII.1145b2-7 is also 
mirrored by Physics IV.211a7-11. I shall say more in a moment about the support that 
scholars offer for understanding the endoxic method as a general method that Aristotle 
relies upon throughout his writings. It might or might not be misleading to describe the 
procedure so briefly described at NE VII as “the endoxic method,” given that scholars do 
not agree whether Aristotle even regards this as a general method of investigation. Thus I 
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do this simply for convenience, rather than implying any prior view about whether 
Aristotle regards himself as using this method once (in the NE VII inquiry into akrasia) 
or hundreds of times throughout his treatises. 
Aristotle introduces the endoxic method at NE VII.1145b2-7 (= EE VI) before using 
it to examine different endoxa about akrasia (“weakness of will”). The method consists 
of a few stages: setting out the endoxa, raising puzzles about them, and then showing all 
or some of them to be correct.54 In the Topics, Aristotle also describes two different ways 
that dialectic can serve philosophy. The first of these resembles the endoxic method. 
Aristotle remarks that, “If we are able to work through the puzzles on both sides of a 
question in each case, we will be able to see what is true and what is false in it more 
easily” (I.101a34-36). The verb διαpiορέω (“to work through puzzles”) is also found in 
Aristotle’s account of the endoxic method. And even though there is no mention of 
endoxa here, Aristotle has already remarked that dialectic draws on endoxa as premises, 
so that it is reasonable to suppose that they are assumed to play a role in creating the 
puzzles referred to here too. The methods differ, however, in a few respects. For one 
thing, Aristotle presents the endoxic method as complete, at least for certain purposes, 
remarking that the matter has been “sufficiently proven” when certain endoxa remain. 
The remark at Topics I.101a34-36 on the other hand implies that by solving puzzles 
dialectic can aid an inquiry of which it is only one part. Thus (to synthesize the NE and 
Topics passages) one might even suppose that only if Aristotle’s aim were a relatively 
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low degree of precision, would he regard an endoxic examination of a subject by itself as 
adequate.  
When describing the endoxic procedure, Aristotle also qualifies it with the remark, 
“just as in other cases” (ὥσpiερ ἐpiὶ τῶν ἄλλων) (VII.1145b3). Thus evidently he is 
describing what he sees himself as doing elsewhere. Yet this remark is ambiguous 
between two possible interpretations: “just as in [certain] other cases,” and “just as in 
[all] other cases.” One scholar has accordingly understood Aristotle in the latter sense, as 
describing the philosophical method here that he uses throughout all of his writings,55 
while another has taken him to be describing his method for ethics.56 But it has recently 
been pointed out that Aristotle uses this same phrase to qualify other, different remarks 
on method, some of which are clearly not intended to describe a universal method for 
investigating any subject whatever.57 Despite this strong philological argument against 
reading absolute generality into this casual phrase, it is sometimes further supposed that if 
Aristotle intends to describe his method here, his actual method must follow it,58 although 
this can of course only be shown by separately examining Aristotle’s remarks on his 
method, and his actual practice of method, and then comparing the two. 
Thus there is little reason to suppose either that Aristotle intends the endoxic method 
as a general account of his method in all his extant philosophical investigations, or that he 
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actually adheres to such a method consistently throughout all his writings. Aristotle 
neither says this in his own account of the endoxic method at NE VII.1145b2-7, nor does 
his reference to working through puzzles (διαpiορεῖν) as one of the uses of dialectic 
imply this (Top. I.101a34-36), nor in any case would his own account of his method by 
itself show anything about his actual practice of method. 
 
 
Aristotle On His Method in the NE: Foundational Knowledge 
  
How does Aristotle view his method in the Nicomachean Ethics? Does he see himself 
simply as using the scientific method of the Posterior Analytics, the dialectical method of 
the Topics, or the endoxic method of NE VII? Or, instead, does he develop an account of 
his own method that is in some way distinctive to the treatise at hand? It should be stated 
clearly from the start that Aristotle never directly answers this question. That is, he offers 
no general characterization of his NE method in terms of the dialectic, endoxic, or 
scientific methods—either as following one of these methods, or as failing to do so.59 
And, as I have already remarked, he in any case gives no direct indication that the 
scientific, dialectical, or endoxic method are intended to describe his procedure within the 
investigations of his treatises. There is thus no good reason to assume from the start that 
Aristotle sees himself as adhering to any of these three methods; rather, this must be 
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determined by examining his more specific remarks in the NE about his method, and 
considering them in relation to his characterization of these three methods. 
In NE I, after mentioning (but not explaining) the distinction between what is familiar 
to us (γνώριµα ἡµῖν) and what is intelligible without qualification (γνώριµα ἁpiλῶς), 
and remarking that the inquiry begins from “what is familiar to us,” Aristotle then says, 
“perhaps then we must begin from what is familiar to us” (1095b3-4). But what does this 
mean in an ethical inquiry? In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle develops a distinction 
between things more familiar to us and more familiar without qualification (71b33-72a5). 
He says that what is familiar to us is prior in respect to us, closer to perception, and more 
particular, while what is knowable without qualification is prior in nature, further from 
perception, and more general. Aristotle again uses this terminology in his preface on 
method in both the Physics and in this passage of the NE, in each case remarking that the 
inquiry begins with what is familiar to us.60 And yet, what is “closer to perception” in 
physics and ethics cannot be the same. In physics those things closer to perception would 
seem to be simply observable facts, although this is an epistemic category that Aristotle 
often does not clearly distinguish (his phainomena can include things that we would not 
class as observable facts, such as ethical endoxa).61 In ethics, however, what is closer to 
perception cannot be merely or straightforwardly a matter of sense perception.  
And in fact Aristotle does give us an indication of how what is “familiar to us” in 
ethics might not merely be what is closer to sense perception. After saying that one must 
begin, “from what familiar to us” (ἀpiὸ τῶν ἡµῖν γνωρίµων), he states its implication: 
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“Therefore the one who is going to listen adequately about fine and just things and 
political matters in general must have been raised well” (I.1095b4-6). Thus when 
Aristotle writes familiar “to us” (ἡµῖν), he evidently means ἡµῖν to refer to both himself 
and also those listeners who are correctly habituated to respond to his lectures. This is, 
then, a crucial refinement of the term “familiar to us” from its meaning in Aristotle’s 
other writings. Aristotle does not seem to have been as preoccupied with the difference 
between ethical knowledge and other kinds of knowledge as moderns are, nor as aware as 
we are of the full range of the problems of developing ethical knowledge on the model of 
other areas of knowledge. In particular, Aristotle does not seem to be primarily 
addressing the relation between ethical knowledge and different cultural systems, as one 
might be tempted to suppose, but rather seems to assume that the Greek conception of 
refinement or excellence is the only one that matters for his readers.  
After saying that the inquiry must begin with what is familiar to us, and that this in 
turn requires that the receptive student has been raised properly, Aristotle goes on to 
explain: “For the fact that [τὸ ὅτι] is the starting point [ἀρχή], and if this should be 
sufficiently apparent, there will be no further need of the reason why [τοῦ διότι]. For 
such a person either has or easily would grasp starting points [ἀρχάς]” (1095b6-8). So 
what are “the fact that” and “the reason why,” exactly? The “fact that” must be a starting 
point in the straightforward sense of something we begin with rather than in the technical 
sense usually translated as “first principle” or “explanatory principle,” since Aristotle 
here contrasts τὸ ὅτι (= ἀρχή) with τὸ διότι. But this still leaves the question of what 




At 1098a33-b4, Aristotle once again refers to “the fact that,” and once again insists 
that it is “a first thing and a starting point,” showing that he is thinking of the same 
concept that he was dealing with earlier at 1095b6-8. Switching to the plural, he then says 
that some starting points may be grasped through induction, some through perception, 
some through “some kind of habituation [ἐθισµῷ τινί],” and still others through other 
means (1098b3-4). It is only “habituation” that Aristotle qualifies with the indefinite 
pronoun, which he often uses when he has not yet fully worked out a concept, and 
sometimes specifically when he plans to elaborate that concept later in a work.62 The 
indefinite pronoun thus leaves Aristotle free to further specify what kind of habituation 
he means. And, in fact, Aristotle does go on to detail the important role of habituation in 
acquiring the virtues in NE II, so that he may well be anticipating this part of his project 
when he indicates that knowledge of certain starting points derives from “some kind of 
habituation.” 
Thus Aristotle’s remark that one must begin “from what is known to us,” in the sense 
of knowledge shared by correctly reared listeners, and his remark that one way to grasp 
facts (in the sense of starting points) is through “some kind of habituation,” where this 
perhaps anticipates the work of NE II, together strongly suggest that Aristotle thinks of 
the substance of his ethical theorizing as being constructed at least in part on the basis of 
foundational knowledge acquired through being habituated in the right kind of political 
and ethical life. It thus seems justifiable to abstract from these two passages to a more 
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 Thus, for example, at NE I.1098a3-4, in the course of the function argument, but before 
reaching his conclusion that eudaimonia is some form of excellent rational activity, Aristotle 
identifies the human good as “some kind of practical [life] of that [part of the soul] possessing 
reason” (piρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος). And, likewise, at NE I.1102a5-6, Aristotle 
summarizes his conclusion so far by saying: “And since eudaimonia is some kind of activity of 
the soul (ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ’ ἀρετὴν τελείαν) in accord with complete virtue…” 
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general Aristotelian notion of foundational ethical knowledge acquired through 
habituation. 
The first question is what the content of such knowledge might be. In the second 
passage, in which Aristotle remarks that some starting points may be grasped “through a 
type of habituation” (ἐθισµῷ τινί) (1098b3-4), he perhaps has in mind knowledge of the 
initial definition of eudaimonia reached through the function argument,63 since this 
passage comes within a methodological discussion appended to the well-known function 
argument.  
The first passage expands on what is familiar to us, by remarking that the listener 
must be correctly reared “about fine and just things and about political matters generally” 
(piερὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν piολιτικῶν) in order to be receptive to his 
treatise. This seems, then, to refer to knowledge about specific kinds of fine and just 
actions.64 This interpretation is supported by an earlier passage in the NE, which remarks 
that “the arguments are from [actions] and concerning [actions]” (1095a3-4). And 
throughout the accounts of the particular virtues (NE III.6 to NE IV), Aristotle often 
defines specific virtues as “for the sake of the fine,” so that it makes sense to think of 
knowledge of “the fine” as playing an important role in specifying the content of 
particular virtuous actions. In fact, at one point, Aristotle even remarks that a friendly act 
should be performed “in reference to the fine and the advantageous” (ἀναφέρων δὲ piρὸς 
τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συµφέρον) (IV.1126b28-30), further supporting the idea that the fine 
specifies action. Aristotle also remarks at one point that the fine and the just “possess 
wandering and variation” (I.1094b14-22), which might also help to explain the 
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 As Burnyeat (1980) 71-72 argues. 
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importance of knowledge acquired through habituation, since apparently propositional 
knowledge is inadequate for ethical purposes.  
One question that arises at this point is what relation there is between endoxa 
(“reputable views”) and “those things familiar to us” in the NE.65 Both kinds of data seem 
in some general way to be commonsense views. And if these data resemble endoxa, one 
might suppose the method that Aristotle describes here to approximate the endoxic 
method of NE VII. What qualifies something as an endoxon are the features of those who 
believe it to be true, however, while what qualifies something as “known to us” is its 
closeness to perception and its degree of particularity—even if the Posterior Analytics 
account of what is familiar to us must be refined for the NE. But even if the formal 
criteria that distinguish endoxa and those things familiar to us are distinct, would these 
two sets of data coincide? Those things which are familiar to us will probably always also 
qualify as reputable opinions, since if the fairly broad group that Aristotle takes to be 
receptive to his lectures can agree on something, then they would qualify it as an endoxon 
according to the definition of endoxa offered at Topics I.100b21-3 where the beliefs of 
“most” are included. But not all endoxa are “closer to perception,” and therefore not all 
endoxa are “familiar to us”; some of them are, rather, views that result from speculative 
philosophical thinking.66  
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 Kraut (2006) 88 supposes that those things familiar to us at NE I.1095a30-b4 simply coincide 
with the endoxa of the endoxic method. Irwin (1988a) 66 likewise interprets “what is familiar to 
us” in the methodological prologue at the beginning of Physics I as indicating that Aristotle sees 
himself as undertaking a dialectical investigation. 
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within the “things said” section—that the goods of the soul are best (I.1098b12-22). And see also 




Perhaps more importantly, though, endoxa and those things familiar to us in ethical 
matters (facts acquired through habituation) would seem to possess different kinds of 
authority, and hence result in a different kind of method for drawing on each type of data. 
According to the NE VII endoxic method, at least, endoxa are subject to reinterpretation 
and rejection, whereas it is not clear that the shared ethical knowledge that Aristotle 
ascribes to the correctly-reared listeners would be tentative in this way. The idea seems to 
be, rather, that such shared beliefs are incomplete in some way and perhaps subject to 
explanation, generalization, or refinement—not that they might simply be rejected in the 
same way that Aristotle rejects the endoxon that the temperate man (σώφρων) and the 
self-controlled man (ἐγκρατής) are the same in his endoxic inquiry into akrasia.67 It is 
also not clear that such foundational knowledge acquired through correct habituation has 
propositional form,68 in the way that endoxa clearly do. Such knowledge might, for 
example, deal with the question of just what actions are right under just what different 
circumstances. Thus there are strong reasons to doubt that such foundational ethical 
knowledge shared by the correctly reared listeners can be assimilated to endoxa.  
This, then, suggests the possibility that Aristotle might draw on the foundational 
knowledge shared through correct habituation, and endoxa to serve distinct roles in 
advancing his inquiry. In fact, as I shall show shortly, Aristotle also draws a contrast 
between legomena (“the things said”) and “the argument” (ὁ λόγος). Thus Aristotle’s NE 
seems to rest on a more flexible method than is sometimes supposed, attributing different 
degrees of reliability and perhaps even different kinds of formal content (propositional, 
non-propositional) to different sources of knowledge about ethical questions.   
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Aristotle On His Method in the NE: The Argument and What is Said 
 
Aristotle twice explicitly draws a distinction between two ways of approaching his 
inquiry: between drawing conclusions (συµpiεραίνεσθαι) or inquiring “from our 
conclusion and from those things from which our argument results” (ἐκ τοῦ 
συµpiεράσµατος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος) and inquiring from what is said (τὰ λεγόµενα).69 I 
am treating these methodological remarks separately, because Aristotle uses this 
distinction to mark a specific section of his inquiry. This raises several questions. What 
kind of premises are used to “draw conclusions” if not legomena? And what criteria does 
Aristotle use to accept and reject things that are said? Does this process of accepting the 
things that are said correspond to dialectic, or the endoxic method, or is it something else 
again? And is the distinction between the two approaches to his inquiry as hard in 
practice as Aristotle’s remarks seem to suggest, particularly when he says he is shifting to 
an inquiry “from what is said”?  
First I shall consider whether an inquiry from legomena is dialectical, endoxic, or 
something else. And the first question here is whether the legomena of NE I can be 
identified with endoxa. In NE VII, Aristotle describes a method involving the 
examination of endoxa, then enumerates a series of views about akrasia, and finally 
summarizes by referring back to them as τὰ λεγόµενα (1145b20). Thus at least 
sometimes he uses these two terms interchangeably. Nevertheless if one follows the bare 
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 Aristotle draws this same distinction at both 1094b19-23 and 1098b9-11. The latter passage is 
where he announces a shift to an inquiry “from the things said about [happiness].” 
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meaning, there are clearly legomena that would not qualify as endoxa (“reputable 
opinions”), in the way that they are defined in the Topics as the views held by either the 
many, most of the wise, or the most respected of the wise (I.100b21-3). Thus (one might 
ask) does Aristotle limit legomena to endoxa in NE I? Indeed, he seems to. For one thing, 
before the so-called “things said section” introduced at NE I.1098b9, Aristotle has 
already remarked earlier on the importance of examining “the most obvious opinions or 
those seeming to have some sense,” rather than any and all views unselectively (1095a28-
30). While these criteria for which legomena are worthy of consideration are different 
than the Topics criteria for endoxa, in both cases Aristotle shows selectivity about which 
views merit consideration. Furthermore, in the things said section itself, he considers one 
opinion that he attributes to the wise (1098b16-18). And when he enumerates a series of 
views about what the good life is, he explains their relevance by saying that many people 
from previous generations and a few respected people have believed different sets of 
them (I.1098b26-29)—groups whose views would also certainly count as endoxa 
according to the criteria given at Topics I.100b21-3. 
Not only does Aristotle say that he is shifting from an inquiry from “the conclusion” 
and “from those things from which the argument comes” to an inquiry “from the things 
said,” but he also continues to draw a contrast between “the argument” and other views 
throughout the section that follows. Thus to this extent, at least, his practice of method 
matches his remarks on method. And “the argument” (ὁ λόγος) must refer specifically to 
the function argument.70 He draws this contrast between “our argument” (ὁ λόγος) and 
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 At 1099b25-28, Aristotle refers to “our argument” (ὁ λόγος) in order to show that “the greatest 
and finest thing” (i.e., eudaimonia) cannot be turned over to luck, and then explicitly summarizes 
the conclusion of the function argument to justify how his argument can show this.  
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another view four times.71 So unlike the endoxic procedure of NE VII.1, Aristotle 
describes himself as relying on two different kinds of considerations.72 This self-
conscious integration of a method that draws on legomena within a supposedly non-
endoxic treatment of the same subject distinguishes the NE I method from the endoxic or 
dialectical methods—at least, if the dialectical method is understood as an exclusively 
dialectical method. Within the endoxic treatment of akrasia, Aristotle does rely upon 
conclusions that he has drawn elsewhere, but he does not do so in the same formalized 
way that we find here—where Aristotle regularly draws a contrast between τὰ λεγόµενα 
and ὁ λόγος. In the exception—the natural digression—Aristotle seems to regard this as 
a supplement or digression to the rest of the discussion rather than an essential part of it 
(NE VII.1147a24-25).73  
In two such cases when Aristotle contrasts his argument with specific legomena, he 
uses the metaphor of harmony to describe this relation.74 Though exactly what this 
metaphor means is unclear, I shall venture a few suggestions. First, harmony is inherently 
relative. Two notes that were flat to the same degree or two correctly pitched notes would 
equally be in harmony, and likewise within some subject domain a pair of similarly 
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 Aristotle uses ὁ λόγος to refer to his own argument, in contrast with the views expressed by 
others, at 1098b20-1, 1098b30-1, 1099b25, and 1100b11. 
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 Aristotle does at one point depart from the endoxic inquiry into akrasia to engage in a “natural” 
inquiry into the same subject (1147a24ff.), but this is a brief digression, and Aristotle does not 
develop the contrast between these two ways of approaching a single subject matter in the same 
way in this case. And elsewhere Aristotle also refers to a view he has shown (1146a8), but in NE 
VII he does not remark in a general way on his method as a fusion of a theory and endoxa or 
legomena. 
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 As Bolton (1991) 22 also supposes, arguing that Aristotle regards the discussion preceding this 
digression as “sufficient for practical purposes.” 
74
 In NE I, Aristotle uses the metaphor of harmony to talk about the relation between his own 
argument and a conventional view at 1098b20-21 and 1098b30-31. At 1098b20-21, the 
conventional view is not explicitly marked as such, but the context (that is, the introductory 
remarks at 1098b9-11) makes it clear that this is how Aristotle views it. 
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mistaken views or a pair of similarly correct views would equally be in harmony. Thus if 
one takes the metaphor seriously, harmony is a remark on the coherence or consistency of 
two views rather than on the absolute justification or grounding of either view. Second, if 
the two elements that Aristotle claims to be in harmony depended on the same argument 
or the same source of authority, then this harmony would be trivial; it would not serve as 
support for Aristotle’s argument. Thus Aristotle presumably believes that “the argument” 
(ὁ λόγος) and the views of others against which he is testing it are at least partly 
independent of one another. I shall consider this problem in more detail when I examine 
Aristotle’s use of the views of others in the final section of this chapter. 
After Aristotle says that he is turning his inquiry to “the things that are said” at NE 
I.1098b9-12, one might expect all of the commonsense views that follow to have an equal 
kind of status as endoxa or legomena. Yet in practice things are more complex. Thus, for 
example, the view “that the happy one lives and does well” (1098b20-21) might count as 
something that is said, as an endoxon, a fact acquired through habituation, a universally 
agreed upon view, or some combination of these. Rather than assuming all such views 
have equal status then, by instead examining Aristotle’s actual handling of a given view 
ascribed to others, anything else he might say about that claim elsewhere, and any 
methodological remarks he makes regarding it, I shall try to give an account of what kind 





Aristotle’s Practice of Method in NE I: Aristotle’s Use of The Views of Others 
 
It is possible to isolate several features of Aristotle’s actual practice for drawing on the 
views of others in NE I. In some cases, Aristotle may deal with some such view twice in 
slightly different ways. In other cases, Aristotle might use two of the features that I 
identify to analyze a single such view in a single go. I use this broad term “view” to avoid 
making a judgment about whether Aristotle is treating a particular datum as an endoxon, 
a fact acquired through habituation, or in some other way, since here my concern is 
primarily with Aristotle’s practice of argument. Furthermore, since sometimes the view 
in question belongs to a poet or philosopher, as opposed to being a widely shared view, I 
will not use the term commonsense or everyday view unless I mean specifically that.75 
Scholars have sometimes characterized the endoxa that Aristotle draws upon in NE VII as 
conventional views, but there is good reason to be skeptical of this—as I shall argue in 
the appendix to this chapter.  
Some features of Aristotle’s treatment of the views of others involve Aristotle’s 
handling of the content of a given view: in certain cases he reinterprets the meaning of 
such a view, and in at least one case Aristotle does not specify whether he understands a 
word that is part of an allegedly widely shared view in its everyday meaning or in its 
meaning within his own technical philosophical vocabulary. Other features have to do 
with how Aristotle explicitly talks about the relationship between a view that he ascribes 
to another and his own theory: sometimes he says that a view “harmonizes” with his 
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 In the so-called “things said” section, Aristotle refers to a view held by “those who 
philosophize,” so it is clear that the legomena here are not limited to popular or conventional 
views (Arist. NE 1098b16-18). Endoxa, however, may include both conventional views held by 
the many, as well as views held by the wise (Topics I.100b21-3). 
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theory, at other times, he says that his own theory explains another person’s view, and in 
at least one case he says both things about a single view.76 Still other features have to do 
with how Aristotle justifies a view without reference to his own theory: often, particularly 
when making a negative claim, Aristotle argues for a view from universal or near 
universal consensus on that view; Aristotle also relies on rhetorical questions and the 
claim that a particular view would be absurd, both of which in some cases may be 
reduced to the claim that no one would disagree with a given proposition.  
First, I shall consider features of Aristotle’s handling of the content of other people’s 
views. Perhaps the most striking such feature is Aristotle’s willingness to reinterpret 
others’ views. When he does this, he sometimes also attributes his reinterpreted version 
of the view to the party who expressed the original version. So, for example, he thinks 
that Solon did not mean that a man counts as happy after he has died, but rather that we 
can only judge a man to have been happy during his life after he has died: “nor does 
Solon intend this” (µηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται) (NE I.1100a15). And Aristotle’s 
argument for modifying Solon’s view is that it would be absurd to call a person happy at 
the time after he has died—regardless of whether one believes that happiness is an 
activity or not. So Aristotle claims that his clarification of Solon’s position does not 
depend specifically on his theory about the nature of eudaimonia, but instead that any 
reasonable person would interpret Solon’s view as he does. If Aristotle is correct that his 
interpretations of Solon’s view is reasonable and would be agreed upon by others, then 
this does not seem to compromise its status as a datum partly independent of his own 
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theory. On the other hand, if he is reinterpreting the view to fit his own theory, but still 
thinks that he can treat it as basically representing another’s view, and as partly 
independent of his own theory, then this would pose a problem for him.  
Another problem arises with Aristotle’s handling of the content of views that he 
supposes are held generally—namely, Aristotle seems to favor conceptually unspecified 
forms of such views. Thus Aristotle says that the view that “the happy man lives well and 
acts well [εὖ piράττειν]” harmonizes with his argument (I.1098b20-22), but the meaning 
of εὖ piράττειν is ambiguous.77 In the language of the NE, piράττω means to act, where 
action is understood to be its own end, in contrast with production (piοίησις), which 
derives its value purely from an end outside of itself (VI.1139b1-4). And if piράττω is 
understood in this particular sense, then this view about the happy man clearly coincides 
neatly with Aristotle’s view. But the everyday meaning of εὖ piράττειν includes both 
acting well and faring well—in the sense of succeeding, prospering, or having good luck. 
And, while Aristotle does include some role for such prosperity and external success in 
eudaimonia, the role for such good luck in eudaimonia is less clear than the way that it 
figures in εὖ piράττειν in the idiomatic sense. And Aristotle possibly excludes certain 
kinds of good luck that do not augment or facilitate virtuous activity in any way, but in its 
everyday sense εὖ piράττειν would not exclude such passively experienced good luck—
such as, perhaps, a gift that is received but not used for any particular virtuous action, or 
receiving an affectionate gesture. 
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 There is a similar problem for εὐpiραξία, which Aristotle uses in the same passage at 1098b22. 
Elsewhere Aristotle uses the term both to mean success dependent on luck (1100a21), and in the 
more technical sense of excellent action (1139a34).  
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Aristotle also gives this claim in slightly different language when he reiterates it in 
the latter part of what he says here: “the fact that the happy man lives well [εὖ ζῆν] and 
acts well [εὖ piράττειν] harmonizes with our argument, since happiness has been said to 
be roughly some kind of good-living [εὐζωία τις] and success [εὐpiραξία]” (1098b20-
22). In the reiterated version, he uses the qualification “some kind” (τις) in order to avoid 
conceptually specifying the two terms that he uses to characterize this allegedly widely 
shared view. That is, he seems intentionally to render the everyday view in a particularly 
open and uncontroversial form. By so doing, he leaves himself room to maneuver and to 
argue in precisely what sense eudaimonia is “some kind of good living and success.” And 
Aristotle does something similar to this elsewhere in NE I, when he remarks that ὀνόµατι 
µὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑpiὸ τῶν piλείστων ὁµολογεῖται (“So it is roughly agreed by most men 
in name”) (I.1095a17-18), arguing that happiness is the highest good on the basis of 
common agreement, but acknowledging that this is an agreement about the word used for 
the highest good, rather than an agreement on the precise content of that concept.  
It is worth distinguishing this kind of view from endoxa. In such cases, Aristotle 
treats a view as universally agreed upon, or nearly so, and therefore as uncontradictable. 
But this is decidedly not the process that he outlines for treating endoxa or legomena in 
his NE VII.1145b2-7 preface on method, where endoxa are subject not only to 
reinterpretation but also to outright rejection. The idea seems to be that Aristotle believes 
that a claim which commands universal agreement is beyond contradiction, regardless of 
whether those who agree to it have a precise understanding of the concepts embedded in 
that claim. So, even if people have a mistaken understanding of what εὐζωία or 
εὐpiραξία is, Aristotle still believes that he can rely on their agreement as support for a 
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conceptually unspecified form of the claim that eudaimonia is “some kind of good living 
and success.”  
Still, this does not resolve whether Aristotle—after he has drawn on a universally 
agreed upon view in a conceptually unspecified form for support—whether after that 
point he puts aside the commonsense conceptions relating to that view and then proceeds 
to examine the question on his own. This is a much thornier issue. In fact, Aristotle seems 
to use εὐpiραξία both as deriving its meaning from the technical concept of piρᾶξις and 
also in its more commonsense meaning of success. Thus one finds Aristotle giving 
εὐpiραξία and τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν piράξει as opposites (1139a34), where he is clearly 
thinking of εὐpiραξία as a kind of praxis in the technical sense. But he also treats 
εὐpiραξία and δυστυχία as opposites, which suggests that he is thinking of εὐpiραξία in 
the broader sense of success that depends on prosperity (1100a21). This slippage between 
the use of the root εὖ piράττω in its technical and everyday senses is a bit problematic, 
since it may suggest that Aristotle in his own thought does not ever develop a clarified 
and stable conception of εὐpiραξία that entirely does away with the connotations of its 
everyday use, but that he instead alternates between a technical and everyday meaning, 
without ever rejecting the everyday meaning or fully explaining how the technical 
meaning might be able to subsume the everyday meaning. It also suggests a more 
fundamental question—namely, does Aristotle really suppose that what one suffers bears 
on one’s eudaimonia exclusively insofar as it influences what he does? 
Now I shall turn to Aristotle’s explicit remarks about the relation between another’s 
view, and his own theory-bound claims about the same subject. First, I shall consider 
cases in which Aristotle describes his own view of some subject as in harmony with the 
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view of another. And second, I shall consider cases in which Aristotle describes his view 
as explaining the view of another. Thus, in at least two cases, Aristotle describes the 
relation between another’s view and his own theory as one of harmony.78 What is 
interesting about the metaphor of harmony is that it does not seem, in itself, to give either 
pair of the harmonizing elements epistemic priority. That is, in principle if two things 
harmonize with one another and neither is specifically marked as providing a standard for 
the other, they have a kind of equal status. But in fact, Aristotle’s intention seems to be to 
give further support for his theory by showing that it harmonizes with conventional 
wisdom. And, as we shall see, two views need not coincide or be fully consistent in order 
to be in harmony; they merely need to share some common feature.  
Aristotle also uses the metaphor of harmony in a passage from NE X. This instance 
does not count as a case for my purposes, since here the harmony is between theories and 
facts (piράγµατα) rather than between theories and conventional views. But looking at 
the passage may still yield some insight into how Aristotle thinks about harmony as a 
justification for a view more generally. Aristotle writes: “So true arguments not only 
seem extremely useful for knowing, but also for life. For by being in harmony with what 
people do [τοῖς ἔργοις] they are believed. Therefore they urge those who understand 
them to live in accord with them” (NE X.1172b3-8). In both the passages from NE I 
describing a harmony relation and also here the harmony is between an argument 
(λόγος) and something else. In NE I, this something else is someone else’s view; here it 
is “what people do” (ἔργα). In both cases Aristotle uses harmony to describe the relation 
between his argument and something separate from that argument, in order to support to 
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it. The idea seems to be that it bolsters a philosophical argument if that argument 
harmonizes with some pre- or non-philosophical piece of evidence, because such 
evidence is in some sense independent from a theoretical understanding in the relevant 
arena; a danger of such theorizing is the neglect of facts and opinions that partially get at 
the truth. But these facts themselves may not tell the whole story, and may be open to 
multiple interpretations and explanations, so they are also not adequate by themselves 
either. 
I have already discussed the first instance of the harmony metaphor in the so-called 
“things said section” of NE I earlier (1098b20-22). In the second such instance, Aristotle 
says “our argument harmonizes with those who say that [eudaimonia] is virtue or some 
kind of virtue, since the activity in accord with virtue belongs to virtue” (1098b30-31).79 
He then goes on to comment about the importance of distinguishing between happiness 
as possession and happiness as use. Here, the harmony is not exact, and Aristotle actually 
rejects the endoxon in question, yet he still thinks that he can rely upon it as a way of 
giving support to his own argument. Some believe that eudaimonia is virtue, while 
Aristotle thinks, rather, that virtue plays a part in eudaimonia. Thus the rejected 
commonsense partially matches Aristotle’s view and therefore harmonizes with 
Aristotle’s view, and lends it some support insofar as Aristotle supposes this view to be a 
likely bearer of truth.80 It should be clear that such a practice of argument cannot support 
the idea that Aristotle uncritically adopts endoxic views, or even that he limits his views 
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 Compare also Aristotle’s belief that people do not entirely miss the truth, expressed, for 
example, at Rhetoric I.1355a15-8. 
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to endoxa, as has sometimes been suggested.81 That is, Aristotle is quite willing to claim 
support from endoxa that only approximate his theory, without modifying his theory in 
the direction of such endoxa, as it were. Furthermore, Aristotle himself (quite obviously) 
is both the authority on the content of, and the arbiter of the truth of such endoxa. Thus if 
one were to claim that Aristotle’s use of endoxa genuinely constrained his findings, one 
would also need to show a certain degree of impartiality in handling the content of 
endoxa—a topic that I take up in the appendix to this chapter, in regard to Aristotle’s use 
of endoxa in his treatment of akrasia. 
Next, I shall consider another way that Aristotle describes the relation between his 
own view of some subject and that of another—namely, those cases in which Aristotle 
thinks that his own view about some subject can itself explain such a view.82 Often 
Aristotle makes sense of quotations from poets in this way, perhaps because he considers 
them to be a weak form of evidence.83 And often Aristotle takes the legomenon that his 
own theory explains to be a partially mistaken approximation of that theory. The implicit 
view seems to be that people have aimed at, but failed to reach the correct theory that 
Aristotle himself describes, so that the mistaken view can be explained by its partial 
correspondence to Aristotle’s theory. Aristotle remarks in the Rhetoric that people have a 
general tendency to come close to the truth (Rhet. I.1355a15-18), but he also says that it 
is not characteristic of people to make distinctions (NE X.1172b3). Thus it makes sense 
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that he would explain a partially correct view as a bungled groping at the truth, drawn to 
it, but not skilled enough to grasp it securely, despite its pull.   
Sometimes Aristotle reformulates the partly mistaken view that he thinks his theory 
explains, sometimes not. Thus Aristotle thinks that, “there also seems to be some further 
need for such good season, because of which [ὅθεν] some take good luck to be the same 
as happiness, others virtue” (NE 1099b6-8). Aristotle’s view fails to coincide with either 
of these mistaken views, nor does Aristotle reinterpret them, but nevertheless he thinks 
that his own view explains why people hold these mistaken views.  
In other cases, Aristotle thinks that his own view can explain another’s view, but in 
the course of considering that view, he clarifies that view, supposedly revealing what it 
actually amounts to. Thus, for example, Aristotle thinks that certain people consider 
honor to be happiness and the good because of the value that they attach to the virtue on 
which honor depends: they want to believe that they are good, so they value honor, which 
gives them the evidence they sought that they are in fact good (I.1095b22-30). Thus 
Aristotle seems to think that their mistaken view that eudaimonia is honor results from 
the value that they correctly attach to virtue, and that even according to them virtue is 
actually better than honor. This explanation is a little problematic, however, since 
Aristotle elsewhere says that different accounts must be given for the goodness of honor, 
practical wisdom, and pleasure (1096b23-25), but here he seems to want to derive the 
value of honor directly from virtue. It may be that because Aristotle’s aim is to refute the 
position that honor is the good he is more critical about its value here than elsewhere, as 
when he calls it the greatest of the external goods (IV.1123b20-21). That is, his refutation 
might be dialectic in the sense that its purpose is to refute the view rather than to put 
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forward his own view. Or otherwise, Aristotle might simply be favoring an explanation 
here that draws specifically on his theory that eudaimonia consists in virtuous activity, 
and putting aside his remarks on the nature of the good.  
Aristotle likewise argues that when people call children happy, they do so “because of 
the expectation” (διὰ τὴν ἐλpiίδα) that the child will one day be happy (Arist. NE 
1100a3-4). What is interesting, is that this remark is both an interpretation and an 
explanation at the same time—as is also the case with Aristotle’s response to the claim 
that eudaimonia is honor. Thus one may ask here, as in the case of honor, whether those 
who call children happy would accept Aristotle’s interpretation-cum-explanation of why 
they say what they say and what they mean when they say it—even after being pressed 
by Aristotle in an imagined verbal exchange. One might easily object to Aristotle, for 
example—in a different, but still Aristotelian vein—that the happiness of a child consists 
in his realization of his own admittedly partial capacity for rational activity and virtue. 
But Aristotle tends to adhere to an absolutist conception of eudaimonia throughout the 
NE rather than such a capacity-relative conception. Thus, he favors the interpretation of a 
common-sense view that his theory can explain. This strategy of modification-cum-
explanation casts doubt upon the degree to which Aristotle’s reliance upon the views of 
others actually constrains his theory, since any number of interpretive variants of a given 
view are then available as explananda, so that in principle Aristotle would be free to 
select the one from these that yields to his explanatory resources most easily. This rests, 
of course, on how plausible one finds his specific interpretations.  
To turn to almost the reverse relation between the views of others and Aristotle’s 
theory, Aristotle also argues in the other direction—from the views of others to his own 
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ethical theories. And this should not be surprising, considering that he has announced that 
he is going to conduct his inquiry from “what is familiar to us” (1095b3-4), and certain 
views of others may fit this description. When Aristotle does argue from the views of 
others toward his own theory, he tends to do this on the basis of universal or nearly 
universal consensus about some thesis. And I have already dealt with a few such 
arguments from universal consent, especially in considering how Aristotle relies upon 
conceptually unspecified and allegedly universally held views. Thus I will make only a 
few brief additional remarks.  
To cite one such example already considered, Aristotle says of the highest good that 
“it is agreed upon by most people in name” (NE 1095a17-18). This claim is both widely 
agreed upon, and—in the form given—conceptually unspecified. Aristotle evidently 
takes this kind of justification to be powerful; indeed, he gives no other justification for 
the identity between eudaimonia and the highest human good. Likewise Aristotle relies 
on a rhetorical question in the course of the function argument that seems functionally 
very similar to positing a universal consensus—asking if (given that the cobbler and the 
carpenter have a function) man is by nature functionless (I.1097b28-30). And indeed at 
one point in the NE Aristotle directly asserts the authority of universal consent: “those 
things which seem to all [to be the case], we say these things are” (X.1172b36-1173a1).  
In addition to arguing from universal belief, Aristotle also argues from universal 
behavior. Thus he argues, for example, that happiness is more end-worthy. And one of 
the arguments that he puts forward is that “no one chooses happiness for the sake of 
[things other than happiness itself]” (Arist. NE I.1097b5-6). This might be Aristotle’s 
way of referencing facts acquired through habituation or at any rate something similar. 
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Now that I have examined these specific features of Aristotle’s engagement with 
others’ views, I shall offer a tentative characterization of how Aristotle draws on such 
views in the NE. One part of this section has dealt with how Aristotle handles the 
conceptual content of the views of others. It should now be clear that Aristotle sometimes 
reformulates such views without trying to preserve the originally intended force of their 
language, the context of the utterance, or the full range of possible meanings of the view. 
Indeed, Aristotle does not even seem to treat the person who expresses a given view as 
the authority on what that view amounts to. In certain cases, particularly when Aristotle is 
describing a universal belief, he seems to consider a view in a conceptually unspecified 
form; indeed, sometimes he explicitly marks it as thus unspecified.84 Thus, to make the 
point with a greater degree of generality, Aristotle does not seem to be very concerned 
about preserving the intended meaning of a view that he draws upon in order to justify his 
own views.  
Another part of this section has dealt with how Aristotle sees the views of others as 
relating to his theories. In some cases, Aristotle uses the metaphor of harmony to describe 
the relation between such a view and his own theory, and in other cases Aristotle tries to 
show that his own view explains what he takes to be a mistaken view. These relations of 
harmony and explanation need not require that an endoxon and Aristotle’s theory be 
particularly close to one another. Thus while Aristotle thinks that he can explain why 
some people mistakenly believe that eudaimonia is good fortune (1099b7-8), his own 
view about the role of luck in playing some kind of auxiliary role in happiness is rather 
different. This is not to say that Aristotle’s method fails to lend credibility to his theories; 
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it certainly does make his arguments more persuasive and grounds them in certain aspects 
what others believe. But he gives himself considerable latitude for reinterpretation and re-
explanation of others’ views. Still, he regards such views as requiring interpretation and 
explanation, and if possible confirmation in some form. How compelling one finds 
Aristotle’s method of drawing on the views of others will ultimately depend upon how 
reasonable one finds his reinterpretation, conceptual clarification, and re-explanation of 
such views, and whether one agrees that such theories as he develops harmonize with 






Chapter 1 Appendix: Two Case Studies in Aristotle’s NE Method 
 
In this appendix I shall consider how Aristotle draws on the views of others in two 
different parts of the Nicomachean Ethics and to what extent such views form the 
substance of his considered understanding of the subjects into which he is inquiring in 
each case. First, I shall consider the NE VII inquiry into akrasia, where Aristotle first 
describes a procedure for inquiring from “appearances” (φαινόµενα) then enumerates 
opinions about akrasia, and finally uses these opinions in the process of developing his 
own theory of akrasia. Then, I shall consider how, in NE I, Aristotle draws on Solon’s 
view that “one must look to the end of a life” to judge its happiness. Here, I shall pay 
special attention to Herodotus’ version of this story, arguing that this is likely to have 
been Aristotle’s source, and consider how Aristotle’s treatment differs from Herodotus’ 
story as a way of drawing his own method into sharper focus. Throughout this appendix, 
as in the preceding chapter, I shall distinguish between Aristotle’s theory and practice of 
method, considering where they coincide and fail to coincide. One of my chief aims here 
is to show the limits of Aristotle’s own remarks on method for giving a full and accurate 






The NE VII Endoxic Method 
 
I would like to begin by considering Aristotle’s description of his so-called endoxic 
method of inquiry. Much attention has been given to this passage, and I discussed it 
briefly in chapter 1, but I shall examine it in greater detail here. Aristotle writes: 
 
δεῖ δ’, ὥσpiερ ἐpiὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόµενα 
καὶ piρῶτον διαpiορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι µάλιστα 
µὲν piάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα piερὶ ταῦτα τὰ piάθη, εἰ δὲ µή, τὰ 
piλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ 
καὶ καταλείpiηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγµένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς. 
And it is necessary, just as in other cases, setting out the 
appearances and—after first going through the puzzles—in 
this way if possible to confirm all the reputable views about 
these pathē, and if not all, the majority and the most 
authoritative. For if the difficult ones are refuted and the 
reputable opinions remain, it would have been made clear 
enough. 
  Arist. NE VII.1145b2-7 
 
 
One major problem that arises in making sense of these remarks is whether to understand 
them as describing a certain procedure for approaching a given topic, or more 
ambitiously as making a claim about the degree of reliability to be granted to endoxa and 
phainomena, and perhaps thereby also indicating a manner or style rather than a 
procedure of inquiring into a subject. Interpretations about the significance of this method 
divide along these lines. Thus G.E.L. Owen takes Aristotle to be giving an account of a 
style of inquiry by which he builds up a view from phainomena in the sense of those 
things that seem to be true on the basis of others’ opinions.85 Owen scrupulously 
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compares Aristotle’s remarks on method at NE VII.1145b2-7 and Physics IV.211a7-11, 
and his actual practice of method in the corresponding parts of each treatise, and finds 
Aristotle practicing what he preaches. Nussbaum draws broader conclusions, writing of 
Aristotle’s NE VII remarks on method that he, “declares that his aim, in science and in 
metaphysics as well as in ethics, is to save the appearances and their truth…”86 But 
Barnes takes the method to be doing something far more modest, as primarily procedural, 
remarking, “the restrictions imposed by the Method are minimal,” and, “The Method is 
not formally vacuous; but it has, in the last analysis, very little content.”87 Barnes’ point 
is that the method gives the inquirer a wide berth for assembling endoxa, interpreting or 
reformulating them, and culling them, in the process of doing so making use of 
arguments and considerations as he sees fit. In the course of this appendix, I shall try to 
determine to what extent the method should be interpreted as procedural, and to what 
extent as offering more ambitious claims about the dependability of certain kinds of data. 
Whether NE VII.1145b2-7 is understood as describing a general method, or one 
limited to specific inquiries also depends in part upon how one resolves this initial 
question. Thus, if the endoxic method is meant simply as a procedure, it is fairly 
straightforward to assess when Aristotle is using it—one can simply look for the steps 
that he describes. On the other hand, if the endoxic method in fact amounts to an 
assertion about the reliability of different kinds of data, and how such data support a 
philosophical argument, then it is harder to discern when Aristotle is using this method—
since it might in that case explain how Aristotle reaches conclusions, without ever rising 
to the surface of explicit argument.  
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One prominent scholar, understanding the endoxic method in this latter, not merely 
procedural sense, has understood the phrase ὥσpiερ ἐpiὶ τῶν ἄλλων (“just as in other 
cases”) to mean “just as in all other cases”—meaning just as when we inquire into any 
subject.88 It should be emphasized, however, that “all” does not occur in the Greek 
phrase. Another scholar interprets τὰ ἀλλά as referring to “other issues in practical 
philosophy.”89 But it is worth pressing the point of what exactly Aristotle intends with the 
simple phrase ὥσpiερ ἐpiὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Indeed, Aristotle uses almost exactly the same 
phrase to describe a feature of his method in the Politics: ὥσpiερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ 
σύνθετον µέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαιρεῖν (“For just as in other cases, one must 
divide what is joined together until one reaches what is not”) (I.1252a18-19).90 And while 
Aristotle does often consider the parts that compose a whole in the course of an inquiry, 
this is certainly not his only way of approaching a problem. At most, this is an aspect of 
any inquiry that he engages in. Thus the parallel with the Politics gives good textual 
grounds for doubting that Aristotle intends to describe the general method that he pursues 
throughout his writings.  
Furthermore, in the terms set out in the beginning of the first chapter, even if NE 
VII.1145b2-7 were intended to describe his general method, this would not by itself show 
much about his actual practice of argument. As Barnes has put it, “From time to time, 
Aristotle thought about his feet; and he produced one or two odd theories of running. But, 
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like any good athlete, he forgot about theorizing when it came to the race.”91 
Accordingly, it is crucial to distinguish between Aristotle’s theory and practice of 
method—there is simply no good reason to assume that the two coincide prior to an 
examination of them in relation to one another. 
Thus, to give one case that shows the difficulty of taking the endoxic method to apply 
to all of the NE or to philosophical inquiry in general, throughout most of the NE I 
“things said” section, Aristotle uses endoxa to give confirmation to his definition of 
eudaimonia as a kind of excellent rational activity. Thus, for example, Aristotle remarks 
that the view that eudaimonia is virtue “harmonizes” with his own theory (I.1098b30), 
without modifying his theory in the direction of this view, which he rather regards as an 
approximation of his own correct view. Aristotle formalizes this contrast between 
endoxic data and his own argument by distinguishing between “the argument” (ὁ λόγος) 
and “the things said” (τὰ λεγόµενα) as two different and at least partly independent 
sources of understanding of the subject in question (NE I.1098b9-11). It would be hard, 
then, to claim that Aristotle’s position arises from the endoxa. 
And if one turns to Aristotle’s other writings, it is again difficult to see them as 
consistently adhering to the endoxic method of NE VII. Thus in the Sophistical 
Refutations, Aristotle remarks that unlike in other subjects, where he has built on the 
work of his predecessors, in the subject matter of reasoning and fallacy, nothing had been 
accomplished before him, and he had to begin from scratch (183b17-184b8). Thus 
Aristotle seems to regard his findings as novel and original in a way that the endoxic 
procedure described at NE VII.1145b2-7 could not support.  
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Now I shall turn back to the one unambiguous application of the endoxic method—
the inquiry into akrasia. At 1145a8-20 Aristotle enumerates the endoxa about akrasia. 
And after he finishes enumerating these views, he summarizes them as legomena 
(1145b20). And, each particular view that he lists is introduced either by δοκεῖ (“it 
seems…”) or φασίν (“they say…”)—language that at least indicates that Aristotle is not 
yet taking a position on whether they are true when he first states them—with some 
views being set forward in contradictory pairs held by different unnamed parties. While 
the use of δοκεῖ seems motivated by a judgment about the plausibility of a view, rather 
than its origin, this does not exclude the plausible proposition in question from being a 
view borrowed from another. One might then ask exactly whose views Aristotle is 
enumerating here. In particular, are these the views of everyday Greeks? Or are they, 
rather, the views of other philosophers? Furthermore, if these endoxa or legomena are in 
fact the views of others, does Aristotle accurately capture the view of the party from 
whom he is borrowing it? And does he really regard the views that he enumerates with an 
impartial eye at the outset?  
Despite the fact that the Topics allows that endoxa may include the views of the wise 
(I.100b21-3), it has nevertheless often been supposed that Aristotle is simply, in a 
detached and impartial way, laying out the relevant views of ordinary Greeks. In his well-
known article, Owen characterizes the views that Aristotle actually enumerates at NE 
VII.1145a8-20 as “common conceptions on the subject.”92 He seems to take a similar 
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view about the nature of the language that Aristotle uses to express these views, claiming 
that the views that he enumerates, “turn out as so often to be partly matters of linguistic 
usage”—for Owen, ordinary Greek rather than philosophical linguistic usage.93 It need 
hardly be said that Owen’s view has been influential.94 Nevertheless, it should not be 
assumed without argument that the views Aristotle gives here are actually borrowed from 
ordinary Greeks and then reported by Aristotle in a roughly accurate and disinterested 
way. Indeed, it is not clear that his method would require this. 
For the most part, Aristotle does seem to describe the endoxa in fairly neutral terms 
that do not reveal his view of their accuracy. In one case, however, he seems to betray a 
prejudgment about the plausibility of an endoxon. He writes: “And some say…that the 
self-indulgent man is akratic and that the akratic man is self-indulgent, mixing them 
together [συγκεχυµένως], but others say that they are different” (1145b14-17). The 
adverb συγκεχυµένως is derived from the passive particle of συγχέω (“pour together”) 
so that it literally means “in a poured together fashion.” But it would seem that 
combining those things which belong together is not strictly speaking mixing at all, so 
Aristotle’s use of this adverb perhaps implies an error of conflation on the part of the 
group advancing this view. Furthermore, Aristotle elsewhere uses this adverb to draw a 
contrast between views expressed clearly (σαφῶς) and those expressed confusedly (EE 
1216b32-35).95 Finally, Aristotle does end up distinguishing between the ἀκόλαστος and 
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the ἀκρατής, rather than “mixing them together,” so that he might be anticipating that 
distinction.  
Furthermore, while not all of the language of the endoxa coincides with Aristotle’s 
own technical philosophical language—as with ἀκρατής and ἀκόλαστος—much of it 
clearly does. Thus Aristotle pairs ἀκρασία with µαλακία, and ἐγκράτεια with καρτερία 
in two legomena—as if each pair of words consisted of pure synonyms (VII.1145b8-10 & 
1145b14-15). But in each case, exactly one of the terms comprising the pair represents 
the true Aristotelian technical term, while Aristotle uses the other more loosely. This 
tends to render these endoxa less conceptually specified than Aristotle’s theory, even for 
a reader already familiar with that theory. And in another endoxon, Aristotle similarly 
uses φρόνιµος and δεινός as if they were synonyms. This case is different, since Aristotle 
has elsewhere defined each of these terms in relation to the other—distinguishing mere 
cleverness (δεινότης) from practical wisdom (φρόνησις) (NE VI.1144a28-29). Thus in 
this case the reader familiar with Aristotle’s formal terminology is forced to interpret this 
endoxon as less conceptually specified than Aristotle’s own theory.  
These observations suggest that Aristotle might be generating a list of possible views 
in relation to his own views, rather than enumerating actual views. Or perhaps the endoxa 
that he enumerates represent some kind of combination of actual views and possible 
views generated by way of contrast to his own views. This interpretation is supported by 
his use of not only verbs of speaking, but also δοκεῖ to express the endoxa that he 
enumerates. And, indeed, in the Topics, Aristotle at one point advises the dialectician to 
generate propositions not only from those views actually held, but also “those that are 
like these” (Topics I.105b5). While technically such views would not count as endoxa on 
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the Topics definition (I.100b21-3), which seems to define endoxa as actual beliefs, 
nevertheless Aristotle still regards these views as serviceable for dialectic. 
Some of the language is also clearly originally Plato’s.96 Thus, for example, Plato 
defines the ἀκόλαστος at one point as the opposite of the temperate (Gorgias 507a-c). 
And this is exactly what the term means for Aristotle, and what it presumably must mean 
for the party that claims that the ἀκρατής and the ἀκόλαστος are distinct from one 
another (1145b17). The plural subjects of φασί (“they say”) then might be explained by 
supposing that Aristotle is referring to Academic debates,97 rather than Plato’s dialogues 
in particular, but the basic point is the same: the views enumerated by Aristotle at NE 
1145b8-10 clearly include views expressed in philosophical language that either were 
expressed by actual philosophers, or that are the sort that philosophers would express.98 
Thus both the language and substance of Aristotle’s and Plato’s views play some role in 
determining the endoxa that Aristotle enumerates here. Thus Aristotle cannot simply be 
reporting commonsense views about akrasia, as has sometimes been supposed, but is 
perhaps instead giving a combination of philosophical views, and views he regards as 
possible, which he has generated in contrast to his own theory.  
Now that I have considered the content of the legomena, the next questions are how 
Aristotle actually proceeds from the initial set of endoxa to his own view. My main 
concern is, apart from the initial set of endoxa, what kind of arguments and evidence does 
Aristotle use to advance the inquiry? The main problem here is that depending upon 
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exactly what views and arguments are brought to bear on the endoxic inquiry, its content 
will differ greatly. Thus Barnes supposes that Aristotle’s initial account of the endoxic 
method allows him to rework the initial set of endoxa into a new form.99 But depending 
upon how much latitude Aristotle gives himself for this reformulation, the degree of 
restriction that is being imposed upon his actual practice of method might be fairly great, 
or fairly slight.100 Furthermore, as I have already pointed out, Aristotle’s own views 
already seem to play some part in how he goes about setting out the endoxa at 
VII.1145b8-20. Thus if Aristotle’s own views play an important role in generating the set 
of endoxa, and if Aristotle grants himself wide latitude for drawing on his own theory to 
reformulate these endoxa and arriving at a subset of his initial set of endoxa, then the 
method does not seem to limit Aristotle as much as has sometimes been supposed.  
In the course of NE VII, Aristotle introduces distinctions between different uses of a 
given word. Thus, Aristotle says that “we speak of knowing [τὸ ἐpiίστασθαι] in two 
senses [διχῶς]” (1146b31), distinguishing between knowing as mere having and 
knowing as both having and using knowledge. And what is initially a linguistic 
clarification between two senses of knowing, leads quickly into what seems difficult to 
avoid characterizing as a technical, philosophical idea—of the two different premises 
used to form the practical syllogism (1146b36-47a10). In his endoxic reading of the 
inquiry into akrasia, Bolton tries to argue that the practical syllogism is not a technical 
doctrine at all, since Plato had already expressed some form of the view that there is a 
universal and particular aspect of moral reasoning, but his references are not convincing 
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parallels for Aristotle’s theory.101 After raising this issue, Aristotle goes on to discuss the 
practical syllogism in more detail in his digressive natural inquiry into cause, which 
seems also to show that Aristotle considers the subject of the practical syllogism as at 
least subject to a technical treatment that goes beyond endoxic inquiry.102 But Aristotle 
already has drawn on the idea of the practical syllogism prior to his natural digression, so 
that its presence within NE VII cannot be explained purely in terms of a digression that 
reaches outside of the endoxic inquiry itself. 
Within the endoxic inquiry in NE VII, Aristotle also argues from universal or near-
universal consensus. In respect to the endoxon that the phronimos can be akratic, 
Aristotle reasons: “But it is absurd. For the same one will be at the same time practically 
wise and akratic, but no one would say [φήσειε δ’ οὐδ’ ἂν εἷς] that doing the basest things 
involuntarily is characteristic of the practically wise man” (1146a5-7). Insofar as 
Aristotle considers such universal consensus to be the final word, not subject to 
conceptual clarification or rejection, it cannot be a raw endoxon or legemonon. As I 
argued in chapter 1, often when Aristotle relies upon an argument from universal 
consensus, he does so in order to defend a conceptually unspecified form of a claim. This 
argument from universal consensus, however—or more precisely from universal denial—
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apparently relies on attributing some roughly Aristotelian notion of φρόνησις to the 
deniers. After all, one of the initial endoxa at 1145b8-20 advances roughly the claim that 
Aristotle denies on the basis of an allegedly universal denial—that the phronimos can be 
akratic—except that in its initial endoxic formulation it is rendered conceptually 
unspecified by the pairing of δεινός and φρόνιµος. Here, however, Aristotle uses only the 
term φρόνιµος and seems to understand it in roughly his own sense. This does not 
necessarily invalidate the argument—Aristotle’s thought might be something like: those 
who use such-and-such a word in my sense would universally deny… The trouble, 
though, is that Aristotle’s notion of φρόνησις is a technical one, and some might well 
deny that the kind of practical wisdom Aristotle ascribes to the man of true excellence is 
even possible. In particular, one might claim that man with great political talent, who had 
an exceptional ability to see the good for man, might at the same time be akratic in 
relation to matters of sex and appetite.103 Thus there is some question about whether this 
argument supports viewing Aristotle as working out his position from the views of 
others—as the endoxic method has sometimes been understood.  
Twice in the inquiry into akrasia, Aristotle also refers directly to what “has been 
established” (δέδεικται) about the nature of φρόνησις and the φρόνιµος (VII.1146a7-9; 
VII.1152a6-14), where NE VI seems to be meant. In one of these passages, he remarks, 
“it has been proved earlier” (δέδεικται piρότερον) that the practically wise man is 
capable of action (piρακτικός) and possesses the other virtues (τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς) 
(VII.1146a7-9). Again, since Aristotle’s formal account of the φρόνησις has such thick 
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substance and is hardly mere commonsense, I think his reliance upon it here supports 
viewing the endoxic method as more procedural than substantive.  
I think, then, one is justified in adopting the position of Barnes, who remarks both 
that the letter of Aristotle’s own account of his endoxic method at NE 1145a2-7 does not 
restrict Aristotle greatly in the pursuit of an inquiry, and—further—that it is not even 
clear that Aristotle was terribly concerned about adhering strictly to his own stated 
methodological procedure.104 Examining NE VII shows both that the endoxa Aristotle 
enumerates seem to be shaped partly by his own views, and also that Aristotle is quite 
willing to rely upon views he has argued for non-endoxically elsewhere—in particular his 
account of φρόνησις.  
 
 
Aristotle and Herodotus 
 
Now that I have offered some observations about the NE VII inquiry into akrasia, I shall 
return to NE I to look at another instance of an inquiry that Aristotle makes which 
purports to rely upon the views of another. Within the so-called “things said section” of 
NE I, at NE I.1100a10 ff., Aristotle appears to draw on an argument that Herodotus gives 
to Solon in order to develop his view about the relation of luck, the end of a life, and a 
complete life to happiness. Aristotle does not, however, give Herodotus’ name at any 
point in the passage. Nonetheless, there are good reasons for supposing that he is 
referring specifically to Herodotus as opposed to some other lost source that described 
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the same story or to an orally transmitted version of this story. First I shall consider the 
evidence that Aristotle is in fact drawing on Herodotus, and then I shall consider how 
Aristotle uses Solon’s wisdom to shape his own theory.  
In Herodotus’ story, Solon says that to judge the happiness of a life one must “look to 
the end,” and Aristotle gives Solon’s view in similar language. Aristotle twice says “it is 
necessary to look to the end,” once reporting Solon’s view, and in the second case using 
this as the protasis of a conditional in order to consider the consequences of this view. He 
uses similar language in each instance: χρεὼν τέλος ὁρᾶν (1100a11) and τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν 
δεῖ (1100a33) (“it is necessary to look to the end”). In Herodotus’ story, Solon says the 
same thing in slightly different language from Aristotle, expressing the view in a more 
general form, as though it were a principle for reckoning any event, not just a human life: 
σκοpiέειν δὲ χρὴ piαντὸς χρήµατος τὴν τελευτὴν (“And it is necessary to look to the 
end of every affair”), and Herodotus sums up Solon’s advice Croesus by saying: τὰ 
piαρεόντα ἀγαθὰ µετεὶς τὴν τελευτὴν piαντὸς χρήµατος ὁρᾶν ἐκέλευε (“having set 
aside the present goods, he commanded him to look at the end of each matter”) (Hdt. 
I.33). While Aristotle uses τέλος instead of τελευτή, the language in the two writers is 
quite similar. 
There are some more general verbal echoes that may be merely coincidental, but may 
show that Aristotle was thinking of Herodotus. Both use the verb τελευτάω (“to die”) 
with an adverb to describe the quality of someone’s life at the point of his death. Though 
this idiom itself is not unique to Herodotus and Aristotle, here both are using the same 
idiom to discuss the same question: the relevance of the way a life ends to reckoning 
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whether it counts as happy.105 And ἀpiοθνῄσκω may likewise be used with an adverb to 
indicate the quality of someone’s death, so the subject matter itself does not require the 
use of this particular idiom. And both writers also use the verb µακαρίζω (“to judge 
blessed”).106 There are also some differences. Aristotle never uses the words ὄλβος 
(“blessedness”), ὄλβιος (“blessed”) found in Herodotus, for example.  
Writers after Aristotle also seem to treat Herodotus’ version of the story as the 
standard one, though this gives us only a terminus ad quem for when Herodotus’ version 
became fixed (by him, or perhaps by someone else telling a very similar version of the 
story). Plutarch in the first century AD and Diogenes Laertius in the second or third both 
appear to follow his version, though neither mentions Herodotus by name. Plutarch’s 
narrative of the conversation follows almost exactly: Croesus shows Solon his treasures, 
Solon is unimpressed, Croesus asks him who the happiest man is, Solon responds first 
Tellus then Kleobis and Biton, Croesus is incensed, Solon explains, Croesus ignores his 
explanation and finally punished when his city is sacked (Pl. Solon 28-9). Diogenes’ 
version is very short, but his Solon gives the same answer to Croesus that we find in 
Herodotus: “Tellus and Kleobis and Biton.”107 Further, he ends this quotation from Solon 
with the phrase καὶ τὰ θρυλούµενα (“and the things repeated”). This last phrase could 
refer either to words repeated through oral transmission or to a written account. Since, 
however, Diogenes likely lived in the 3rd century AD—some six hundred years after 
Herodotus died—it seems unlikely that this story was simply being repeated orally, and 
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 Herodotus: τελευτήσαντα καλῶς (I.32.5), τελευτήσῃ εὐχαρίστως τὸν βίον (I.32.9). 
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we know of no other text earlier than Herodotus that would have transmitted it. Further, 
Plutarch reports that even in his time the authenticity of the story was in doubt, which 
suggests that the original source was not, say, a now lost bit of Solon’s own verse.  
There are also more general reasons to suppose that Aristotle is referring directly to 
Herodotus. Aristotle clearly knew Herodotus’ writings. He refers to him directly by name 
in a number of different works, including the Poetics, De Generatione Animalium, 
Historia Animalium, and in the Eudemian Ethics.108  
Aristotle also appears to draw on Herodotus in a rather similar way to what we find in 
NE I in his discussion of pity at Rhetoric B.8. Here, Aristotle alludes to a story about 
Psammenitos which we know only from Herodotus (III.14), but he does not use 
Herodotus’ name, instead remarking ὡς φασίν (“as they say”) (1386a21). Although this 
attribution of the story might seem odd if Aristotle were drawing on Herodotus, 
Herodotus himself often ascribes his stories to others and here in particular he interjects 
at one point ὡς δὲ λέγεται ὑpi’ Αἰγυpiτίων to explain the source of a detail. So given 
Herodotus’ tendency to ascribe stories to others, attributing a story from Herodotus as ὡς 
φασίν would make some sense. Aristotle also refers to ὁ Ἄµασις in the manuscripts 
rather than Ἀµάσιος (“the son of Amasis”), which is the emendation made by Spengel in 
order to match Herodotus’ story, so he might have recalled this story from memory rather 
than directly consulted a text, such as Herodotus’. There are also two words in common 
between the passages, though neither is so unusual as to provide a definite confirmation 
that Aristotle drew directly from Herodotus: the verb piροσαιτέω (“to beg”) describing 
Psammenitos’ friend where the uncompounded αἰτέω would have carried a very similar 
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force, and the verb δακρύω used to describe Psammenitos’ crying upon seeing this friend 
where Aristotle might have used a more generic word such as κλαίω (“bemoan”). So the 
limited evidence suggests that Aristotle was thinking of Herodotus’ version of the story.  
I shall briefly consider how Aristotle draws on Herodotus in the Rhetoric, before 
turning to his use of the Solon story. In Aristotle’s understanding the terrible is what men 
feel for those closest to them, to whom they react “just as to themselves,” while pity is 
something men feel for those who are at least some distance from themselves. Aristotle 
supposes that his distinction can explain why the dethroned Egyptian king Psammenitos 
cries in one case (for his friend who has been reduced to begging) and shows no outward 
sign of emotion in another case (when his son is being lead to his death).109 Aristotle 
explains the first case as an instance of pity, and supposes that in the second case the 
dreadful (τὸ δεινόν) must drive out pity. In the text of Herodotus, Psammenitos is never 
described as feeling pity for his friend, but Aristotle thinks he can explain Psammenitos’ 
external behavior (i.e., crying) by supposing that Psammenitos felt pity. That is, Aristotle 
supposes he can explain Psammenitos’ behavior if he describes it in a particular way. 
This redescription of a story is in a way very similar to the reinterpretation of endoxa that 
Aristotle engages in when he is drawing on the views’ of others. 
There is no other known extant earlier source for the stories about Solon and 
Psammenitos, yet Aristotle does not mention Herodotus when referring to these stories, 
referring directly to Solon and the son of Amasis, apparently as historical figures. In 
some other such cases when Aristotle refers to a character in a text, he cites the particular 
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author and work—as he does when he refers to Plato’s Republic at Politics 1261a6. But 
there are also other instances when he refers directly to a character from a text without 
citing the author or the text that seems to be his source. Thus, for example, in NE 
VII.1145b21-27, Aristotle refers simply to Σωκράτης, though he is almost certainly 
paraphrasing lines from Protagoras 352c that deal with akrasia. This parallel reference 
without a direct mention of the author or text gives some further support to the 
interpretation that Aristotle is thinking of Herodotus, but failing to reference him by name 
at Rhetoric B.9 and NE 1100a10-18. This kind of reference to a character without the 
author or title of the text could be explained if Aristotle had assumed his audience to be 
very familiar with Plato and Herodotus, as he probably would have, or simply by a 
greater concern with the content than the source of the story. Another possibility here is 
that the topos of “looking to the end” in order to reckon someone eudaimōn was re-
oralized from the Herodotean version in academic debates.110 This would provide a 
different explanation for the lack of any direct reference to Herodotus. 
If it is right that Aristotle is drawing directly on Herodotus’ version of this story, how 
then does he draw on Solon’s view? First, he tries to interpret it. He suggests two 
alternatives: either Solon means that someone may only be happy while he is dead, or we 
can only judge him to have been happy while alive once he is dead. The first possibility 
he judges to be absurd—“both otherwise and also to us who say that happiness is some 
kind of activity.” Here he concludes that “this is not what Solon intended” (µηδὲ Σόλων 
τοῦτο βούλεται) (Arist. NE I.1100a15), justifying his interpretation by appealing to 
common sense. It is interesting that Aristotle is treating Solon’s view as an endoxon or a 
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legomenon, but he draws on common sense and consensus in order to correctly interpret 
that view. So Aristotle seems to take Solon’s words and common sense to be separate 
sources of understanding that can be used in conjunction but in different ways.  
A very un-Nicomachean view is, however, embedded in Herodotus’ version of the 
story about Kleobis and Biton, which Aristotle neglects. Their mother asks the god to 
give them whatever is best for them and they then die, which Solon interprets by saying: 
διέδεξε τε ἐν τούτοισι ὁ θεὸς ὡς ἄµεινον εἴη ἀνθρώpiῳ τεθνάναι µᾶλλον ἢ ζώειν 
(“And in these matters the god showed that it is better for man to die than to live”). Thus, 
while Tellus dies in the course of defending his city, the death of Kleobis and Biton is not 
understood by Solon as a result of their strenuous trip to the festival, but rather as god-
given. So it is clear that a fairly radically different and perhaps rather counter-intuitive 
idea of the good-for-man is at work here. That Aristotle was familiar with some form of 
this view is apparent from the Silenus fragment, in which Silenus tells Midas that it is 
best for man never to have been born, and second best for him to die quickly (Rose frag. 
44). But this view does not ever appear to surface in the Nicomachean Ethics, which 
instead optimistically supposes that an activity largely controlled by man constitutes his 
chief or primary good. Aristotle says that they are brave for whom “a defense or death is 
fine” (ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀpiοθανεῖν) (1115b4-5), but he seems to see fine death as an 
accidental good—something that is good because it is the best possible thing under less-
than-good circumstances. Herodotus’ Solon, however, evaluates a fine death rather as an 
escape from a perilous and uncertain life and as such possibly more desirable than life 
itself. And Aristotle does not try to come to terms with this extra-Nicomachean view 
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here. So the limited scope of Aristotle’s interest in Solon’s stories about Tellus and 
Kleobis and Biton seems clear—if, indeed, Herodotus was Aristotle’s source. 
In addition to referring to Solon’s view—and to common sense—in order to correctly 
interpret that view, Aristotle also refers to the function argument during his treatment of 
Solon’s dictum. From 1100a31-1101a17, Aristotle is dealing specifically with the 
problem of how happiness can be both stable and also dependent on fortune. At one point 
during this discussion, he writes: “But the current puzzle also supports the argument” 
(µαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαpiορηθέν) (Αrist. NE 1100b11-12). The puzzle 
that he is referring to here must be that happiness is stable, but does have some further 
need of good fortune and the external goods—a view he has already expressed at 
1099a15-16 and 1099b17-18. And Aristotle’s point seems to be that “the current puzzle 
supports the argument” because it explains how happiness can be stable but depend on 
fortune at the same time—or, as he explains it himself: piερὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑpiάρχει 
τῶν ἀνθρωpiίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς piερὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ’ ἀρετήν· (“For in 
no human endeavor is there such great stability as there is for the activities of 
excellence”) (Arist. NE 1100b12-14). For this claim about the relation of the function 
argument to this puzzle to make sense, I believe there have to be three at least partially 
independent claims: (1) happiness is stable, (2) yet it needs external things, and (3) 
happiness consists in virtuous activity, where (1) and (2) form a puzzle, and (3) at least 
partially ameliorates that puzzle.111 (1) seems to come from some kind of intuitive 
process. It is either identical to or very closely related to the claim we find justified 
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earlier: τἀγαθὸν δὲ οικεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι µαντευόµεθα (“And we divine 
that the good is something personal and difficult to take away”) (1095b25-26). The 
source of (2) will be the central question that I consider in this dissertation, but it does not 
seem to be something that is simply derived from (3), and Aristotle first begins to talk 
about the external goods in the legomena section of NE I (1098b9ff.). Furthermore, 
Aristotle seems to think of Solon’s claim that one must look to the end (itself an endoxon 
or legomenon) as closely connected to this additional requirement for external things. 





The scope of this appendix is limited to the inquiry into akrasia, Aristotle’s treatment of 
Solon’s dictum, and some comparisons drawing on the preceding discussion to the NE I 
method. But some general conclusions within the limited scope of the passages 
considered here are possible. First, I have shown that across several passages of the NE, 
Aristotle treats common sense and universal consensus as different sources of authority 
from endoxa. This is not to say that there is no relationship at all between the grounds for 
relying on these different sources of understanding for a given subject, but Aristotle does 
not seem to treat endoxa as having exactly the same kind of authority as universal 
consensus, or his own arguments. Thus Aristotle rejects or reinterprets endoxa in at least 
two cases, because they conflict with universal agreement (1146a6-7, 1100a13-14), 
showing that these two sources of authority are functionally distinct for him. Furthermore 
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Aristotle also seems consistently to differentiate between the status of endoxa and of his 
own arguments and theories—both within the endoxic inquiry into akrasia, and 
throughout the so-called things-said section of NE I. Thus, although there is more work to 
do, I think these two case studies show the advantages of a synoptic study of Aristotle’s 
methods and the limitations of relying on the methodological preface at NE VII.1145b2-7 
to unlock Aristotle’s methods of ethics. 
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Chapter 2: Aristotle’s Argument for the External Goods Requirement 
 
Now that I have examined Aristotle’s theory and practice of method in NE I, I shall apply 
some of these observations to the main subject of my dissertation: Aristotle’s view about 
what the external goods are, why they are genuine goods, and how they contribute to 
eudaimonia. Since it is unclear to what extent the external goods are a technical category 
of goods that is intended to help to develop the core substance of Aristotle’s theory, I 
shall first try to assess their exact role in his inquiry. I shall then consider whether 
Aristotle offers an argument for eudaimonia’s need of the external goods strictly in terms 
of his formal definition of eudaimonia or on some other grounds. If his explicit argument 
is not made strictly in terms of his formal definition of eudaimonia, I shall consider 
possible explanations for why. Finally, I shall interpret his assessment of what kind of 
value the external goods do have.  
First it is worth clarifying a point of Aristotle’s terminology. Initially in the NE, 
Aristotle uses a threefold division of goods, distinguishing the external goods, the bodily 
goods, and the goods of the soul. At times, however, he implicitly adopts a twofold 
division between the external goods and the goods of the soul. In this twofold division, 
the external goods are understood in a broader sense, so that they are distinguished only 
from the goods of the soul, and include anything external to the soul, namely, the bodily 
goods. Since the argument that particularly concerns me in this chapter uses the external 
goods in this broader sense, for simplicity I shall use the term in this sense in this chapter, 
and throughout the dissertation as a whole.  
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While Aristotle does not offer a definition of the external goods, he does illustrate 
what he means by the external goods with examples—such as good looks, wealth, and 
political power. Yet the exact content of these goods is still a puzzle, since the different 
goods that Aristotle names are subject to different possible specifications, but Aristotle 
does not directly indicate how they are to be specified. Good looks, for example, might 
be defined as just those looks that are most conducive to virtuous action, or in a more 
conventional way, as those looks that are most pleasurable to look at. The way in which 
an external good is defined, also entails a certain specification of what exactly counts as 
that good. Or, to put it simply, definition entails specification. Thus, for example, if 
wealth is defined as that which is good or useful for exchange with others in return for 
various goods, then those things that do this count as wealth, and those that fail to do not. 
If it fails to be thus useful, it also fails to be good—as, for example, wealth held in a 
currency that is no longer circulating and no longer exchangeable.  
While Aristotle does not directly define the sense in which the external goods are 
goods, his formal definition of eudaimonia as final, self-sufficient, and consisting in 
some kind of excellent rational activity is often taken to provide all the information that is 
needed in order to determine what he must mean about why the external goods are good. 
If this is so, then the external goods derive their value strictly from virtuous activity. 
Many scholars have accordingly tried to explain the value that Aristotle grants to the 
external goods strictly in terms of some contribution to virtuous activity.112  
There is an alternative way of getting at this problem. That is, Aristotle might be seen 
as offering either a theory specific or a theory independent explanation for the value of 
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the external goods. A theory specific explanation of their value would have to explain 
their worth strictly in terms of some kind of contribution to eudaimonia, on its formal 
definition as virtuous activity. A theory independent explanation of their value might 
simply acknowledge the explanatory limitations of the formal definition of eudaimonia, 
and explain their value on independent grounds. Aristotle’s own remarks about the 
relative precision of ethics compared to other subjects of inquiry lend support to the 
possibility that he might assign value to something outside the strict terms of his own 
theory.  
If, then, the external goods are not defined as good by virtue of some kind of 
contribution to eudaimonia, they might be conventional goods in the way that the 
examples that Aristotle gives suggests. If the external goods were defined in their own 
terms in this way, then a particular kind of relation to eudaimonia would result. Namely, 
the external goods would make an accidental, rather than essential, contribution to 
virtuous action. While Aristotle never considers the problem of the value of the external 
goods in these terms, it creates a useful standard against which to clarify his own remarks 
and arguments about the kind of value such goods actually have.  
 
 
What Part Do the External Goods Play in Aristotle’s Inquiry? 
 
First I shall consider the role of the external goods within NE I. Aristotle begins NE I 
with an inquiry into goods and the good. In the course of doing so, he alleges that it is 
generally agreed upon “in name” that the highest practical good is eudaimonia, though 
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the specific content of this highest good is disputed (I.1095a14-30). Eudaimonia then 
turns out to be the focus of the entire first book. A little further, Aristotle rejects the 
relevance of Plato’s form of the good for his inquiry, since it is not predicable of various 
particular goods, and since it is no aid to the practitioners of particular arts, and does not 
form the end of action (1096a12-1097a14).  
At this point, Aristotle goes on to establish what is generally regarded as his official 
or formal definition of eudaimonia. First, he establishes that it is a final and self-
sufficient good (1097a15-b21). Then, saying that a clearer account is needed, he argues 
that it consists in a characteristically human function—namely, some kind of rational 
activity in accord with virtue (1097b22-1098a20). Aristotle next explains that this is an 
outline account with a precision appropriate to the subject matter (1098a20-b8). After this 
formal and official treatment, Aristotle shifts his approach to his subject, writing: “it is 
necessary to investigate happiness not only from the conclusion and premises, but also 
from the things that are said about it.”113 And it is within this so-called “things said” 
section that the two crucial passages concerning the external goods occur.114 I shall spend 
the first part of this chapter looking at these two passages. 
It is immediately after announcing this shift in method that Aristotle first refers to the 
external goods: 
 
νενεµηµένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν µὲν ἐκτὸς 
λεγοµένων τῶν δὲ piερὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶµα, τὰ piερὶ ψυχὴν 
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κυριώτατα λέγοµεν καὶ µάλιστα ἀγαθά, τὰς δὲ piράξεις 
καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς piερὶ ψυχὴν τίθεµεν. ὥστε 
καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατά γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν piαλαιὰν 
οὖσαν καὶ ὁµολογουµένην ὑpiὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. 
Indeed, given that the goods have been divided in three 
ways—into those called external, those of soul, and those 
of body—we claim that the goods of soul are good in the 
strictest sense and are the most good, and we reckon the 
actions and activities of soul to belong to these, so that our 
argument would be finely made in accord with this old 
opinion agreed upon by the philosophers. 
Arist. NE I.1098b12-18 
 
 
Aristotle does several things here that seem to indicate that he does not regard the 
threefold division of goods as properly part of his theory. First, and most obviously, this 
threefold division is introduced in the legomenon section of NE I.8-12. Aristotle’s 
purpose throughout NE I.8-12 is usually to defend his narrow definition of eudaimonia, 
drawing on legomena in order to do so, rather than to refine or develop his formal 
position further.115 Here too Aristotle uses the division in order to show the similarity 
between his own theory and “the old opinion agreed upon by the philosophers.”116 Thus 
Aristotle is not using the division in order to articulate or refine some aspect of his 
theory, but rather as a way of giving further support to it.  
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Second, Aristotle marks the external goods themselves as “spoken of” 
(λεγοµένων)—using the same word that he uses to describe the data of NE I.8-12 in his 
brief methodological remarks introducing this part of NE I. At times Aristotle uses 
legomenos as an adjective simply to mark an unusual use of language, with roughly the 
meaning of the English phrase “so-called.”117 This probably partly explains its use here, 
since it immediately follows the term ἐκτός which has the least obvious meaning of the 
three kinds of goods mentioned here, since it must be external in relation to something, 
but what this is is not specified. Since, however, Aristotle has just indicated a shift in 
method toward “the things spoken of” using the same Greek word, he may be indicating 
that the external goods, and perhaps the entire threefold division, are borrowed and do not 
properly belong to the substance of his own view, as, for example, eudaimonia, virtue, 
action, activity, and similar concepts clearly do.  
In fact, this division seems to borrow from a similar threefold division found in 
Plato’s Laws (697a-b), consisting of the goods of the soul, the goods of the body, and the 
goods “in respect to money.” But the origin of Aristotle’s term τὰ ἐκτός (“the externals”) 
is more difficult to determine. No use of this phrase in the sense of “worldly things” can 
be definitely established as preceding Aristotle.118 Cicero tells us, however, that a similar 
threefold division of goods was shared by Peripatetics and Academics of Plato and 
Aristotle’s day, using the Latin phrase externa bona.119 Thus Aristotle may be using 
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Epistle 3, and Xenocrates, frag. Parente (1981) 138 = §232. 
119
 Academica I.19-22. See Tusculan Disputations V.30/85 for the phrase externa [bona]. 
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legomenos here to mark “the externals” for worldly things as a term that arose in 
contemporary Academic and Peripatetic discussions. The evidence, however, makes it 
impossible to determine this with certainty. 
There is also a third way in which Aristotle seems to mark this division as tentative or 
not fully his own. Aristotle places the division of goods in a genitive absolute using a 
perfect passive participle with no expressed agent, so that the goods are simply divided, 
but the reader is given no indication as to who has thus divided them. Furthermore, the 
Greek circumstantial participle, which is found here, may have a conditional force. When 
it does have a conditional force, the assertion in the main clause of course depends upon 
this conditional, so that this assertion is not being advanced without qualification. If the 
force is conditional here, then Aristotle is not endorsing the threefold division, but merely 
making use of it to state a position that follows from assuming this division.  
Curiously enough, Aristotle puts the threefold division of goods in a very similar 
genitive absolute expression in a passage in the Politics, where the main clause states that 
no one would disagree that the blessed require all these goods (VII.1323a22-27). 
Aristotle even uses the phrase “at least in respect to one division” (piρός γε µίαν 
διαίρεσιν) to qualify this allegedly universal consensus, thus explicitly indicating that this 
is not the only way to divide the goods. This parallel supports interpreting the NE passage 
as avoiding a full endorsement of this threefold division as forming part of the fabric of 
the developing theory, since the handling of the division is similar in both texts.  
Thus in the NE, Aristotle introduces the threefold division of goods within the 
legomenon section of NE I.8-12, initially uses them to provide further support for his 
theory rather than to articulate a feature of it, marks the external goods as “spoken of”—
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perhaps to indicate that the term itself is borrowed—and he places the division itself 
within a genitive absolute that may have a conditional force.  
 
 
The Context of the Main Argument for the External Goods Requirement 
 
There are two passages about the external goods in the so-called “things said” section of 
NE I.8-12. Now that I have discussed the first, I shall turn to the second. This second 
passage is the more important of the two for my purposes, since Aristotle directly states 
that eudaimonia needs such goods, and then argues for this claim. Here, I shall consider 
the context of the claim, and in the following section, I shall consider the argument itself.  
After introducing the external goods in the first passage, discussed above, Aristotle 
goes on to anticipate the second passage by briefly surveying several different opinions 
about eudaimonia. The final of these is about the external goods, and it is the context of 
this treatment that concerns me here. He writes: it seems “to be excellence [ἀρετή] to 
some, practical wisdom to others, wisdom to others, and to others still these or one of 
these things with pleasure or not without pleasure. And others also include external good 
season [τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν]” (1098b23-26). After this brief survey, he then goes on to 
consider a subset of these legomena in more detail, following the order in which he 
initially surveyed them. First he deals with the relation of eudaimonia to excellence, then 
to pleasure, then to external good season. To be precise, however, it is a discussion of the 
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external goods that corresponds to the reference in the initial survey to external good 
season.120  
It will be useful to examine briefly how Aristotle deals with the views concerning 
excellence and pleasure for the sake of comparison to his treatment of the view that 
eudaimonia needs the external goods. Turning first to the view that eudaimonia is 
excellence, he says that his own view is “in harmony with those who say that eudaimonia 
is excellence or some kind of excellence” (1098b30-31). He then goes on to clarify that 
his view is that eudaimonia is an activity of excellence, in implicit contrast to the claim 
that eudaimonia is simply excellence itself. Finally, he offers some fresh evidence to 
support his claim that it is an activity rather than a state. Thus the initial legomenon can 
be sharply distinguished from his actual view, but Aristotle nevertheless takes it to 
provide some kind of support for that view. 
Next, Aristotle returns to the view that pleasure accompanies eudaimonia. Rather 
than attributing the legomenon under consideration to a third party, however, as he has 
just done in the case of excellence, he simply states what turns out to be his own view, 
that the life of the virtuous is “sweet in itself” (καθ’ αὑτὸν ἡδύς). He then defends this 
claim in terms of his own theory, giving a seamless argument that fine actions are 
pleasurable for the lovers-of-the-fine (φιλόκαλοι), and that their life therefore contains 
pleasure in itself.121 Interestingly, he also says that the life of the virtuous does not “have 
further need” (piροσδεῖται) of pleasure (1098a15-16), since pleasure is contained within 
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 I discuss the distinction between the external goods and good luck below. 
121
 When I say that the argument is seamless, I mean that Aristotle gives the impression of 
regarding it as such, not that the argument is completely successful. Most obviously, base and 
fine things other than his own actions—in particular, the actions of his fellow citizens—also seem 
to be potential sources of pleasure and pain for the virtuous agent. 
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such a life. This is important, since it turns out to be precisely the opposite of what he 
will say about the relation of the external goods to eudaimonia. According to this 
argument at least, pleasure also quite neatly avoids interfering with eudaimonia’s self-
sufficiency and finality, since it is simply part acting virtuously to take pleasure in that 
action, and thus presumably such pleasure is chosen along with that action by a virtuous 
agent, as part of the package as it were.122 Thus, although Aristotle makes no explicit 
mention of his definition of eudaimonia as virtuous activity, he is able to take a position 
that subsumes the view that eudaimonia is something “with pleasure or not without 
pleasure” (1098b25), and argue for it in terms that are wholly consistent with this 
definition.123  
Aristotle then turns to a related topic, which helps to form the transition to his shift to 
a discussion about the external goods. Here, Aristotle rejects a Delian epigram’s 
definition of the best, the finest, and the sweetest as separate, and asserts that all these 
things in fact belong to activity, referring back to the conclusion of the function 
argument. Although this epigram is not anticipated in the brief survey of legomena earlier 
(1098b23-26), its reference to what is sweetest seems natural after the discussion of 
pleasure. And it serves as a kind of legomenon par excellence here, insofar as it is a word 
for word quotation of an attempt to describe how different kinds of value are to be 
distinguished. After this, Aristotle then returns to the external goods: “Nevertheless it is 
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 Elsewhere Aristotle indicates that this relationship is not quite so neat, saying that generous 
actions are done “with pleasure or not without pain” (IV.1120a26). 
123
 I say wholly consistent, but there is some slippage. In the function argument, Aristotle defines 
eudaimonia as “activity” (ἐνέργεια) in accord with virtue, whereas he later freely alternates 
between piρᾶξις (“action”) and ἐνέργεια (“activity”), treating the two as synonyms. 
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evident that there is also further need of the external goods, just as we have said” 
(1099a31-32).  
There are two important things that structure Aristotle’s transition here. First, 
Aristotle positions the discussion of the external goods in response to the immediately 
preceding treatment of the Delian couplet. He writes that “nevertheless [ὅµως] it is 
evident that there is also [καί] an additional need [piροσδεοµένη] of the external goods” 
(1099a31-32). Both the prefix piροσ- and the Greek word “also” (καί) very clearly 
indicate that something additional is needed. It is also pretty clear that what Aristotle 
actually means is something additional to activity—since he has just insisted that the 
finest, sweetest, and best all belong to activity and can therefore all neatly be subsumed 
under his definition of eudaimonia, thus allowing him to reject the division and proposing 
a unified good in its place. The transitional word “nevertheless” (ὅµως) also indicates a 
contrast, apparently acknowledging that while activity (ἐνέργεια) can subsume the 
sweetest, finest, and best, it cannot subsume the external goods—at least not in quite the 
same way. The other important thing that structures Aristotle’s transition to the external 
goods here, is that this discussion corresponds to the final legomenon about eudaimonia 
that Aristotle had so briefly surveyed earlier at 1098b22-29, that others “also include 
external good season” (καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συµpiαραλαµβάνουσιν), so that the 
order in which he considers excellence, pleasure, and the external goods follows the order 
in which these legomena are initially surveyed. This is important, because it suggests that 






Ιs The View that Eudaimonia Needs the External Goods a Legomenon? 
 
The context strongly supports interpreting the claim that eudaimonia needs the external 
goods as a legomenon—because of the initial declaration of a shift to an inquiry “from 
what is said” at the beginning of NE I.8-12 (1098b9-12), because this claim corresponds 
to one of the legomena briefly surveyed earlier, and finally because of the actual method 
Aristotle has been pursuing in treating the views about excellence, pleasure, and the 
Delian couplet as legomena subject to refinement or rejection. Despite this expectation, 
Aristotle remarks that eudaimonia “evidently has a further need” for the external goods, 
thus qualifying this claim with much stronger language than that he uses to express 
endoxa and legomena. This creates a puzzle, since the argumentative context suggests 
interpreting this as a legomenon, but the language that Aristotle uses to express the claim 
does not.124 
Indeed, Aristotle typically describes endoxa or legomena that he regards as subject to 
modification or rejection using tentative language—such as δοκεῖ, or passive or generic 
active forms of λέγω or φηµί, or substantive forms of φαίνω such as φαινόµενα (“the 
things that appear”).125 The verb φαίνεται with the participle, however, means “it is 
evident,” and is thus distinguished from the infinitive construction “it seems.” Bonitz’s 
Index Aristotelicus as well as a survey of the instances of φαίνεται throughout NE I 
                                                 
124
 Broadie (2002) ad loc. supposes that Aristotle’s use of φαίνεται with the participle in this 
passage suggests that this is a “received view,” although in fact Aristotle typically uses less 
forceful expressions such as δοκεῖ with the infinitive or λέγεται to express legomena and endoxa 
that he regards as subject to modification or rejection. 
125
 For examples of λέγω, φηµί, and δοκεῖ to describe endoxa that are subject to modification or 
rejection see: NE VII.1145b8-20. 
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confirms that Aristotle maintains this distinction in usage between the participle and 
infinitive constructions, so that the distinction in meaning is no mere grammarian’s 
invention.126 Thus, for example, at NE I.1097b22-24 Aristotle uses the construction to 
draw a contrast between what is established—that is, what is evident—and what remains 
to be established in the course of his inquiry. And Bonitz likewise offers an example 
where an observation that is close to pure perception is expressed with φαίνεται and the 
participle—that animals have been encased in amber.127  
Describing something as evident amounts to treating it as established, yet this is very 
clearly not the status that endoxa generally or the legomena in NE I.8-12 have for 
Aristotle. For one thing, Aristotle has stated earlier in the “things said” section of NE I 
that popular consensus is not likely to be entirely wrong, but to get at least one thing or 
perhaps most things right (1098b28-29)—which clearly implies that some such views 
may simply have to be rejected, and thus corresponds to the view that Aristotle takes on 
endoxa in NE VII.1145b2-7, where he indicates that some views may be discarded. For 
another thing, Aristotle in fact goes on to reject the view that eudaimonia consists in 
excellence, as well as the claim that he mines from the Delian couplet—that the finest, 
sweetest, and best things are distinct (1098b30-1099a7; 1099a24-31). And the legomena 
that eudaimonia is wisdom (σοφία) or practical wisdom (φρόνησις) are implicitly 
rejected, since these are states rather than activities (1098b24).  
Aristotle’s treatment of the legomenon that eudaimonia involves pleasure is different. 
When Aristotle comes to pleasure, he states directly that the life of the virtuous is sweet 
in itself (1099a7). Here, however, Aristotle clearly does not regard this statement as a 
                                                 
126
 Bonitz (1955) ad loc. 
127
 Meteorologica 388b21. 
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legomenon, but rather as his own view, which simply corresponds to the earlier 
legomenon about the role of pleasure in eudaimonia. There is no need to say that this 
view is evident, because the argument demonstrates it unproblematically in terms of 
Aristotle’s formal definition of eudaimonia as virtuous activity.128 Thus Aristotle’s 
treatment of the view that eudaimonia needs the external goods here is unusual, since he 
regards it as evident, and thus not as subject to rejection, and yet at the same time his 
argument fails to demonstrate it unproblematically in terms of his formal definition of 
eudaimonia as virtuous activity—as I shall show in the next section.129 Furthermore, it 
amounts to an important substantive refinement or development of his position, rather 
than mere endoxic testing of an already established position. Thus the formal 
methodological context differs from his actual on-the-ground treatment of a claim. 
It is true that Aristotle often regards a schematic, pre-philosophical view of some kind 
as universally agreed upon, and therefore as beyond dispute. But this does not seem to 
apply to Aristotle’s declaration that eudaimonia evidently has further need of the external 
goods. Such allegedly universally agreed upon views are generally schematic, and used to 
outline or confirm a general position, rather than extending, refining, or developing the 
substance of a theory that Aristotle is working out. Thus, for example, Aristotle regards it 
as universally agreed upon that eudaimonia is the highest good “in name” (ὀνόµατι), but 
makes it quite clear that the substance of eudaimonia remains to be specified. And 
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 At least, this is how Aristotle regards this argument. It is certainly possible to wonder whether 
fine actions and pleasure are as neatly joined as Aristotle supposes here—even according to his 
own theory. For example, at one point Aristotle himself remarks that the pleasure of a virtuous 
action depends upon its reaching its end (NE III.9.1117b15-16). It is not necessary to pursue this 
question here, however. 
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 See, however, Aristotle’s claim at NE VII.1146a7-9 that no one would claim that the 
phronimos is the same as the akratic—where Aristotle is perhaps ascribing his own technical 
definition of φρόνησις to those who agree to this.  
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indeed, at one point Aristotle uses φαίνεται and the participle to express that this 
agreement is evident (1097b22-24). One might, of course, ask whether in this case, too, 
Aristotle is presenting a schematic, pre-theoretical view about the relation between 
eudaimonia and the external goods, where eudaimonia is meant in the pre-technical sense 
established early in his inquiry as agreed upon “in name” as the highest practical good. 
Yet the argument that follows this statement at least initially presumes the technical 
definition of eudaimonia, so that Aristotle seems to be trying to refine or develop his 
theory rather than merely describing a pre-theoretical consensus about eudaimonia.  
Thus this claim cannot be regarded as reflecting a pre-theoretical consensus, because 
the argument for it that immediately follows is made in terms of the formal definition of 
eudaimonia. Nor can it be regarded as a legomenon, because it is described as evident 
rather than something that is said or seems to be the case. Thus its status is unique.  
 
 
How Does Aristotle Argue for the External Goods Requirement? 
 
Now that I have contextualized the claim that eudaimonia needs the external goods 
within NE I, and shown that the language that Aristotle uses to express this view implies 
that it relies upon some stronger authority than legomena or endoxa, I shall examine the 
argument itself. The very fact that Aristotle states the view, then advances an argument 
for it, rather than simply testing it against his theory and making a remark about the 
relation between the two, however, suggests that it has a special status. Looking at the 
argument itself will help to clarify exactly how Aristotle regards the claim. Before I begin 
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my analysis of Aristotle’s argument, however, it is important to consider a problem about 
what Aristotle is trying to accomplish in the course of this argument.  
The difficulty concerns the relation between the argument that eudaimonia needs the 
external goods, and the central claims about eudaimonia that Aristotle has already 
advanced in NE I. Aristotle has defined eudaimonia as a final and self-sufficient good 
consisting in excellent activity; he then de facto specifies this activity as excellent 
practical activity, or virtuous action, in the discussion that follows. Eudaimonia is final in 
the sense that all other goods are chosen for its sake, and it is not chosen for the sake of 
anything else (1097a15-b6). And it is self-sufficient in the sense that it cannot be 
improved by the addition of any other good (1097b6-21). In order to prove that 
eudaimonia has an as yet unspecified need for the external goods, Aristotle merely needs 
to show that in some cases an agent must rely upon some such goods in order to engage 
in virtuous activity. This is very easy, of course, and it is sufficient to point out, for 
example, that generous and magnificent acts require wealth. But if eudaimonia is a final 
good—and all other goods are chosen for its sake—then the external goods too must be 
chosen for its sake, and thus something further must be shown. To make this as clear as 
possible, if the external goods are chosen for the sake of eudaimonia in the particular 
sense that they contribute something to virtuous activity,130 and if this contribution turned 
out to be necessary for the kind of virtuous activity that constitutes eudaimonia, then 
eudaimonia would have a particularly clear need for the external goods—Aristotle’s 
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 The finality criterion may also be understood to indicate some less straightforward relation 
between other goods and virtuous activity. According to Richardson Lear (2004) 85-92, 
teleological approximation of one good for another good is sufficient to satisfy the finality 
criterion. On this interpretation, one good need not contribute to another good in order to be 
understood as chosen for its sake.  
110 
 
argument and the view that eudaimonia needs the external goods would fold together. 
That is, in this case the external goods’ value would be defined in terms of a concrete 
contribution to virtuous activity, and the kind of excellent activity that amounts to 
eudaimonia would depend upon the external goods in order to be actualized. The 
question, then, is whether Aristotle relies upon this latter line of reasoning in order to 
both defend his claim that eudaimonia needs the external goods and also at the same time 
preserve his formal definition of eudaimonia as a final good consisting in virtuous 
activity.131  
Now that I have made this point, I shall look at the specific argument that Aristotle 
actually gives here: 
 
A. Happiness evidently also has a further need [piροσδεοµένη] of external 
goods [τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν], just as we have said (1099a31-32) 
B. For [γάρ] it is impossible or not easy to do [piράττειν] fine things 
without resources [ἀχορήγητος] (1099a32-33) 
C. For many things [piολλὰ µὲν γάρ] are done [piράττεται] just as 
through instruments [καθάpiερ δι’ ὀργάνων]—through [διά] friends, 
wealth, and political power (1099a33-1099b2) 
D. But when men lack certain other things [ἐνίων δέ], their blessedness 
[τὸ µακάριον] is tarnished—such as good birth, the blessing of children, 
and beauty (1099b2-3) 
E. For [γάρ] the one who is ugly in looks, or ill-born, or lonely and 
childless is not a happy sort [εὐδαιµονικός] (1099b3-4) 
F. And still less so if his children or friends should be wicked, or—
although good—if they have died (1099b5-6) 
A’. Thus just as we have said, there seems to be need [ἔοικε piροσδεῖσθαι] 
also of such good season (1099b6-7) 
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Here, Aristotle advances a thesis (that eudaimonia needs the external goods) (A), offers 
an initial justification in terms of his formal definition of eudaimonia (that is impossible 
or not easy to do fine things without the external goods) (B), and then different 
subjustifications for this (C-F) that variously seem to be made in terms of his definition 
of eudaimonia as virtuous activity, and not in such terms. Finally, he restates his thesis in 
a slightly different form (A’).  
The initial claim that eudaimonia needs the external goods is straightforwardly 
justified by the immediately following γάρ clause, which states that “it is impossible or 
not easy to perform fine actions without resources.” A person “without resources” 
(ἀχορήγητος) is evidently a person lacking the external goods, and the justification is 
made in terms of Aristotle’s formal definition of εὐδαιµονία as consisting in activity 
(ἐνέργεια) or action (piρᾶξις). Thus Aristotle begins the argument by offering a 
justification for the claim that eudaimonia needs the external goods transparently in terms 
of eudaimonia’s formal definition. It is also worth emphasizing that χορηγεῖν literally 
refers to performing a particular kind of socially sanctioned public service—namely, 
financing a chorus, where the chorus is then able to use this money to do something—
namely, to play their part in a drama as a chorus. Thus the very term ἀχορήγητος 
implies lacking the resources to do something, an implication that is made explicit in 
Aristotle’s initial justification that for such an ἀχορήγητος “it is impossible or not easy 
to perform fine actions.” 
It should, however, be immediately clear that depending on how this initial 
justification (B) is construed, it may nevertheless fail to offer a secure proof of the initial 
claim that such goods are needed (A), since this initial justification is given as a 
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disjunction.132 Thus if it is impossible to perform fine actions without the external goods, 
then such goods are needed for eudaimonia. But if instead it is not easy (i.e., possible but 
difficult) to perform fine actions without the external goods, then they do not seem to be 
necessary at all.133 If Aristotle regards the initial claim as evident, however, then he does 
not necessarily have to offer a secure proof of it. He may, instead, regard this argument as 
supporting rather than proving the initial claim. The sub-justifications for this first 
argument (C-D)—which are offered in the lines that follow using a µὲν γάρ…δέ 
construction—may help to resolve the ambiguity in the disjunction of the initial claim—
that is difficult or not easy to perform fine actions without the external goods.  
While the µὲν γάρ subjustification (C) might be able to support a stricter 
specification of the initial justification (B)—that fine actions are impossible rather than 
merely difficult without the external goods—the latter part of the argument introduced by 
the δέ clause (D-F) does not support a stronger construal of that initial disjunctive 
justification (B), since it says nothing about how action depends upon the external goods, 
which is what the initial disjunctive justification depends upon. And, as I have pointed 
out, a stricter construal of this argument would be required in order to prove the initial 
claim that eudaimonia needs the external goods.  
And not only does the latter part of the argument (D-F) fail to support a stricter 
construal of the initial justification (B), but it also seems to be made outside of the terms 
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 Brown (2006) 233 argues that needs here should be understood in a relaxed sense, on the basis 
of charity, but Aristotle is consistent on eudaimonia’s need for good luck and the external goods 
throughout NE I. 
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 That is, as long as doing fine actions is all that is required for eudaimonia, which is the 
implication here. If one considers the later accounts of particular virtues, however, something 
more than fine action is apparently required—the full range of determinate types of fine action 
corresponding to the particular virtues. 
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of Aristotle’s own theory, so that it fails to offer a theory specific explanation of the value 
of the external goods for eudaimonia at all. First, Aristotle makes no reference to action 
or activity throughout the second part of the argument (1099b2-8). Second, in place of 
giving explanations in the technical language of this work, he instead uses metaphorical 
language to describe how certain conditions affect the quality of a person’s life (D), and 
the vague εὐδαιµονικός (“a happy sort”) (E). Third, he refers to blessedness rather than 
happiness at one point in this section (D) and not before, even though the initial thesis is 
about eudaimonia. Finally, in the latter part of his argument, he considers the influence of 
loss rather than mere lack upon happiness (F), which perhaps raises a new question.  
Scholars have debated whether Aristotle uses “blessedness” [τὸ µακάριον] as a 
synonym for eudaimonia, or to mean something different and—in violation of his own 
theory—better than eudaimonia.134 Yet the fact that this alternation coincides perfectly 
with Aristotle’s alternation from an argument made in terms of action, to an argument 
that makes no reference to action and instead uses vague and metaphorical language, 
strongly suggests that the word means something distinct from eudaimonia here. The 
evidence thus suggests that Aristotle is using “blessedness” here to mean something other 
than eudaimonia as he has formally defined it.   
Furthermore, Aristotle is quite capable of making an explanation for something in 
terms of his theory when he chooses. Thus, for example, he argues that the view that 
honor is the good can be explained by the value that men attach to virtue, since they want 
to be honored for virtue (I.1095b23-30). Yet although he has defined eudaimonia as 
activity, and initially defends his claim that it needs the external goods in just these terms, 
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 Nussbaum (2001) 329, for example, insists that Aristotle is using the terms interchangeably. 
Joachim (1951) 58-59, on the other hand supposes the two terms to have distinct meanings. 
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he makes no reference to activity or action in the latter part of his argument here, instead 
relying on language that is not part of his technical philosophical apparatus.  
The failure of Aristotle to offer a theory specific explanation for how the external 
goods contribute to eudaimonia suggests that he regards them as making an accidental 
rather than essential contribution to virtuous action—perhaps despite himself. That is, if 
they were reckoned as external goods by virtue of contributing to virtuous activity, and 
indeed as choiceworthy for its sake (a type of teleological relation), and if eudaimonia 
were supposed to depend upon this contribution in order to be realized, the argument 
would not be difficult to make, and there would be no need to remark that the need for 
such goods is evident—the argument itself would make it so, just as Aristotle regards his 
argument about the role of pleasure in eudaimonia as doing.  
 
 
How Are the External Goods Defined? 
 
As I have argued, Aristotle seems to treat the external goods as standing at least partly 
outside his formal theory. When he first introduces the external goods within the 
legomenon section of NE I.8-12, he uses them as one of several endoxic confirmations of 
his formal definition of eudaimonia, rather than to elaborate a new feature of his theory. 
Later in this same legomenon section, when Aristotle says that it is evident that 
eudaimonia needs the external goods, he is using language atypical of his treatment of 
endoxa to assert the manifest need for such goods. And in his argument for this claim he 
seems to try, but fails, to explain how such external goods contribute to eudaimonia in 
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terms of his formal definition of eudaimonia as action. Thus, he seems to regard 
eudaimonia’s need for such goods neither as a legomenon, nor subject to justification 
strictly in terms of his theory. Thus the status of this claim is somewhat unique.  
Not only does Aristotle treat the value of the external goods for eudaimonia as having 
some extra-theoretical plausibility, he also gives examples of the external goods that 
seem very conventional. Thus, all of the examples that Aristotle offers are the kinds of 
things that people ordinarily attach value to, and no such ordinarily valued external good 
seems to be intentionally excluded from his list. Accordingly he mentions wealth, beauty, 
political power, friends, and honor all among the external goods.135  
Thus Aristotle both treats the external goods as having some special status in the 
course of constructing his argument, and at the same time the examples of external goods 
that he offers seem conventional. This suggests that Aristotle may recognize them as 
being good and contributing to eudaimonia simply because of their conventional or 
intuitive value, rather than for theory-specific reasons.  
One way to object to this view would be to claim that even if the external goods 
consist of a set of things conventionally regarded as good, all of these goods nevertheless 
have some value specifically for excellent activity. In this case, a theory-specific and 
conventional evaluation of their value could actually result in an identical set of goods, 
even if perhaps each mode of evaluation would select that identical set as good for 
different reasons. In this case, the virtuous happy man and the wicked man might desire 
the same set of external goods, but for different purposes.   
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 Honor, however, is not mentioned among the examples used in the “official” argument for the 
claim that eudaimonia needs the external goods at 1099a31-b8. 
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Thus for each specific external good that Aristotle names as an example, however 
conventional it might seem, a theory-specific explanation of its value might be offered. 
Along these lines, John Cooper has suggested that beauty is valuable for the happy life by 
making the beautiful one more sexually appealing, thereby generating more temptation 
and greater opportunity for temperance.136 Scholars have been skeptical of this suggestion 
on intuitive grounds, since there seems something at any rate unusual about valuing 
beauty for its temperance-facilitating power.137 Yet there is a deeper problem. If one 
insists that the essential property of each external good is some potential or actual relation 
to virtuous activity, then any given external good must be defined in terms of some such 
relation. And, if this is so, an unconventional set of goods must result.  
Thus, for example, if one defines beauty (κάλλος) as precisely the appearance in face 
and body that best facilitates excellent activity over the course of a person’s life, this 
picks out certain appearances as good and rules out other appearances. But if one defines 
beauty as just those looks that are most pleasurable to look at, this selects a different set 
of looks. Perhaps in many cases, for many people, conventional beauty will facilitate 
greater virtuous action, but it is unlikely in the extreme that conventional beauty will in 
every case most effectively facilitate virtuous action over the course of that person’s 
life—even if virtuous action is defined in terms of an aristocratic social life. For example, 
in combination with a particular sort of personality, ears that stick out to the side might 
set others at ease in social situations, because they are somewhat amusing, and thus 
facilitate the virtue of friendliness, though they might not be regarded exactly as 
beautiful. 
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 Cooper (1985) 182. 
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 See Botros (1987) 113 for a critique, and Brown (2006) 235 for a defense of Cooper’s view. 
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Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists 66, records a criticism advanced by Ariston 
against the Stoic category of the preferred indifferents along these lines. Ariston claims 
that what is preferred or dispreferred can only be determined in relation to a particular 
situation. He then offers the example of a tyrant who chooses only the healthy for his 
army, releasing the sick—showing that in this situation, it is sickness that is preferred and 
health that is dispreferred. Against this sort of critique of his account of the external 
goods, Aristotle might argue that he is simply identifying the set of those things that tend 
to be useful for virtuous activity. Even this argument, however, is unsustainable.   
If, in fact, the essential property of the external goods were tending to make some 
kind of contribution to excellent activity, then even those things conventionally regarded 
as evils would have to turn out to be external goods. Thus things such as bloody wars that 
provided the opportunity for bravery, or a plentiful supply of physically attractive and 
inexpensive prostitutes that provided the opportunity for temperance, or poverty that 
could be alleviated by generosity, would all also have to be reckoned as external 
goods.138 Such an evaluative scheme is clearly highly unconventional, and Aristotle’s 
very conventional examples of external goods do nothing to suggest that he embraced 
such a scheme. Many things both facilitate virtue and have some other feature that is 
conventionally regarded as bad, but this is the whole difficulty. If the external goods are 
just those things that facilitate virtue, regardless of how they might be evaluated on some 
more conventional scheme, then the examples themselves seem suspiciously 
conventional.   
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 Interestingly, in Politics II.1263b5-14, Aristotle defends inequality in property and the 
traditional institution of marriage in terms of their value for generosity and temperance. He is not, 
of course, categorizing these things as external goods, however. 
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One way to try to explain this difficulty would be to suppose that it is a sufficient 
supply of external goods, with some hardship mixed in, that would most effectively 
facilitate virtuous activity.139 On the face of it, this seems very reasonable. Yet if this 
combination were what effectively facilitated virtuous action, and if the external goods 
were indeed defined as good strictly by virtue of their contribution to virtuous activity, 
then this blend of favorable and difficult circumstances would form the true set of 
external goods. Yet Aristotle does not define the external goods in this way. He does say 
at one point that the happy man needs a sufficient supply of the external goods (NE 
I.1101a14-16). But there is a crucial difference between requiring a sufficient supply of 
the external goods, and saying that whatever things are sufficient for the exercise of 
virtue are the external goods. These considerations help to explain why Aristotle tries, 
but fails, to give a theory specific explanation for the value of the external goods, and 
why the external goods cannot be understood as choiceworthy for the sake of eudaimonia 
in any straightforward sense—as the finality criterion seems to require.140 
 
 
Defining Good Luck and the External Goods in Relation to Eudaimonia 
 
There is, however, one passage in NE VII where Aristotle comes close to directly 
confronting the problem that I have just considered in the previous section—of whether 
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 As Cooper (1985) 188 suggests. 
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 Broadie (1991) 31-32 makes the interesting suggestion that the “for the sake of” relation might 
be interpreted broadly, to include situations where eudaimonia acts as a constraint upon the 
choice of something, rather than actually forming the end for the sake of which it is chosen. If this 
is what Aristotle had in mind, however, his struggle to explain why eudaimonia needs the 
external goods (I.1099a31-b8) would be inexplicable.  
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the external goods are defined as good in reference to eudaimonia or in some other more 
conventional way. In this passage, Aristotle approaches this question in reference to good 
luck, however, and not in reference to the external goods. In fact, he actually defines 
good luck in reference to eudaimonia here. It will be useful to look carefully at this 
passage to consider whether the view that he briefly touches on here should be used to 
interpret his view of the external goods.  
Here, Aristotle first points out that εὐδαιµονία and εὐτυχία are not equivalent. Then, 
as evidence for their distinctness from one another, he says that excessive good fortune 
impedes happiness (NE VII.1153b21-25). But apparently seeing something odd in the 
idea that good fortune could interfere with eudaimonia, he revises his definition of good 
fortune, saying that such excessive good fortune does not count as good fortune at all, 
since good fortune itself must be defined in relation to happiness. This, of course, has the 
odd consequence of narrowing the distinction between good fortune and eudaimonia that 
Aristotle initially insisted on here, but his train of thought is clear.  
Before considering the implications of the view itself, it is important to point out first 
that Aristotle gives the impression of stumbling upon this problem. This is clear from the 
fact that he initially says that excessive good fortune impedes eudaimonia, then 
reconsiders, redefines good luck in terms of eudaimonia, and finally rejects his initial 
view that excessive good luck can interfere with eudaimonia. Thus this passage gives the 
impression that Aristotle had not thought very carefully about the problem of whether 
good luck, at any rate, is independently good, or whether instead its value arises purely 
from some teleological relation to virtuous activity—even though the finality and self-
sufficiency criteria that he develops in NE I seem to require him to take the latter 
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position. Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether the view that he ultimately takes 
here can be applied to his view of the external goods or not.  
The implications of the view seem clear. If good luck is defined in terms of 
eudaimonia, and Aristotle is using eudaimonia to mean virtuous activity (as in his formal 
definition of it), then the idea must be that luck which promotes such activity is evaluated 
as good luck, while luck which interferes with such activity is bad luck. (The context in 
NE VII, a discussion of pleasure as unimpeded activity, also reinforces this 
interpretation.) Thus, this redefinition of good luck seems to result in a kind of 
consequentialist evaluative framework according to which the value of any luck that 
befalls a moral agent arises strictly from its contribution to eudaimonia—that is, its 
contribution to his virtuous activity. As with the redefinition of the external goods that I 
imagined above, this would result in a rather unconventional notion of good luck, 
regardless of whether the virtuous activity of some aggregate of agents were considered, 
or one individual moral agent. Thus again, a very unconventional consequentialist 
evaluative scheme results from taking this idea seriously.  
There is, however, a crucial difference between defining good luck in respect to 
virtuous action, and defining the external goods in this way. In particular, good luck by 
its very nature must consist in luck that is judged to be good against some particular 
standard. Without such a standard, good luck is a meaningless category. Thus defining 
good luck in terms of its contribution to some particular fine action, is unconventional, 
but does not create any formal or conceptual problems; it must always be defined in 
relation to some standard of what is good.   
121 
 
Redefining the external goods in this way, on the other hand—to return to the subject 
of the previous section—is much more difficult. The particular examples of the external 
goods that Aristotle offers appear to have stable definitions. Thus wealth seems to count 
as wealth and to be reckoned as a genuine good by virtue of being useful in exchange. 
And beauty seems to count as beauty and to be reckoned as a genuine good by being fine 
or pleasant to look at. Yet as long as particular external goods are defined in this way, as 
possessing stable definitions and as prima facie goods apart from any particular 
circumstances, they will not necessarily make any contribution to virtuous action. To put 
the matter in another way, they make an accidental contribution to virtuous activity, but 
not an essential one.  
As I have argued here, the external goods cannot simply be assimilated to good luck. 
Whereas good luck is whatever luck counts as good, according to some as-yet 
unspecified account of what is good, the particular external goods presuppose particular 
kinds of value that are not obviously reducible to one another. This crucial distinction 
between good luck and the external goods also seems to me to provide a good reason for 
avoiding the term “goods of fortune” that has become popular in recent scholarship on 
the external goods.141 While this term need not be taken to entail the formal identity of 
good luck and the external goods, it has been used to support a broader interpretation of 
the external goods—according to which things such as the achievement of aimed-at 
consequences, and opportunities favorable to excellent activity would be counted among 
the external goods.142 Nevertheless, as I have argued, it is not at all clear that these things 
can simply be subsumed within the class of the external goods—in particular, because 
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 As far as I have been able to tell, this term is originally introduced by Cooper (1985). 
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 Cooper (1985) & Brown (2006). 
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they are defined in terms of some relation to excellent activity or deliberation in a way 
that the external goods do not seem to be.  
Of course, it is true that Aristotle sometimes refers to good fortune and the external 
goods interchangeably in the NE.143 And it is also true that the external goods very often 
will be due largely to luck. Nevertheless, Aristotle offers two separate explanations for 
why eudaimonia needs the external goods (1099a31-b8) and good luck (1100b18-
1101a14). And while these explanations are quite similar, Aristotle’s choice to deal with 
them separately suggests that he sees them as at least somewhat distinct. Thus the 
conceptual difficulty of identifying the external goods and good fortune is not the only 
objection to treating them as identical to one another—Aristotle himself, even as he 
sometimes treats them interchangeably, nevertheless never entirely assimilates them to 
one another.  
Despite all this, I think in certain contexts, there is a good case for treating the 
external goods and good luck together, which may explain why Aristotle does so, and 
which will prove to be important for the final section of this chapter. Namely, the 
external goods and good luck are both things that stand outside of the agent in some 
sense, and yet at the same time are judged by Aristotle to make some contribution to his 
eudaimonia. Thus in those cases where Aristotle’s primary concern is the somewhat 
broader question of how the full range of things outside an agent generally may 
contribute to his eudaimonia, it would be quite natural for him to group them together.  
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 As, for example, in his reformulation (1099b7-8) of the thesis that eudaimonia needs the 
external goods (1099a31-32). 
123 
 
How Does Aristotle Evaluate the Contribution of the External Goods and Luck to 
Eudaimonia?  
 
Now that I have considered the difficulties of Aristotle’s argument for eudaimonia’s need 
for the external goods, as well as the reasons why this argument turns out to be strained, I 
shall turn to examining exactly how he describes the contribution of the external goods to 
eudaimonia. In fact, Aristotle offers separate discussions explaining first why eudaimonia 
needs the external goods (I.1099a31-b8), and then why it needs good luck (I.1100b18-
1101a14). Thus despite the fact that Aristotle sometimes treats the external goods and 
good luck as interchangeable, these two separate arguments suggest that he regards good 
luck and the external goods as distinct. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
the full range of those things outside of an agent would contribute to eudaimonia within 
some restricted range of value, given their shared characteristics. After all, these things at 
least have in common the fact that, from the perspective of any particular agent, they are 
not the activation of his soul. Furthermore, even if the external goods are not obtained 
exclusively through good luck, good luck is very often this source—so that at any rate 
they would seem to have kinds of value that overlap. These reasons for suspecting that 
Aristotle would assign a similar value to the external goods and good luck is given some 
confirmation in the similar language that Aristotle uses in his arguments about the value 
of the external goods and good luck for eudaimonia. Thus while my main interest here is 
in Aristotle’s argument about the external goods, I shall look to his remarks on good luck 
to help resolve some potential obscurity in this argument.  
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As I have argued above, when Aristotle puts forward his official justification for the 
claim that eudaimonia evidently has further need of the external goods, that explanation 
breaks down into two basic parts: a theory-specific explanation in terms of action, and a 
second explanation that does not seem to be made in terms of the narrow definition of 
eudaimonia as virtuous activity. It is this so-called second explanation that I am 
interested in here. When Aristotle makes this second explanation he says that when men 
lack certain external goods “they soil [ῥυpiαίνουσι] their blessedness [τὸ µακάριον]” 
(1099a33-b3).  
Although this language is metaphorical, it is nevertheless possible to try to extract 
some underlying meaning from it. The verb used here, ῥυpiαίνω, comes from the noun 
ῥύpiος meaning “dirt, filth,” so its literal meaning is “to dirty, to soil.” There must be 
some underlying good in order for something to be dirtied or tainted; dirt itself cannot be 
made dirty. And the taint cannot be so severe as to destroy this underlying good; if it is so 
severe, the taint simply becomes destruction or corruption. Thus presumably it is sullied 
specifically in the sense that the underlying or primary good is at least partly preserved, 
while the primary good is diminished or some secondary good is removed. This 
suggestion is supported by Aristotle’s claim elsewhere that τὸ καλόν (“the fine”) is 
retained even when misfortune removes eudaimonia (1100b30-34).144 Since it is 
blessedness rather than eudaimonia that is being tainted—a term that Aristotle first 
introduces here when he finds it difficult to explain the value of the external goods in 
terms of action—perhaps Aristotle means that this secondary good consists of whatever 
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 Aristotle does not explicitly say here that such misfortune can remove eudaimonia, but it is 
implied by his claim that such misfortune cannot render a man “wretched” (ἄθλιος), and 
elsewhere he explicitly indicates that misfortune can remove eudaimonia (I.1100a8-9). 
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does not contribute to eudaimonia according to its narrow definition as virtuous activity. 
In this case, the taint might amount to a removal of the independent and conventional 
value of the external goods which cannot be entirely subsumed within eudaimonia. This 
suggestion is supported by Aristotle’s implicit admission of cases in which τὸ καλόν is 
retained but eudaimonia is not at 100b30-35. 
When describing how serious good luck makes life more blessed, as in the other cases 
considered here, Aristotle once again gives two distinct explanations for its value.145 
Aristotle explains: “for they provide a further natural ornament to happiness, and the use 
of these is a fine thing and a matter of virtue” (1100b26-28). The latter explanation here 
seems to correspond closely to the use explanation that we encountered earlier, although 
here Aristotle does not specify that such events are useful specifically as instruments. The 
former explanation seems to match closely the so-called “second explanation” for how 
lacking the external goods and suffering bad luck contribute to happiness. But here, 
Aristotle is giving a description for how something outside a moral agent contributes to, 
rather than detracts from, the quality of his life, so it may shed some additional light on 
his remarks on the external goods.146  
In this description of the positive contribution of good luck to eudaimonia here, 
Aristotle says that many great pieces of fortune make life happier, “because they 
themselves contribute a further natural adornment to life” (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεpiικοσµεῖν 
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 Stewart (1892/1999) v. 1, 146 understands these as two distinct explanations. Against my 
interpretation, however, an anonymous scholiast, understands the second explanation (“the use of 
them is a fine and serious thing”) as an explanation of the first (“they provide a further 
ornament”). 
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 Stewart (1892/1999) 129 & Botros (1987) 113 also assume this correspondence between 
Aristotle’s “second explanation” of the influence of the external goods on happiness and this part 
of his explanation for how good events contribute to happiness. 
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piέφυκεν) (1100b26-27). Aristotle uses the emphatic nominative form αὐτά here, and 
these things—the events constituting good luck—are the subject of the verb (piέφυκεν), as 
though they were acting on an agent from the outside, and as if that agent were simply 
passively affected by these events. Grammar does not always indicate a deeper meaning, 
but it is suggestive. It is also interesting that Aristotle alludes to nature here—apparently 
an altogether different form of authority, which perhaps indicates that even apart from 
any sophisticated framework for ethical appraisal certain kinds of events have some 
unquestionable worth.   
The Greek word that Aristotle uses here to describe the contribution of great good 
luck to life is κοσµέω, meaning to ornament or decorate. (This word group is often used 
specifically to describe women’s cosmetics.) As Aspasius already recognized in his 
commentary to the NE, a κόσµος means an addition: an ornament does not make 
beautiful bodies beautiful; beautiful bodies are already such and, to quote Aspasius, the 
ornament is rather something added or “placed around” (piεριτεθειµένος).147 And 
Aristotle’s use of the prefixes συν- “together with” and ἐpiι- “on top of” to form 
συνεpiικοσµέω emphasize further that the ornament is additional to something.148 So the 
metaphor of further ornamenting a life seems to be a kind of inverse reflection of the 
sullying metaphor: in one case something secondary is taken away, in the other case it is 
added. Furthermore, it strongly suggests that some distinct good is being added to a pre-
existing good, an idea that would explain Aristotle’s reluctance to offer an explanation 
for the value of the external goods for eudaimonia strictly in terms of their contribution to 
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 Aspasius, In Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria = CAG 19.1 ad. loc. 
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 Aristotle uses this exact compound (συνεpiικοσµεῖν) in a similar sense in the Topics to 
describe improving an argument by non-essential means (157a12-14). 
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activity. Thus this language provides strong evidence for the interpretation that Aristotle 
is admitting that things outside of an agent can contribute directly to his eudaimonia—
without somehow making his activity more excellent. 
Aristotle’s use of language suggesting addition or subtraction, without direct 
reference to virtuous activity, thus amounts to an admission that the external goods and 
fortune have some independent value, which cannot be fully explained in terms of 
making activity more excellent. I have also shown that Aristotle is responding to some 
kind of intuitive or conventional pull in his argument for the external goods requirement, 
when he claims that their absence taints life—without explaining a mechanism for that 
contribution and without directly referring to activity.149  
The inconsistency between Aristotle’s formal definition of eudaimonia—according to 
which it consists strictly in some kind of excellent activation of the soul—and his 
recognition that both the external goods and good luck may contribute to eudaimonia 
directly, unmediated through such activity, thus raises an interpretive problem. The 
principle of charity if often taken to require the interpreter to extract a single position 
from the philosopher that he is interpreting.150 But, in fact, Aristotle’s argument for 
eudaimonia’s need for the external goods is made outside of the terms of his formal 
definition of eudaimonia. And his reference to makarios hardly resolves this problem, 
even if he uses it to reference a more conventional notion of the good life, since he 
originally sets out to say something about eudaimonia at 1099a31ff. What it does seem to 
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 In one case, when Aristotle says that serious bad luck taints blessedness, he does justify this in 
reference to impeding activity, but he also mentions pain here, leaving it unclear whether this 
taint is really entirely a matter of activity (1100b28-30). 
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 See Brown (2006) for an interpretation that makes use of this notion of charity, in order to 
interpret the arguments for the value of the external goods as being made strictly in terms of 
Aristotle’s formal definition of eudaimonia. 
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show, however, is Aristotle’s willingness to take a small step back from the formal theory 
that he is working out, to respond to the pull of a consideration that does not neatly fit 
within the terms of his own theory, and to try to mount an explanation of that 
consideration—even when doing so requires him to veer away from strict adherence to 
his own theory. If Aristotle himself is willing to approach his own theory in this spirit, it 
would seem odd for interpreters to insist on adhering to it in its strictest formulation. The 
substantive point, then, is that Aristotle recognizes that his formal definition of 
eudaimonia fails to fully explain the value of good luck or the external goods for 
eudaimonia. 
Here, rather, I suggest that Aristotle develops a formal theory, acknowledges the 
imperfect precision of that theory in some of his methodological remarks, and continues 
to respond to the intuitive or conventional pull of the value of the external goods—
apparently regarding his formal definition of eudaimonia as lacking final and total 
authority over the subject of his inquiry.151 This view would also offer an alternative way 
to approach many of the problems of interpretation that motivate the debate about 
whether eudaimonia should be understood as a monistic or inclusive good—though 
pursuing those implications would be beyond the scope of the present project. Here, I 
propose that Aristotle regards his formal definition of eudaimonia as a powerful but 
approximate account of the human good. 
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 As Aristotle perhaps indicates himself at NE I.1098a20-b8. See Annas (1993) 368 for a similar 
argument that Aristotle’s view that eudaimonia requires both virtuous activity and the external 
goods is a response to both “the theoretical pull and the intuitive requirement in our 
commonsense views about happiness.” 
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Chapter 3: The External Goods Within Aristotle’s Account of Action 
 
In the last chapter, I argued that Aristotle offers an argument that eudaimonia needs the 
external goods that is made outside the terms of his formal definition of eudaimonia. 
Thus Aristotle in essence admits that the external goods can contribute to eudaimonia 
either by promoting excellent practical activity, or in some more direct way—violating 
the strict requirements of his own definition of eudaimonia as a form of activity that is at 
once self-sufficient and final. Here, I turn to Aristotle’s account of action in order to 
examine to what extent the value of the external goods can be explained by their 
contribution to excellent practical activity. That is, I try to push Aristotle’s account of 
action, to see just how far it can go in explaining the value of the external goods—while 
at the same time recognizing that my conclusions in the previous chapter indicated that 
there is some point at which the external goods’ value cannot be explained in terms of the 
promotion of excellent activity.  
To make this point more concrete, one might well imagine action pairs that differ 
only in respect to the external goods that one possesses. Thus, it may be that the 
temperate consumption of a delicious meal is more enjoyable and renders one’s life better 
than the temperate consumption of several day old porridge that is growing mold. This is 
just one example, but imaginary action pairs of this kind seem to vary not so much in 
terms of the degree of excellence of the activity being exercised, as in the degree of value 
being conferred upon the agent by something external to that activity. Even if the activity 
mediates or gives access to that value in some way, it does not seem that it is the sole 
source of value. This example illustrates the general problem that interests me here.  
130 
 
Thus while in the last chapter my aim was to examine how Aristotle actually does 
argue for eudaimonia’s need for the external goods, my aim here is to examine what kind 
of explanation for the value of the external goods is available to Aristotle in terms of his 
own account of action as it is developed especially in NE II-III, and also in the accounts 
of the particular virtues that follow. Thus while the second chapter is more strictly 
interpretive, this chapter will explore, in ways that go beyond Aristotle’s text at points, 
how the external goods might contribute to the value of virtuous action in terms of 
Aristotle’s account of action.  
I shall set aside NE X here, and treat Aristotle’s original tentative formulation, 
defining the human good as, “an activity [ἐνέργεια] of the soul in accordance with 
virtue” (I.1098a16-18), to mean virtuous action in particular (i.e., piρᾶξις). This is in fact 
his operating assumption for more or less all of NE I-IX, and is the assumption that 
underlies Aristotle’s argument for eudaimonia’s need for the external goods at I.1099a31-
b8, so it is this view that concerns me here—since what I am doing in this chapter is in 
essence considering the kinds of arguments that are available to Aristotle at I.1099a31-b8 
in terms of the account of action that he works out in the books that follow.   
While my ultimate aim is to assess the contribution of the external goods to excellent 
action, this task is impossible without first engaging in a different task of somewhat 
broader scope—namely, assessing where Aristotle sets the boundaries of action, and 
whether its value arises purely within the soul or also outside of it. That is, does the value 
of an action arise entirely from excellence of character, deliberation, and correct choice—
that is, from things internal to the agent? Does Aristotle’s account of praxis thus justify 
classifying it as a pure good of the soul? Or does the value of an action also depend upon 
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the achievement of some result external to the agent’s soul—such as executing certain 
bodily motions, achieving military victory, or helping a friend? If so, then excellent 
action would confound the distinction between goods of the soul and the external goods.  
For the purposes of this chapter, especially, it will be useful to isolate the broad class 
of all those things that lie beyond an agent’s control, which nevertheless potentially 
impinge upon the value of his activity in some way. While Aristotle offers separate 
arguments for eudaimonia’s need for the external goods (I.1099a31-b8), and its need for 
good luck (I.1100b22-1101a13), these two categories of goods outside of the full control 
of the agent do not exhaust those things outside of him that contribute something to his 
excellent activity. The most obvious such good that belongs in this broader category, and 
which at the same time Aristotle does not himself classify as luck or an external good, is 
the accurate knowledge of relevant particulars upon which excellent action depends. 
While an agent is responsible for doing everything within reason to acquire such 
knowledge, there are situations in which it will elude him, and to this extent this 
knowledge lies outside of his control. The external results at which an action aims also 
perhaps fall in this category, although it will require argument to decide whether they 
contribute worth to excellent practical activity at all.  
Although Aristotle does not consistently link together this broader set of valuable 
things that lie outside the boundaries of the agent’s soul and outside of his full control, at 
times he does show an interest in the general question of to what degree eudaimonia lies 
within the agent’s control—in particular, at NE I when he remarks that the good man 
“will always do the finest available things” (1101a2-3), and in some similar remarks in 
this same discussion. Thus there is some explicit textual warrant to grouping together the 
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full range of things that lie beyond the agent’s control and yet impinge upon his ability to 
realize eudaimonia and excellent practical activity. It will thus be convenient for me to 
consider what kind of value Aristotle attributes to such things collectively, using the 
simple term “external things,” to differentiate this broader class of things from the 
narrower classes of goods that they contain, which Aristotle more explicitly recognizes—
the external goods and good luck. While there is no reason to think that all those things in 
this broader class will have exactly the same kind of value, nevertheless insofar as they 
share the negative feature of not being excellent activity, they must at least fall within 
some range of value that coincides with this restriction.  
Now that I have laid out some general points, I shall describe the general questions 
that I intend to address in this chapter:  
 
1) Is excellent action dependent upon things outside of the agent who 
acts? If so, upon which kinds of external things, exactly, does it 
depend? 
2) If excellent action depends upon things outside of the agent who 
acts, in order to realize its full worth, why is it thus dependent? In 
particular, what kind of value do things that are external to the 
agent contribute to the worth of his virtuous action? 
3) How do the external goods in particular contribute value to 
excellent action? Are there distinct kinds of value that different 
external goods can contribute to virtuous action—for example, as 




The first question asks broadly what kinds of external things action needs. I avoid using 
the term external goods here, because at this point I am interested in the full range of 
external “things” that Aristotle reckons as ingredients in the success or perfection of an 
action—thus not only Aristotle’s category of external goods, or good luck. For one thing, 
an agent must have accurate knowledge of the particulars relevant to his action, in order 
for that action to count as virtuous.152 Yet the accuracy of such knowledge in some 
circumstances will elude the agent, and thus lies outside of his full control. And since 
Aristotle repeatedly insists that the correct action can only be defined in relation to the 
relevant particulars, this requirement that an agent possess accurate knowledge is in some 
sense embedded deeply within his theory, rather than being a merely superficial feature. 
While in principle Aristotle might simply have made virtuous action consist in doing the 
right thing in respect to one’s beliefs about the relevant particulars, rather than the actual 
particulars themselves, this is not what he does. An examination of this particular kind of 
contingency will occupy the first part of this chapter.  
The second question asks why Aristotle supposes that virtuous action depends upon 
external things for its value. Aristotle claims that eudaimonia is an ultimate and self-
sufficient good, and that its substance consists in excellent rational activity. How, then, 
can external things that are not themselves activities contribute worth to such activity? 
Put simply, external things such as good luck, the external goods, and the accuracy of 
one’s knowledge of relevant particulars, all might contribute value either to the purely 
internal features of a given action, such as deliberation and choice, or else they might 
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in NE III. See below for a discussion of these passages. 
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contribute both to these internal features and also to the achievement of a consequence or 
result aimed at by that action. One must choose between these two lines of 
interpretation—either the achievement of an aimed at consequence contributes something 
to the worth of an action as its end, or it does not. In reference to Aristotle’s argument for 
eudaimonia’s need of the external goods, Julia Annas has aptly dubbed the former kind 
of explanation, according to which other goods contribute to the worth of an action only 
on its internal dimensions—such as excellence, deliberation, and choice—as the 
“internal-use view.”153 On such an interpretation the virtuous man uses everything else 
for the sake of the excellent processes and states within his own soul. In an influential 
article, John Cooper has advanced such an internal-use view of the value of the external 
goods—without, of course, using Julia Annas’ term to describe his interpretation.154 But 
if the achievement of the consequence aimed at by an act has value as part of its end, 
then the pure internal-use view collapses.  
The third question applies the findings of the more general inquiry in the first part of 
the chapter to trying to determine how the external goods, in particular, might contribute 
value to virtuous action. To this end, I consider different ways in which the external 
goods might contribute to the worth of virtuous action. Aristotle himself only clearly 
delimits one kind of contribution that the externals can make to action—as 
instruments.155 But he also seems to indicate a second way in which the external goods 
can contribute worth to action, without defining exactly what kind of contribution this 
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 I do not count the reference to the goods other than excellent activity as either instrumental or 
necessary goods, since this reference to necessary goods contains no comment on why such goods 
are necessary or what for (I.1099b27-28). 
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would be. As I have argued in the second chapter, it is clear that this second kind of 
contribution that the external goods make to eudaimonia is not merely instrumental, and 
may not even contribute to eudaimonia through improving or promoting activity. But the 
exact nature of this non-instrumental contribution must be worked out. In this latter part 
of the chapter, I draw on Aristotle’s theory of action in order to determine whether 
Aristotle’s theory of action accommodates some non-instrumental contribution of the 
external goods to excellent action.  
 
 
Upon Which External Things Does Excellent Activity Depend? 
 
Excellent activity clearly depends upon a number of things that can be broadly classed as 
external, in the straightforward sense that they are separate from that activity itself, and in 
the less straightforward sense that they are not fully within the agent’s control. In 
grouping these dependencies together, I am to some extent going beyond anything that 
Aristotle himself says and attempting to draw some more general conclusions about his 
position on the dependency of excellent activity upon such things than Aristotle ever 
states directly. Nonetheless, I think the question is justified by the fact that Aristotle at 
times comes close to considering it (for example, in his NE I discussions of the 
dependency of eudaimonia upon the external goods and luck, which he treats as 
connected to one another). Nevertheless, it is worth keeping in mind that the aims of this 
chapter are synthetic and work to define a position for Aristotle that he does not directly 
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express, but which clarifies and explains the views that he does offer us explicitly in his 
text.  
I shall begin by sketching out those external things upon which virtuous action 
depends. Thus Aristotle requires that excellent action be performed in full knowledge of 
the relevant particulars.156 In order for an agent to possess such knowledge, his beliefs 
about certain relevant features of the world must correspond to those actual underlying 
features. In certain situations such knowledge will elude the agent, even when he has 
taken whatever measures are reasonable to acquire such knowledge given the situation 
and the cost of ignorance in that situation. (It is important to emphasize that Aristotle 
does not describe such knowledge as depending upon τύχη (“luck”) in his NE III 
discussion of the voluntary, however.157) Second, Aristotle makes eudaimonia dependent 
on the external goods, and explains this at least partly in terms of virtuous action’s need 
for the external goods (I.1099a31-b8). Considering this argument was the aim of my last 
chapter. Third, Aristotle makes eudaimonia dependent on good luck, offering separate 
arguments for eudaimonia’s need for luck (1100b18-1101a14) and the external goods 
(1099a31-b8). Fourth, and finally, Aristotle perhaps makes the achievement of certain 
kinds of external results a partial determinant of the worth of virtuous action—a question 
I shall consider at some length. 
Here, in this first section of this chapter, I shall focus on the way in which virtuous 
action depends upon knowledge, since this seems to me to offer the clearest evidence that 
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performed knowingly, at NE II.1105a31, and (2) the discussion of the voluntary in NE III. 
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 As Halliwell (1988) 315 remarks critically of Martha Nussbaum’s assumption that NE III 
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actions arise from luck seems to owe more to Bernard Williams’ work on moral luck than to 
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Aristotle regards virtuous action as dependent upon what lies outside the agent’s control. 
Indeed, virtuous action seems to depend upon knowledge of the relevant particulars to 
count as virtuous activity at all—not merely for its optimal realization. Bad luck and the 
loss of the external goods rarely make virtuous action impossible, more often diminishing 
its range and magnitude of exercise. And the role of consequences in giving value to 
virtuous action is debated by Aristotle scholars. But Aristotle seems to offer a pretty clear 
and direct view that excellent action is not merely made less excellent when it is 
involuntary because of ignorance; rather, it is pushed out from the domain of the 
excellent activity altogether.  
Initially, in NE I, Aristotle seems to ignore this problem, saying at one point that the 
blessed man will never become wretched, because he will “always do the finest possible 
things” (ἐκ τῶν ὑpiαρχόντων αεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα piράττειν) (I.1101a2-3). This remark 
(and the supporting context) implies an exclusion of the possibility of terrible or at least 
non-fine and non-virtuous ignorant actions, such as, for example, those of Oedipus. But 
elsewhere Aristotle makes it clear that he regards excellent activity as depending upon 
the agent acting knowingly. In NE II, Aristotle remarks that virtuous action must be done 
knowingly, but does not offer an account of what it means for it to be done knowingly. 
One may draw on NE III for a more detailed account of what Aristotle means.  
Thus, according to NE II.1105a28-33, virtuous action must be chosen, and according 
to NE III.1111b6-10, choice is a species of the voluntary. Synthesizing these two 
remarks, one can conclude that, since virtuous action must be chosen, and since choice is 
a species of the voluntary, virtuous action must therefore be voluntary. This line of 
reasoning justifies drawing upon Aristotle’s NE III analysis of the voluntary and the 
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involuntary in order to develop a fuller account of virtuous action. That is, whatever 
restrictions Aristotle places upon voluntary action can be applied to virtuous action too, 
since he requires that it be done knowingly and from choice.  
One may now consider the implications if the NE III constraints on the voluntary are 
taken to apply to virtuous action. In order for an action to count as voluntary, Aristotle 
requires that the agent have accurate knowledge of the particulars that are relevant to a 
given action—in his words knowing, “the particular things in which the action lies” (τὰ 
καθ’ ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ piρᾶξις) (III.1111a23-24). This requirement that a virtuous action 
be done with knowledge of the relevant particulars makes such action dependent upon 
external circumstances, since there are situations in which a person will fail to have 
accurate knowledge of such relevant particulars. I shall defer to a later section the 
question of why Aristotle insists on the knowledge requirement. At this point, I am only 
interested in showing that virtuous action is outside of an agent’s full control in this 
particular way. After all, it would certainly be possible to evaluate an action undertaken 
blamelessly in ignorance of a relevant particular as a fully excellent action, insofar as 
such action exercises deliberation and choice correctly—at least in relation to an agent’s 
actual beliefs. But this is not the position that Aristotle takes.  
 
 
The Results and Consequences of Excellent Practical Activity 
 
Determining whether Aristotle regards excellent activity as depending upon the 
achievement of external results will help to answer two of the basic questions that I posed 
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at the beginning of this chapter—first, what external things (in the broadest sense) does 
excellent activity depend upon for its perfection, and, second, why does it depend upon 
such external things? That is, if the results or consequences at which an excellent action 
aims turn out partly to determine the worth of that action, then this would be one clear 
kind of dependence on an external thing (which addresses my first question). 
Furthermore, if the result or consequence at which an action aims is valued as its end, or 
more precisely as part of its end, then this would explain the value of other things too, 
since certain external things would then gain value by promoting not only bare activity 
itself but also the consequences at which that activity aims (which helps to address my 
second question about why activity needs external things). The consequences or results of 
an action might then help to explain part of how the external goods themselves contribute 
to the worth of an action (which addresses my third question).  
It is important to make one distinction before I turn to considering the evidence for 
the role of results in excellent practical activity. As far as I know, no scholar has directly 
considered the problem of whether consequences are a kind of external good, though this 
has sometimes been assumed.158 Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to doubt this. 
While results are physically outside of the soul of the agent, and thus might be thought to 
be external goods—since the external goods are also defined as external by being 
physically outside of the agent—this assimilation poses difficulties. In particular, results 
are specified by the deliberation and choice of the virtuous agent, and thus must have a 
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more intimate relationship with his practical reason than the external goods.159 Thus the 
aimed at consequences of virtuous actions seem like candidates for goods in a strong or 
unqualified sense, whereas the external goods appear to be defeasibly good, in that they 
are assumed to be good in general, but are not necessarily good or choiceworthy in any 
one particular case.  
In an important passage from NE V, Aristotle seems to describe the kind of value that 
he ascribes to the external goods, without actually using the term “external goods” to 
describe the class of goods that he is considering. Thus Aristotle remarks that those goods 
that are a matter of fortune and misfortune are “always good in general, but to a particular 
person not always” (ἁpiλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά, τινὶ δ’ οὐκ ἀεί) (1129b1-5). The point seems to 
be to distinguish the goods that are correctly chosen by an agent in some particular case, 
and the goods as they stand prior to a particular instance of the exercise of practical 
reason. But if this is the division between the external goods as such, and those things 
that are strictly the correct objects of choice, then it should be evident that the aimed at 
results of excellent action come much closer to the latter kind of value, and are thereby 
good in a different and stronger sense than the external goods.   
The importance of external aims or consequences for particular virtues also seems 
clear. As scholars have noted, Aristotle often indicates that particular kinds of virtuous 
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action aim at and in fact typically also bring about certain states of affairs.160 Thus 
friendliness, for example, aims at the pleasure of another person (NE IV.1126b28-30), the 
correct love of honor desires honor in just the right way (NE IV.1125b7-8), and complete 
justice “does what is advantageous for another, whether for the ruler or for the 
community as a whole” (NE V.1130a4-5). And at one point Aristotle also distinguishes 
the generous from the spendthrift (ἄσωτος) by relying upon the criterion of benefiting 
others (NE IV.1120a27-30). Aristotle also refers to vicious actions, using conventional 
terms that presuppose the success of the action at achieving some result or 
consequence—adultery, stealing, and murder (µοιχεία κλοpiὴ ἀνδροφονία) (II.1107a9-
12). None of this evidence resolves the question by itself, but it is suggestive. 
Aristotle’s general account of action is, however, more often taken to be the core 
evidence for this question. Thus Aristotle’s distinction between action (piρᾶξις) and 
production (piοίησις) is often taken to indicate that the results or consequences of actions 
cannot be partial determinants of their worth.161 What Aristotle actually says, however, is 
ambiguous. Aristotle says that action and production are different, because the end of 
production is different from the production itself, whereas the end of action is not—the 
end of action is simply acting well (εὐpiραξία) (NE VI.1140b6-7). The process of 
producing thus apparently gets its worth purely from the product that it aims to produce, 
whereas this is not true of action. But Aristotle does not define what qualifies an action as 
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 For this line of argument, see: Charles (1986) 132 and Politis (1998). Politis (1998), however, 
acknowledges an exception—that virtuous action may derive value from bringing about further 
virtuous action, since he supposes the finality of eudaimonia as virtuous activity to allow this.  
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εὐpiραξία (“acting well”). Acting well thus might or might not depend upon achieving 
certain kinds of aimed at consequences or results. 
To put the matter as clearly as possible, there are two possible interpretations of the 
distinction:  
(1) Production is only for the sake of its result, while action is only for the sake of 
the bare process of acting or aiming at some end. 
(2) Production is only for the sake of its result, while action is both for the sake of 
the process of acting and also for the sake of the result or consequence at 
which that process aims.162 
The way that Aristotle draws the distinction does not by itself resolve this interpretive 
problem. It is worth saying, too, that a further problem (even apart from which of the two 
above interpretations one follows) is where exactly to draw the line between the “bare 
process of acting or aiming” and “the result or consequence.” Thus, for example, if one 
construes acting as a purely internal and mental process, then any enacted bodily motions 
might count as results or consequences—but clearly this is not the only place that one can 
draw the line between the bare process of acting and the result or consequence that issues 
from such bare action. Furthermore, there are clearly more and less immediate results of 
one’s actions—both judged in terms of causal directness, and in terms of the time that 
passes between an agent’s action and those results that ensue from it. And (although 
Aristotle says nothing about this) one can clearly draw the line in different places as to 
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what counts as a consequence of an action. Here, I have in mind mainly causally direct 
and predictable consequences. 
In antiquity, Alexander of Aphrodisias already saw clearly the potential contradiction 
in Aristotle’s distinction between action and production, and his ascription of 
characteristic aims or consequences to certain kinds of excellence.163 In order to raise the 
problem, he points out a parallel between a type of production, housebuilding 
(οἰκοδοµική), and the virtues. The virtues, like housebuilding, seem to aim at certain 
results. Alexander then points out that bravery aims at the moderation of fear and 
boldness, temperance at the moderation of bodily pains, and justice at the preservation of 
the community.164 Alexander also sees that this seems to make the virtues similar to 
productions, and that in this case, the virtues and their activities would not be chosen for 
their own sake. His solution is interesting: “For it is just as if—if housebuilding were a 
house, for the sake of which it were choiceworthy, it would be choiceworthy for itself. It 
is the same way for each of the virtues—if it is the same thing as that for the sake of 
which it is choiceworthy, then it would be choiceworthy because of that” (Ethical 
Questions 281.12-15). The house can be taken as an example meant to stand in for any 
consequence or result of excellent activity. Thus Alexander’s solution is to suppose that 
conducting oneself in a just way and preserving the community together make an act just. 
Thus when one chooses a virtuous action for its own sake, one also chooses its 
consequence or result—whether that involves moderating one’s emotions, or an external 
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end such as preserving a community.165 On this interpretation, an action and its result 
together form a unity.  
Alexander develops an interpretation constrained by: (1) the action/production 
distinction, (2) the requirement that virtuous action be chosen for its own sake, and (3) 
the particular ends that Aristotle ascribes to particular virtues. He takes a position that 
accommodates all of these aspects of Aristotle’s theory. Thus apparently he develops his 
interpretation of Aristotle’s position on the basis of a kind of principle of charity 
requiring that Aristotle’s position be both consistent and coherent—without, of course, 
explicitly identifying charity as constraining his interpretation. I believe that a further 
examination of the evidence supports Alexander’s interpretation, however.  
While Aristotle’s requirement that excellent activity be chosen for its own sake (NE 
II.1105a31-33) is often taken in connection with the action/production distinction as 
meaning that it is the bare activity (rather than its consequences) that are chosen, this line 
of reasoning also needs scrutiny. As Ackrill has pointed out, the meaning of Aristotle’s 
remark that excellent practical activity is chosen for its own sake waits upon a definition 
of exactly what it is that is chosen for its own sake.166 Thus Aristotle’s distinction 
between action and production, according to which the end of action is eupraxia 
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(VI.1140b6-7), and Aristotle’s requirement that excellent practical activity be chosen for 
its own sake present much the same ambiguity. 
 
 
Further Evidence for the Role of Results of Consequences in Excellent Practical 
Activity 
 
In at least two cases, Aristotle describes things that are clearly states of affairs that can 
only result from excellent practical activity as fine—the same term that he uses to 
describe excellent practical activity itself. Thus Aristotle defines the brave man strictly so 
called as, “fearless in respect to noble death” (III.1115a32-35). Yet if nobility inheres in a 
certain kind of death, that is, a certain state of affairs defined in part as resulting from a 
certain kind of action, then apparently results can share the same kind of value with the 
process that aims at them. Aristotle likewise remarks at one point that, “long lasting” 
(piολυχρονία) works of magnificence are “finest” (κάλλιστα) (IV.1123a6-9). It is very 
difficult to explain away these kinds of remarks, which attach the same kind of value 
(i.e., nobility) to virtuous actions and the works that they produce. One might counter that 
these expressions are in fact intended to describe the process of action rather than its 
result. Yet if it is only the action that achieves its characteristic result that deserves to be 
characterized as fine, then this amounts to nearly the same thing.  
The discussion of deliberation also seems to presume that anything that can occur 
may be the object of deliberation and thus of action—and results clearly fall within the 
realm of the possible. Thus in his NE III discussion of deliberation, Aristotle writes, “If 
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something seems possible, men try to do it [piράττειν]. And what is possible [δυνατά] is 
that which could come about through us. For the things through friends [τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν 
φίλων] are in some sense through us. For the moving principle [ἀρχή] is in us” 
(ΙΙΙ.1112b26-8). Aristotle here supposes that the whole range of possible things may be 
the objects of action—whether they are accomplished by a person directly or through the 
aid of his friends. He even supposes that the moving principle of something brought 
about with the help of friends can be regarded as being in the agent who brings it about. 
Yet “the things through friends” clearly cannot refer to the bodily movements of the 
agent himself, or his mere internal will or choice, but must instead here refer to 
consequences of some kind that lie beyond the physical agent, so that Aristotle here 
clearly regards such consequences as properly deliberable and thus doable. Aristotle 
likewise at one point here remarks that deliberation has as its object things that “come 
about through us, but not always in the same way,” and this description seems to have a 
wide extension, including things that are physically outside of the agent and thus not fully 
in his control (III.1112b2-8). Indeed, it seems likely that the imperfect predictability of 
the external world explains Aristotle’s characterization of such things as coming about 
through us “but not always in the same way.” After all, Aristotle regards the excellent 
man’s own appetites, emotions, and choices as under his control and thus predictable—so 
that this remark seemingly could not characterize any such things. 
Aristotle’s definition of the voluntary (in respect to action) gives further support for 
including the achievement of the result or consequence as a feature of action. In addition 
to requiring that the moving principle be in the agent who acts, in order for that action to 
be voluntary, Aristotle also requires that the agent act knowing the particulars in which 
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the action lies (III.1111a22-24). This tentative definition is the fruit of a discussion in 
which Aristotle enumerates types of particular knowledge, as well as offering examples 
of involuntary actions that violate the knowledge requirement. In the course of 
enumerating the kinds of particular knowledge, however, Aristotle mentions knowledge 
of “that for the sake of which, for example safety” (ἕνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας) 
(III.1111a5). Finally, after offering examples of involuntary action, he goes on to make 
knowing “that for the sake of which” (οὗ ἕνεκα) decisive for voluntary action 
(III.1111a18-19).  
Aristotle’s inclusion of knowledge of “that for the sake of which” among different 
kinds of particular knowledge at 1111a5 seems difficult, however. For one thing, strictly 
it is knowledge of something that has yet to occur at the moment one begins to act. And it 
is also more abstract and less particular—at least in the example that Aristotle offers at 
1111a5—for the sake of saving someone. Certainly it sticks out alongside the other types 
of knowledge that Aristotle mention, which are much more clearly particular—such as 
“whom” is acted upon, or what instrument is being used to perform the action (1111a3). 
This can perhaps be partly explained, however, by the contrast that Aristotle develops 
before introducing his requirement that an agent have particular knowledge. In particular, 
when Aristotle introduces the requirement for particular knowledge, he is drawing a 
contrast with a general ignorance of what one ought to do or abstain from (1110b28-
1111a1), so that a higher order knowledge of “that for the sake of which” might still be 
reckoned particular in contrast to this kind of knowledge or ignorance of general 
principles of action—for example, saving Agathon from succumbing to a deadly fever, 
versus the knowledge that one ought to save one’s friends. Still, knowing “that for the 
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sake of which” one acts is undoubtedly a higher order kind of knowledge than the other 
kinds of particular knowledge that Aristotle lists.167   
It is also worth clarifying that particular knowledge need not be prospective factual 
knowledge of what lies beyond the agent’s control and beyond his physical body—
knowledge which one possesses only at the outset of the action. Thus Aristotle also 
mentions among the kinds of particular knowledge, knowing “how [one acts], such as 
calmly or forcefully” (piῶς, οἷον ἠρέµα ἢ σφόδρα). This is knowledge of a feature of an 
ongoing action, which is internal to the physical body of the agent and ordinarily under 
his control and direction. Thus one can reasonably speak of Aristotle as requiring that one 
know what one is doing. This somewhat narrows the gap between the other kinds of 
particular knowledge and knowledge of “that for the sake of which.” 
What is interesting about knowledge of “that for the sake of which” is that it forms a 
kind of middle ground between the other kinds of particular knowledge and purpose or 
intention. It shares the same form as purpose or intention, but it is not orectic. Thus it can 
help to explain how Aristotle can include among his examples of involuntary action: 
intending to touch (θῖξαι βουλόµενος) but striking, and offering a drink “for the sake of 
saving” (ἐpiὶ σωτηρίᾳ) but killing (III.1111a13-15). Aristotle refers to intention or 
purpose in his descriptions of these involuntary actions, yet intention and purpose do not 
figure in Aristotle’s own definition of the voluntary at NE III.1111a22-24. Nevertheless, 
if one takes Aristotle’s requirement that a voluntary act be performed in knowledge of 
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“that for the sake of which” seriously, then he has a higher-order explanation for why 
such actions count as involuntary.  
What is especially important for my purposes, however, is that if Aristotle requires 
that an agent act with knowledge of “that for the sake of which,” then an action 
seemingly must achieve its aimed at result in order to count as voluntary. That is—in 
conjunction with the requirement that the moving principle of a voluntary act rest in the 
agent who acts—the further requirement that voluntary action be performed with 
knowledge of “that for the sake of which” seems to be violated in cases where the result 
that an agent actually brings about does not coincide with what the agent believed himself 
to be doing. Even if one sets aside the requirement that an agent act with knowledge of 
“that for the sake of which,” the various particular kinds of knowledge that Aristotle 
enumerates seem at any rate to guarantee or nearly guarantee that a voluntary act achieve 
the result at which the agent was aiming. Thus even though Aristotle does not directly 
require that a voluntary action achieve its intended result, this does seem to follow from 
his account of voluntary action. Perhaps (to speculate briefly) Aristotle’s reason for 
excluding intention from his definition of the voluntary is that intention is still more 
obscure than knowledge and cause, and thus makes it somewhat easier to reckon an act 





Why Does Excellent Practical Activity Depend Upon External Things? 
 
If excellent practical activity depends upon achieving a certain result or consequence in 
order to realize its full worth, and if such a result has value as its end—as I have 
argued—then this also serves to explain certain other aspects of action’s dependence on 
external things. Thus it is quite hard to explain why Aristotle requires that an agent know 
the relevant particulars in order for his action to count as excellent—unless it is for the 
sake of achieving the result that the agent believed himself to be bringing about. After all, 
if Aristotle supposed that the value of practical activity consisted purely in aiming 
excellently at some consequence or result, then it would be quite difficult to explain why 
this aiming would have to be done with accurate knowledge of the relevant particulars. 
After all, one might well do everything within reason to attain accurate knowledge about 
some situation, and then aim excellently in relation to what one believes, even if one’s 
beliefs were false. One might posit some psychological need to feel successful in one’s 
efforts, but this is simply to admit the value of results through the back door, as it were.168 
Furthermore, it is very hard to explain what an agent would regret about having 
performed an involuntary action because of ignorance—unless he is regretting the 
unintended result.169 (Aristotle does not say what is regretted, of course.)  
Finally, while it is certainly possible to place all the value in aiming at some 
consequence and none in achieving that aim—as the Stoics do—this requires 
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distinguishing two different kinds of aims in a way that Aristotle does not do.170 Thus for 
the Stoics, there is the reference point for action (an external outcome or consequence), as 
well as the end from which the action derives all or virtually all of its worth (aiming 
excellently). These two ends are different from one another, and they have distinct kinds 
of worth. But Aristotle does not seem to split value in this way—he often remarks that 
actions are performed “for the sake of the fine” throughout his accounts of the specific 
excellences of character, in one case he makes the fine serve as the reference point for 
how benefits ought to be conferred upon one’s friends (IV.1126b28-30), and in two 
instances he describes aimed at consequences of excellent practical activities as fine 
(ΙΙΙ.1115a29-35, IV.1123a7-9). Thus Aristotle seems to suppose that a single kind of 
worth is spread over the bare activity and the consequences specified by and aimed at by 
the agent. Interestingly, one might even suppose that the internal aspect of action is prior 
in time, as the efficient cause of the bodily motions that ensue from it, but that the bodily 
and material realization of that action is prior insofar as it is an instantiation of the fine 
(τὸ καλόν), which in turn has an independent life from any particular agent, act, or 
exercise of deliberation. Nor does all of this turn Aristotle into a Utilitarian. Simply 
because he ascribes some value to the result at which excellent practical activity aims, 
this does not require him to suppose that the same state of affairs if unconnected with 
purposeful activity would retain that kind of worth, or any kind of worth for that matter. 
But in the context of an excellent activity, he does seem to suppose that a particular result 
can share the same kind of worth with the activity itself.  
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This conclusion helps to answer the second question that I posed earlier—Why does 
excellent practical activity depend for its value upon a range of the external things—
namely, the consequences at which an action aims, the accuracy of one’s knowledge of 
the relevant particulars, good luck, and the external goods? At this point, it is possible to 
offer at least a tentative answer. It depends upon the consequences at which it aims as 
partly constituting its end. Thus a generous act is both for the sake of excellent activity 
itself, as well as for the sake of conferring a benefit. This, in turn, can explain why an 
agent must know the relevant particulars—in order to help realize the external aim. The 
internal process of realizing one’s excellences through deliberation and choice might 
equally well be exercised in ignorance or knowledge of the relevant particulars. But if 
such excellent activity depends upon the consequences at which it aims in order to realize 
its worth, then this explains why the agent must know the relevant particulars and “that 
for the sake of which” he is acting. In fact, the way that Aristotle construes such 
knowledge seems virtually to guarantee that voluntary activity achieves the consequences 
at which it aims—that is, the requirement that excellent activity be performed in 
knowledge of “that for the sake of which” seems actually to require that an agent’s 
beliefs about what he is bringing about coincide with what he actually does.  
If Aristotle understands the consequences at which excellent practical activity aims as 
sharing the same basic kind of value as the activity itself, this also helps to explain the 
value of the external goods. Thus the internal-use view, according to which the external 
goods derive their worth purely from their contribution to an agent’s activity of the soul 
can be set aside. Cooper argues for the internal-use view, supposing that the external 
goods help to secure such internal goods as the “normal exercise of the virtues,” and that 
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they offer “particular challenges that his virtue responds to with its correct assessments 
and right decisions.”171 Christine Korsgaard likewise seems to offer an internalist account 
of the value of virtuous action, although she does not comment directly on the problems 
concerning external goods or external results. She thus characterizes Aristotelian action 
as deriving its worth purely from “the way that [it is] chosen,” or from “the fact that it is 
chosen for its intrinsic rightness.”172 But if the results at which an action aims give that 
action value as part of its end along with the process of aiming itself, then certain 
external goods may derive their value from their contributions to both aspects of this 
end—the bare activity of soul, as well as the consequence being aimed at. On this 
understanding, money, for example, would derive its worth not merely from the bare 




The External Goods as Instruments for the Exercise of Activity 
 
Now that I have shown the evidence that supports the interpretation that the results of 
actions are partial determinants of their worth, as the ends of excellent activities, I shall 
turn to my third question—how can the external goods contribute value to action? That 
is, within the terms of Aristotle’s own understanding of what action is, what possible 
kinds of value are available to external goods? The only such contribution that Aristotle 
                                                 
171
 Cooper (1985) 182-184. 
172
 Korsgaard (1996) 213 & 205. She is trying to show the similarity between Aristotle and Kant’s 
accounts of the source of virtuous action’s value. 
154 
 
himself explicitly and clearly distinguishes is an instrumental one. Thus I shall begin by 
considering what it means for an external good to serve as an instrument to excellent 
rational activity.  
There are some considerations that in fact support understanding the external goods 
as gaining their value purely as instruments to excellent practical activity. Indeed, if one 
supposes that excellent practical activity is a pure good of the soul—consisting in the 
exercise of practical wisdom and of the character excellences, and thus in deliberation 
and choice—and if this activity is indeed a final and self-sufficient good, then other 
goods must gain their value through some relation to such an activation of the soul. That 
is, if eudaimonia really rests here, and here alone, and if some kind of teleological 
relation obtains between every other good and such an activation of the soul, it seems 
quite hard to explain other goods as serving as anything more than instruments to such an 
activation of the soul. To press this point further, most scholars recognize three different 
teleological kinds of value—instrumental, constitutive, and final.173 If one takes this 
threefold division as exhaustive, goods other than eudaimonia must gain their value 
either as constituents of eudaimonia or as instruments to it. Furthermore, if eudaimonia is 
strictly an activation of the soul, and nothing else, it is very hard to see how other goods 
could ever be constituents of this activity. This seems, then, to force a merely 
instrumental evaluation upon the external goods, as well as all the things outside of an 
agent that impinge upon the worth of his acts. 
And when one turns to Aristotle’s text, this is, indeed, the only kind of contribution to 
eudaimonia that Aristotle clearly and directly recognizes for the external goods. Thus he 
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writes: “For many things are done, as if through instruments—through friends, wealth, 
and political power” (piολλὰ µὲν γὰρ piράττεται, καθάpiερ δι’ ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων 
καὶ piλούτου καὶ piολιτικῆς δυνάµεως) (NE I.1099a31-b8). Aristotle is not necessarily 
distinguishing a class of external goods that have an exclusively instrumental value, 
however—as he makes clear by including friends both among the instrumental goods and 
those goods that soil a life when absent.  
Aristotle clearly goes on to recognize a non-instrumental value for certain external 
goods in the course of the argument that he makes here, and in fact even recognizes that 
the external goods have a value that cannot be mediated by excellent activity. 
Nevertheless, one does find the view that the external goods are valuable just as 
instruments—both in Aristotle himself, outside of the NE, and among the commentators 
to the NE. Thus in a passage from the Politics, Aristotle refers to the external goods 
generally as instruments, remarking that there is a limit to the quantity one needs, just as 
with other instruments, whereas there is no such limit upon the goods of the soul 
(VII.1323b7).174 And at one point Alexander of Aphrodisias explains the requirement that 
eudaimonia consist in an activity “under preferred circumstances” (ἐν piροηγουµένοις) 
by remarking simply that this is “because the preferred and desired activities need 
instruments” (διὰ τὸ δεῖσθαι ὀργάνων τὰς piροηγουµένας τε καὶ βουλητὰς 
ἐνεργείας).175 Alexander thus supposes that all favorable circumstances serve as 
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instruments to virtuous activity—and includes the external goods among such preferred 
circumstances. Among more recent interpreters, John Cooper attempts to distinguish 
external goods as possessing two possible kinds of value—facilitating conditions and 
instruments of virtuous activity. But this distinction seems to be merely terminological, 
for ultimately he ascribes an instrumental value to all external goods: “In each case the 
value to the happy man consists in what the external goods make it possible for him, as a 
result of having them, to do,” where “do” is meant in a strictly internalist sense.176  
The point to press here is whether interpreting Aristotle’s definition of eudaimonia as 
consisting strictly in the activation of one’s own soul is really tenable. Whiting, in her 
paper on the role of results in actions, sensibly points out that if states-of-affairs other 
than further excellent activity are excluded from counting as ends, then this results in a 
“virtuous circle,” in which virtue gains its value merely by advancing itself, never by 
recognizing the value of anything else.177 Of course, to give the objector a chance to 
respond, even if eudaimonia were to consist strictly in an activity of the soul, excellent 
activities might still gain value by aiming at certain specific ends, just not by achieving 
those ends, which seems to ascribe at least some kind of value to such ends. But if, as I 
have argued here, the character excellences collectively amount to a scheme of value, 
which indeed recognizes the achievement of ends as possessing value beyond what 
accrues to the bare activation of the soul, then other goods need not contribute to 
excellent activity merely by promoting such activation. If the interpretation that I have 
advanced here is correct, then this opens up the way to granting some further value to 
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things outside of the virtuous agent’s control—insofar as they advance not only the 
activation of the soul, but also its success at achieving those ends at which it aims.   
 
 
Can External Goods Contribute Value to Activity as Parts Thereof? 
 
As I have remarked, philosophers generally, as well as interpreters of Aristotle, often 
distinguish three kinds of teleological value—instrumental, constitutive, and final.178 An 
instrumental good gets its value purely from its contribution to some other good; a 
constitutive good has value in itself but is also chosen for the sake of some larger good of 
which it is a part; and a final good is both chosen for its own sake and at the same time 
other goods are chosen for it—either as constituents of it, or as instruments to it. 
Interpreters of the NE often attribute an implicit notion of constitutive value to Aristotle 
in order to explain how he can claim that any given specific excellent activity can both be 
chosen for its own sake and yet also be chosen for the sake of eudaimonia.179 This notion 
of constitutive value is especially useful here, because a good that contributes 
constitutively to eudaimonia can satisfy the finality criterion and the self-sufficiency 
criterion at the same time—since it is both chosen for the sake of eudaimonia, and at the 
same time is not something separate from it.  
Accordingly, some have also made use of a similar notion of constitutive value in 
order to explain how the external goods can be both intrinsic goods and at the same time 
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be chosen for the sake of virtuous activity. If they are right, then the interpreter (and 
Aristotle) can have his cake and eat it too—the external goods are both choiceworthy for 
their own sakes and for the sake of eudaimonia. Self-sufficiency is satisfied, since certain 
external goods are contained within the various specific forms of virtuous activity, rather 
than being separate goods needed in addition to such activity. And finality is satisfied, 
since such goods are thought to be chosen for the sake of the activities in which they 
figure. Thus when one chooses an activity one also chooses whatever external goods are 
contained within that activity. And, at the same time, one need not abandon the 
intuitively plausible proposition that certain external goods have value in themselves.180 
This line of reasoning is not always given so directly as I have put it here, but this 
seems to describe accurately the motives of those scholars who argue that certain external 
goods may be parts of virtuous actions. Thus Martha Nussbaum says of love: “The other 
person enters in not just as an object who receives the good activity, but as an intrinsic 
part of love itself.”181 Nothing other than the formal constraints of Aristotle’s theory 
would be able to motivate so odd a claim. Crisp makes a similar but more general claim, 
calling his position “aretic inclusivism,” because it supposes that all other intrinsic goods 
can be included in virtuous (that is, aretic) activity in some way. He writes that 
eudaimonia is “not improvable, since excellent activities themselves include or involve all 
intrinsic goods.”182 The “intrinsic good” qualification is important here. Crisp sidesteps 
some difficulties by denying that honor, beauty, or offspring are among these intrinsic 
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goods, and considering friendship rather than friends per se.183 Thus he plausibly includes 
the activities of philia as partly constituting excellent activity, but avoids remarking on 
the value of philoi as such, even though Aristotle includes philoi rather than philia among 
his examples of the external goods at NE 1099a31-b8. If Crisp had reckoned with loved 
ones directly, presumably he would have had little choice but to admit that they are 
intrinsic goods and thus (like all other intrinsic goods in his paper) partly constitute 
activity, and thus cannot improve eudaimonia, since they are already found within it. 
Nevertheless, one can set aside these frustrating moves within Crisp’s paper and reckon 
with the implications of his more basic claim that all intrinsic goods help to constitute 
excellent activity (as Heinaman, for example, does in a paper provoked in part by Crisp’s 
arguments184).  
A critique of this inclusion of external goods within excellent rational activity can 
thus be advanced in terms of Aristotle’s own metaphysics of activity and action. Robert 
Heinaman has made such an argument against aretic inclusivism, interpreting the position 
“to mean what it says,” that “other intrinsic goods that constitute eudaimonia should be 
understood to constitute virtuous activity itself.”185 One line of argument that Heinaman 
makes is that Aristotle’s Categories distinguishes substance (οὐσία) from suffering 
(piάσχειν) and making (piοιεῖν).186 Thus substances such as friends or loved ones should 
not be able to partly constitute activities. Heinaman also offers a second line of argument, 
interpreting the activity (ἐνέργεια) and action (piρᾶξις) of the NE as corresponding, 
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respectively, to the activity (ἐνέργεια) and change (κίνησις) of the Metaphysics.187 On 
this line of argument, a piρᾶξις/κίνησις or an ἐνέργεια would itself have to be made up of 
like entities, rather than entities different from itself—such as external goods or states of 
character. Whether or not one accepts Heinaman’s attempt to use Aristotle’s 
metaphysical views from outside of the NE in order to try to clarify the nature of action 
and activity within the NE itself, the basic point that an action or activity cannot be 
literally composed of elements that are not themselves actions, activities, or events itself 
seems reasonable. 
The exception that proves the rule are the examples of fine results or consequences 
ensuing upon excellent activity that Aristotle offers us—a fine death, or the long-
enduring product of a magnificent act (NE ΙΙΙ.1115a29-35; IV.1123a6-9). Such results are 
not strictly external goods—as I have argued—since they are subject to the specification 
of the agent and arise from his excellent deliberation, choice, and action. Nevertheless, a 
noble death, or the fine long-enduring product of a magnificent act resemble external 
goods, in that they occur physically outside of the agent, and as such they are not fully 
under his control. Yet at the same time, such goods help to define the acts that correspond 
to them, and as such can be reckoned parts of such actions in a way that the external 
goods (in the strict sense) cannot. Thus it is fair to reckon this kind of external good (in 
the broad sense) as properly a part of excellent activity, since the perfection of such an 
activity apparently depends upon the consequence or result that ensues from it.  
Furthermore, the wealth that magnificence uses to produce certain results seems to 
have a particularly intimate connection to those results, that perhaps cannot be plausibly 
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reduced to a strictly instrumental relation. Thus “long enduring monuments” 
(piολυχρόνια) that are judged “finest” (κάλλιστα) depend both upon magnificence and 
also upon the use of wealth (IV.1123a6-9). And likewise with a house that the 
magnificent man “outfits decorously using wealth” (κατασκευάσασθαι piρεpiόντως τῷ 
piλούτῳ), and which Aristotle reckons an “ornament” (κόσµος) (1123a6-7)—
presumably meaning an ornament for the virtue of the houseowner. While Aristotle for 
the most part insists that wealth has an instrumental value, one might well question 
whether this insistence holds up here. Is not wealth plausibly understood as part of what a 
nice home is? Indeed, it would seem to retain monetary value, and if it is valued qua fine 
home, must it not be valued partly in respect to such worth? Along these lines, one might 
ask whether the great man takes pleasure in his tastefully outfitted home strictly as an 
ornament to his own worth, rather than simply enjoying those comforts—of which he 
happens to be worthy—in the same way as anyone else would? Since evaluation always 
has a subjective element, one might ask whether the subjective evaluation that Aristotle is 
implicitly ascribing to the virtuous man seems plausible. And here, I think, there is some 
real room for doubt.  
This also raises a more serious and more pervasive problem for Aristotle—which is 
whether the kind of psychic harmony that he praises, where excellent activity and 
pleasure coincide, is even possible outside of a narrow aristocratic context, where people 
have the resources to exert control over the world, and thus practical wisdom gets some 
real causal grip in the consequences at which it aims—and furthermore, where they have 
the opportunity to feel ownership for such consequences, in a way that they might not if 
their efforts were more systematically subverted by conditions less favorable for action. 
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The aristocratic paradigm might be viewed as a kind of incidental and separable feature 
of Aristotle’s system—as those who try to detach magnificence and magnanimity 
(µεγαλοψυχία) from the other virtues perhaps regard it.188 But it plays a suspicious role 
in making many of the exercises of the virtues likely to achieve success, convenient, and 
relatively low cost for the man of excellence—with the major exception of bravery, 
according to which Aristotle regards a fine death as both choiceworthy and a greater good 
than the external goods (IX.1169a16-1169b2). This point might even be pushed further to 
claim that the kind of psychic harmony that Aristotle ascribes to the man of excellence 
rests upon the restriction of his activity to a particular type of environment. One might 
ask, then, whether Aristotle can plausibly situate value squarely on activity itself, or 
whether, rather, he can be read as at the same time implicitly acknowledging the value of 
circumstances of life for which almost all hope.  
 
 
Objects Virtuously Acted Upon or Correctly Valued 
 
Another role that the external goods might play in excellent practical activity is as objects 
acted upon. Certain external goods that Aristotle lists—such as children and true 
friends—seem to enter into action in this way. And Aristotle says, for example, that a 
friendly act may aim at the pleasure or lack of pain at another person “in accord with 
what is advantageous and fine” (IV.1126b28-30). In his books on friendship he also 
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remarks that since it is more characteristic of friendship to benefit than to be benefited, 
“the good man needs those who will benefit from his acts” (IX.1169b10-13). So far, 
however, I have only commented on the role that loved ones might play as the recipients 
of excellent activity. What is needed, however, is to go further and explain whether being 
a worthy recipient of such activity contributes some particular kind of worth to that 
activity. Thus one might suppose that somehow an excellent activity acting upon an 
excellent object is improved by the object upon which it acts. So far, this seems intuitive 
enough, but it threatens the self-sufficiency of excellent activity by improving it through 
the addition of more numerous or more worthy objects upon which to act.   
Another major difficulty, however, is that a virtuous agent may just as well act upon 
an object of aversion as one of affection. Thus an angry act correctly regulated by the 
virtue of mildness might aim at the displeasure of an enemy, just as a friendly act in fact 
aims at the pleasure of a friend. Both acts would be similarly virtuous, and both acts 
would depend upon the object being acted upon in some way. Yet comparing an angry 
act to a friendly act clarifies the problem of whether both kinds of action depend upon the 
object acted upon for their value in the same way. A transgressor provides an appropriate 
object upon which the virtue of mildness might be exercised. Yet this does not make such 
a transgressor good in any conventional sense, though good for virtuous activity. This 
shows the difficulty in trying to insist that the sole criterion of value is the promotion of 
virtuous activity—it is exactly the same problem that I raised in chapter 2 in critiquing 
the attempt to explain the value of external goods exclusively in terms of virtuous activity 
promotion. One might counter that both objects of affection and aversion are required in 
order for the virtuous agent to engage in the full range of virtuous activities; this, 
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certainly, is true. Yet if one supposes that a loving act derives value from an object of 
love, and that this explains how such an object of love figures in eudaimonia, one must 
explain why an angry act does not lose value from the object of aversion against which it 
is directed. That is, there would have to be some kind of asymmetry in how objects of 
affection and aversion contribute worth to the action that acts upon them. And as soon as 
this asymmetry is admitted, then seemingly worthy objects of love contribute value to the 
excellent man as more than merely convenient objects upon which to exercise one’s 
excellence. Thus this line of thought seems to fail to explain the value of the objects upon 
which one acts strictly in terms of their virtue-facilitating power.   
One might suppose, then, that the virtuous agent is in some way more receptive to the 
positive value of intrinsic goods through action, than he is receptive to the negative value 
of intrinsic ills. Indeed, the mild one (piρᾶος) aims, at least in part, to be “undisturbed” 
(ἀτάραχος) and not moved by emotion (IV.1125b33-1126a). One might go beyond the 
letter of the text here and suppose that the idea here is that the virtuous man resists being 
pained by even a legitimate object of anger. It might be, then, that the virtuous man 
virtuously resists being affected by the badness of the vicious men or vicious, yet 
somehow gains from the worth of the good men he helps. Yet if this were so, it still poses 
a problem for self-sufficiency, since then helping good men would be more productive of 
eudaimonia than harming of evil men—a life of helping good men would be better than a 
life of harming evil men. At the same time, I have already argued in the last chapter that 
Aristotle’s difficulty in formulating an argument strictly in terms of his definition of 




At this point, I shall turn briefly to the problem of whether goods can contribute 
worth to the agent by being correctly evaluated. Thus the possession of some good, 
whose worth the possessor has correctly evaluated, might also be supposed to confer 
some value on him. Magnanimity seems to involve, among other things, the correct 
evaluation of honors (NE IV.1124a16-17). Yet this too is problematic, because even if 
such evaluation is taken to be a kind of activity, excellent evaluation is itself separable 
from the value of the thing being evaluated—both evils and goods alike may be correctly 
evaluated, and if value should arise purely from correct evaluation, then the external good 
itself would add no value. Again, one might argue for an asymmetry, but again if there is 
such an asymmetry, and if correctly evaluating good possessions is better than correctly 
evaluating bad ones, then the external goods themselves seem more or less directly to be 
conferring value upon the life of the agent in question, and the self-sufficiency criterion is 




The Value of Loved Ones (Φίλοι) 
 
One can develop a similar line of reasoning about loved ones. For Aristotle, the best kind 
of friendship is between two men of excellence (VIII.1156b7 ff.). The idea is that 
friendship, in an analogous way to honor, can be understood as something that is either 
deserved or not deserved, and that excellent activity is the most important element in 
rendering someone worthy. At times, Aristotle also describes friendship itself as “some 
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kind of excellence” (ἀρετή τις) or “with excellence” (µετ’ ἀρετῆς) (VIII.1155a3-4; 
1159a34-b2). Thus one might suppose that the friendship of the virtuous man is simply 
an exercise of excellence joined with the correct assessment of one’s worthy friend. In 
this way, friendship might simply be assimilated to the other excellences, and its value 
might be more or less continuous with that of the other excellences. Yet the friend 
remains external in a sense, since the two friends are separate and their activity is 
separate. And insofar as a perfect friendship depends upon the existence of the object of 
one’s love, and this object of love is more essential to the activities that develop around 
it, than, say, wealth is to generosity, it does seem difficult to simply reduce a friendship to 
the activities that partly characterize it. Aristotle somewhat enigmatically remarks that the 
friend is “another self” (IΧ.1170b5-7), however. And this might be taken to indicate that 
the virtuous man regards his own excellent activity and himself as somehow continuous 
with his friend. If this idea is taken seriously, then it might be taken to resolve Aristotle’s 
remark that eudaimonia must not be understood as self-sufficient for one man alone, but 
for a man with his family, wife, and fellow-citizens (Ι.1097b8-11). In this case, one might 
suppose that a perfect friendship of excellent men amounts simply to some kind of 
accumulation of a greater sum of excellent activity, which each of them regards as to 
some extent shared between the two.  
But this account of friendship poses some difficulties. Aristotle often remarks that a 
friend desires the good of his friend “for his sake” (ἐκείνου ἕνεκα) (IX.1166a2-5), which 
seems to recognize the separateness and value of the friend, perhaps as a unique 
individual, rather than as a mere vehicle of virtue. But, as Vlastos correctly points out, 
this formulation is ambiguous, since it does not specify which feature or features 
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motivate a man’s desire for his friend’s good.189 In this way, they are similar to 
Aristotle’s remark that excellent action is chosen “for its own sake” (II.1105a32), the 
meaning of which likewise waits upon an account of the salient features of an action that 
render it choiceworthy in this way. There are passages, however, in which Aristotle 
makes it quite clear that, in perfect friendship at any rate, goodness or excellence is the 
reason why each friend is loved by the other (VIII.1157b3). Thus Vlastos supposes 
Aristotle to risk reproducing what he takes to be “the cardinal flaw” of Platonic love: 
regarding the best love as being of properties rather than persons.190 If Aristotle does in 
fact conceive of perfect love in this way, then it is a love of an excellence that remains 
separable from the persons in whom it is instantiated. In this case, particular objects of 
love (i.e., particular people) would be substitutable for one another, and would function 
as mere bearers of excellence. Aristotle’s repeated emphasis that the cause of perfect 
friendship is the excellence of each friend lends support to this possibility.  
Bernard Williams criticizes Aristotle’s account of perfect friendship on similar 
grounds, although instead of interpreting perfect love as love of properties, Williams 
criticizes it as love of whatever excellence the virtuous lover regards himself as 
possessing. Thus Williams characterizes such friendship as a, “three-dimensional mirror,” 
in which one looks for a friend that offers him his own “duplication.”191 Whether one 
sees Aristotle’s perfect friend as loving his own duplicate (as Williams argues), or as a 
lover of properties (as Vlastos suggests), the problem is more or less the same; he does 
not seem to be properly a lover of persons. The critiques offered by Vlastos and Williams 
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both depend upon the reasonable supposition that actual human relationships are driven 
in part for a love of a unique person. While this kind of critique might be dismissed as 
arising from a peculiarly modern interest in the individual as instantiating a set of unique 
and irreproducible characteristics, surely to some extent uniqueness is simply a product 
of the inevitably various circumstances, inclinations, and choices that characterize 
people.  
Aristotle does, however, at points seem to come close to acknowledging attachment 
as something with at least a partly independent life from the love of excellence. Thus, for 
example, he remarks that people especially love those things that they have labored over 
or suffered for (IX.1167a18 ff.), which acknowledges a motivation for love other than the 
excellence of the loved one, and thus a kind of attachment—though admittedly this kind 
of attachment still has a connection to excellence, but the excellence of the lover rather 
than the beloved. Aristotle also repeatedly emphasizes the importance of familiarity in 
perfect friendship, and this also might be taken to indicate some appreciation for the 
importance of attachment in relationships. But the explanation that he offers for its 
importance is made pretty strictly in terms of the theory—familiarity serves the purpose 
of assuring the good man that his friend is as good as he first appears (VIII.1156b25-32). 
Aristotle also discusses what happens when a perfect friendship is ruptured through the 
descent of one party into vice or less perfect virtue, finishing his discussion with a 
rhetorical question that seems to admit retaining at least some favor for one’s former 
friend, as well as “a memory of the previous familiarity” (µνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενοµένης 
συνηθείας) (1165b32-36). Nevertheless, he remarks at one point that there is nothing odd 
about a man breaking off a friendship with someone who has descended into incurable 
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vice, “since he was not a friend to a man of that sort” (1165b20-22). This implies that the 
kind of person someone is can be reduced to his intellectual virtues and character virtues. 
Indeed, the discussion as a whole seems to set aside the possibility that even the excellent 
man might find features of another person loveable that could persist despite vice.  
Nevertheless, despite much in Aristotle’s account of perfect friendship that suggests 
the virtuous man is a lover of excellences rather than a lover of persons, Aristotle never 
quite explicitly resolves the ambiguity in his formulation of loving another for his own 
sake. If, in fact, he did have some notion of attachment to persons, this would go a long 
way to explaining why the loss of loved ones, or their turning out to be vicious, would 
“soil” his life. And, as I have pointed out, Aristotle does seem to offer an explanation for 
attachment to those for whom one has toiled, at least, that falls outside of love-of-
excellence. And it would in principle be possible to extend this class of beloved-
beneficiaries to many of those the excellent man knows, since he will often work for the 
interest of the people to whom he is connected (as the accounts of generosity and 





My argument here has shown that it is impossible to use Aristotle’s account of action to 
give a full explanation for the value of the external goods. This chapter thus vindicates 
the conclusions of chapter 2 that Aristotle’s argument for eudaimonia’s need of the 
external goods at NE I.1099a31-b8 acknowledges that the external goods have some 
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value for eudaimonia apart from their role in making excellent activity more excellent. 
My chapter 2 analysis of that argument showed both that Aristotle attempts to explain the 
value of the external goods strictly in terms of the promotion of excellent activity, and 
also that his attempt fails. That is, Aristotle (at least initially) expects himself to be able to 
explain the value of other goods straightforwardly in terms of the promotion of excellent 
activity, but he does not succeed in doing so. This suggests that he takes the finality 
requirement seriously, and that he regards his theory as demanding all other goods to be 
chosen for the sake of virtuous activity, in the sense that they derive their value from a 
contribution to such activity. Aristotle’s handling of this argument thus runs contrary to 
the suggestion of one scholar that the for-the-sake-of relation between certain goods and 
eudaimonia should be understood loosely, as a constraint upon which other goods should 
be chosen, but not requiring all goods to derive their worth from the promotion of 
excellent activity.192 It also seems to count against looking for more subtle explanations 
of how this for-the-sake-of relation is to be understood—such as Gabriel Richardson 
Lear’s teleological relation of approximation.193 
One of the aims of this chapter has been to show just how far Aristotle’s account of 
action can go in explaining the value of various other goods. In particular, I have argued 
that Aristotle’s requirement that excellent practical activity be performed knowingly—in 
particular with knowledge of “that for the sake of which” some action is performed—
implies that such activity generally succeeds in bringing about its aimed at results or 
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consequences. Contrary to what is often supposed, my analysis of Aristotle’s 
action/production distinction has also shown that this distinction does not necessarily 
exclude aimed at and achieved results from partly determining the value of virtuous 
action. This interpretation goes some distance to explaining how external things play a 
part in the value of action. Thus, for example, wealth seems to have a more than purely 
instrumental relation to the ends for which the magnificent man uses it. Furthermore, 
even if the results or consequences at which an action aims are not themselves external 
goods (as I have argued) they are clearly more akin to the external goods than the internal 
goods of deliberation and choice. This line of interpretation, then, opens up a larger role 
for external goods and external things more generally within excellent practical activity 
than has sometimes been supposed. Nevertheless, even on this interpretation, Aristotle’s 
theory cannot fully explain the value of the external goods—as I have tried to show in the 
latter part of this chapter. 
At this point, I shall offer a suggestion for the source of Aristotle’s difficulty. While it 
is trivially true that the activity of one’s own soul must always mediate access to any 
value offered by other goods, this by itself does not guarantee that all such goods derive 
their value from improving such activity—at least, not by improving it in the way that 
Aristotle seems to have in mind. In NE I Aristotle contrasts the way in which excellent 
activity brings about eudaimonia, with how the opposite sort of actions brings about the 
opposite condition (1100b9-11)—where a later remark supports interpreting this to mean 
that vicious actions make a man miserable (1100b33-35). This remark seems to imply 
that the salient feature of activity (ἐνέργεια) for reckoning a man eudaimōn or athlios 
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(“wretched”) is the degree of excellence that it exhibits—that is, its actualization of 
intellectual or character excellence.  
This point raises what seems to me a fundamental interpretive problem—whether 
Aristotle regards activity as improvable exclusively by being made to exhibit a greater 
degree of excellence, or in other ways also. It seems to me that such formulations as 
“complete activity” and “excellent activity” are ambiguous, in that they do not specify 
precisely what conditions render such activity perfected, and whether it is exclusively the 
degree to which excellence is actualized in some activity that determines its worth. This 
is a problem that I have already discussed in relation to anger and friendly actions, both 
of which express specific character excellences, but one of which seems to have a kind of 
value that the other does not and cannot—a value which furthermore seems to accrue to it 
partly from the worthy person in respect to which it is exercised. If the value of the 
activities of the various excellences can be distinguished from one another in this way, 
and some of these activities are receptive to valued external goods—such as friends or 
honors—then activities of the latter sort would be improvable not only by being made 
more excellent, but also through such receptiveness. My preceding discussion about the 
difficulty of Aristotle’s evaluative scheme for making sense of people’s attachment to 
one another is particularly important here.  
These kinds of considerations also raise a problem for Aristotle’s claim that 
eudaimonia, defined as a kind of excellent activity, can be self-sufficient—that is, lacking 
in nothing. It is clear that Aristotle does not intend the self-sufficiency criterion to mean 
that excellent activity literally can stand alone as the sole good, since various other 
supporting goods must always be present in order for it to be actualized—such as 
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intellectual and character excellence, for example, life, and some degree of health. And in 
any case, there would be no scope for other goods to be chosen for their own sake if 
excellent activity were not (in a sense) choiceworthy along with those goods. On a more 
plausible reading, Aristotle means that excellent activity is self-sufficient taken with 
whatever goods are necessary to support that activity, or taken with whatever ends it 
seeks.  
Yet this latter interpretation also poses problems. In particular, Aristotle himself 
admits that eudaimonia is not self-sufficient for one person alone, but for a man along 
with his family and fellow citizens (1097b8-11). If he means that one’s community 
supports one’s activity, then this can be made to square with the self-sufficiency criterion. 
But if (as I have just suggested) Aristotle leaves it to some degree ambiguous whether 
activity is improvable only by being made to exhibit a greater degree of excellence, or in 
addition in other ways, then there is a major question left open. If one interprets Aristotle 
to take perfected activity in the latter sense, as improvable both by exhibiting a greater 
degree of excellence and also in other respects, then this seems to risk trivializing the 
self-sufficiency criterion by allowing all other goods some role in improving activity, and 
removing the special standing of activity qua realization of excellence. Furthermore, this 
interpretation is also at odds with Aristotle’s close identification of noble activity with 
eudaimonia (e.g., 1099a22, 1101a2), since such nobility seems to arise from activity’s 
realization of excellence, rather than through its being improved in other ways—for 
example by means of its contact with external goods. And, furthermore, such a broad 
conception of what improves or perfects activity would threaten Aristotle’s 
characterization of the good he is looking for as something δυσαφαίρετον (“difficult to 
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take away”) (I.1095b26). On the other hand, if Aristotle insists that activity is improvable 
only by more perfectly realizing excellence, then various goods that have a strong claim 
to value seem to be excluded. This ambiguity about how exactly excellent activity can be 
improved and perfected, and what kinds of goods can play a role in bringing about such 
perfection, would help to explain Aristotle’s equivocation about whether external things 
affect eudaimonia simply as instruments to excellent activity—or, instead, by tainting it 






Chapter 4: Aristotle’s NE on Moral Luck? 
 
 
The Notion of Moral Luck 
 
In the first three chapters, I interpret Aristotle’s view in the NE about how the external 
goods contribute to eudaimonia—in the first chapter, examining Aristotle’s method in NE 
I, then in the second chapter applying my observations about his method to an analysis of 
his argument that eudaimonia needs the external goods. Finally, in the third chapter, I 
look at his theory of action in order to evaluate how things outside or partly outside of 
action contribute value to that action—whether as external results, as instruments, or in 
some other way. The collective aim of the first three chapters, then, is to identify 
Aristotle’s position in the NE on the question of how the external goods, as well as 
external things in the broadest sense, bear on the ability of a man to achieve the human 
good. 
Here, I shall extend this work and apply these findings to a fresh question. In a pair of 
papers delivered jointly in 1976, Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel coined the term 
“moral luck,” and examined the philosophical problems that this idea raises.194 Moral 
luck is a concept that describes the factors outside of an agent’s control, which 
nevertheless impinge upon the moral assessment of him or of his actions (whether 
positive or negative). This notion is subject to different possible specifications, depending 
upon how exactly “moral” and “luck” are defined. Thus whatever both counts as moral 
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worth (on some definition) and yet at the same time depends upon what is outside of an 
agent’s control (on some definition) counts as moral luck. Debates about whether moral 
luck exists at all, or what kind of moral luck exists, thus naturally depend upon how each 
of these two definitions is worked out—and thus in which cases (if any) success or failure 
at realizing moral worth is judged to lie at least partly beyond an agent’s control.   
Nagel and Williams take Kant to be the chief exponent of the moral, and thus for the 
most part follow his concept of it. For their purposes, what matters most is that Kant 
insists upon a category of value that is both supreme and at the same time universally 
accessible to all humans as rational beings.195 Williams accordingly remarks that for Kant 
morality is, “open not merely to the talents, but to a talent which all rational beings 
necessarily possess in the same degree.”196 The term “talent” may be used by Williams 
here to avoid ruling out the possibility that while a rational potentiality is an essential 
human trait, it nevertheless requires cultivation in order to be brought to full fruit.197 The 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals does not distinguish between potential and 
fully cultivated reason in this way. Indeed, here Kant seems to ascribe rationality to 
human beings without distinction.198 In the Metaphyiscs of Morals, however, Kant 
specifically discusses moral instruction, which at least suggests that he sees fully fledged 
practical reason as contingent upon circumstance, and thus not necessarily equally 
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accessible to all.199 Here, I shall follow Kant’s position in the Groundwork, since the 
analysis of moral luck developed by Nagel and Williams presupposes an interpretation of 
the moral consistent with what Kant sets out in the Groundwork, but not necessarily in 
his other ethical writings. Nagel and Williams’ view does not necessarily depend upon 
Kant in particular, however. Thomas Nagel also works out his own notion of the moral as 
equally accessible to all by restricting moral worth to what falls within an agent’s control 
(without offering a technical definition of control, but rather illustrating it through 
examples).200 I shall not be especially concerned to distinguish between Kant’s view and 
Nagel’s here, since what I take to be most important is their shared contention that the 
moral is a good that is both supreme and at the same time equally accessible to all people.  
Some examples of moral luck should clarify what Nagel and Williams have in mind. 
In regard to the results of actions, Nagel insists on the “morally significant difference 
between rescuing someone from a burning building and dropping him from a twelfth-
storey window while trying to rescue him.”201 By positing two imaginary actions here, 
that differ only in respect to the result which lies beyond the agent’s control, Nagel thus 
isolates the role of this external factor in influencing the moral worth of an act. Nagel and 
Williams also both suppose that the will itself, which realizes moral worth through 
choice, is not independent of forces that act upon it from outside. Thus they coin the term 
“constitutive moral luck” to refer to the specific kind of moral luck that determines one’s 
ability to act in such a way as to realize moral worth. As Nagel claims, “Someone who 
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was an officer in a concentration camp might have led a quiet and harmless life if the 
Nazis had never come to power in Germany.”202 Thus Nagel and Williams reject Kant’s 
view that moral worth is equally within the reach of all rational beings through the 
exercise of their rational faculty. 
All of this should make it pretty clear what Nagel and Williams have in mind. But 
there is also a note of dissatisfaction or even distress that characterizes their work—both 
find the idea of a category of moral worth, which is at once supreme and equally 
accessible to all human beings through the exercise of the will, both attractive and 
untenable. They find it attractive, because it is a kind of moral democracy—where the 
greatest good is equally within the reach of all. But they find it untenable, because they 
insist that certain things that fall outside of an agent’s control either themselves have 
moral significance (such as consequences) or influence the exercise of the will (one’s 
rearing; the opportunities for moral and immoral action). Moral luck thus uncovers the 
failed pretension of moral worth to lie equally within the reach of all, and at the same 
time to possess supreme value. Nevertheless, Nagel and Williams themselves are 
sympathetic to the aspirations of morality. 
All of this has the somewhat odd result that the very idea of moral luck destabilizes 
the underlying notion of the moral upon which it depends. If moral luck exists, then 
moral worth cannot truly be equally accessible to all humans. But if morality did not have 
this pretension, then there would be nothing interesting or surprising about the existence 
of such moral luck. As Nagel and Williams themselves insist, the very idea that a 
category of value is equally accessible to all implies that it cannot be influenced by 
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factors outside of agency itself—and hence that moral luck is impossible. Thus Nagel 
dubs the idea of moral luck “paradoxical,”203 and Williams has remarked that he 
originally, “expected it to suggest an oxymoron.”204 Strictly, then, one cannot both accept 
the possibility of moral luck, and insist upon the category of the moral. Nevertheless, 
while both Nagel and Williams see their work as casting doubt upon the plausibility of 
the moral, neither seems entirely satisfied with the alternative either—that the idea of a 
universally accessible and supreme moral good must simply be dispensed with. As 
Williams puts it, the “allure” of Kantianism is that it offers, “an ultimate form of justice,” 
and a “solace to a sense of the world’s unfairness.”205  
 
 
Moral Luck in Aristotle 
  
Now that I have given a sketch of what moral luck is, I shall begin to assess Aristotle’s 
position on the possibility of moral luck. Two issues arise immediately. Aristotle has no 
notion of the moral, so strictly speaking one cannot assess his position on moral luck at 
all, since this notion presupposes that of the moral. Secondly, does luck in Nagel and 
Williams’s sense coincide with a Greek notion?  
Luck is the easier of the two points, so I shall consider that first. Since Nagel and 
Williams think of luck negatively, as what is outside of the agent’s control, it is useful to 
begin by looking at how they see that domain of control. Nagel regards with suspicion the 
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claim that any particular act is actually within the control of an agent (and hence free of 
luck). After considering the many forces that press upon the agent from outside, he goes 
so far as to conclude: “Eventually nothing remains which can be ascribed to the 
responsible self…”206 Aristotle’s position could hardly be more different from Nagel’s 
skepticism. Indeed, he assigns responsibility to an agent for almost anything that he 
physically causes, including the so-called mixed actions undertaken under non-ideal 
conditions of choice, in which the agent chooses something undesirable and something 
choiceworthy together in a single act.  
Nevertheless, there are certain kinds of action that Aristotle regards as outside of an 
agent’s control, and hence involuntary—in particular, involuntary acts due to force or 
ignorance. At the same time, Aristotle does not explicitly ascribe such force or ignorance 
to luck (τύχη). Thus Aristotle’s notion of responsible agency does not necessarily have 
the same neat relation to luck that one finds in Nagel and Williams—for whom 
responsible agency and luck are defined in relation to one another as mutually exclusive 
alternatives.  
Aristotle’s explicit discussion of how luck influences eudaimonia in NE I (at NE 
I.1100b18-1101a21), however, does seem to take the notion of luck expansively, in a way 
that seems similar to the way that Nagel and Williams use it. Such a conception of luck 
would seem in principle to be inclusive of force or ignorance. Thus Aristotle remarks that 
the good man “always or most of all will do and will see those things that accord with 
virtue” (1100b19-20) and, a few lines later, that he “will never perform hateful and 
wicked acts” (οὐδέpiοτε γὰρ piράξει τὰ µισητὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα) (1100b34-35). By 
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making this latter categorical assertion that the good man will never perform acts of a 
particular sort, within a discussion of luck’s effect on eudaimonia, Aristotle implicitly 
assumes a very broad understanding of luck as including anything that would create an 
exception to that claim. In any case, I shall not be particularly interested in Aristotle’s 
conception of luck here. Instead, I shall focus my work here on assessing the various 
ways in which Aristotle regards virtuous action as depending upon forces outside of the 
control of the agent. Thus I shall use luck in Williams and Nagel’s sense throughout, 
while following Aristotle’s own distinctions between the different ways in which 
excellent activity depends upon what lies outside the full control of the agent. 
The moral poses a more significant problem. Aristotle knows nothing like the modern 
category of the moral—at least in the form that it takes in Nagel, Williams, or in Kant 
himself. That is, Aristotle has no category of value that is both equally accessible to all 
human agents and at the same time of supreme worth (to set aside some of the other 
distinguishing criteria of the moral). Thus assessing Aristotle’s position on moral luck 
amounts to asking a broad question about the degree to which he regards each of his own 
categories of value as depending upon factors outside of the agent’s control. And if one 
takes moral in the strict sense, Aristotle has no position on moral luck at all. Aristotle 
reckons eudaimonia the supreme good for man—and to this extent it does resemble 
moral worth in Kant’s sense. But it is also defined in at least formally egoistic terms, 
whereas Kant insists upon a division between happiness and moral worth. And 
furthermore Aristotle sometimes identifies eudaimonia with contemplative rather than 
practical activity, in which case it is clearly not a specifically moral good. But most 
importantly for my purposes, throughout the NE Aristotle supposes that only free adult 
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men can fully realize the rational activity in which such eudaimonia consists, so that he 
clearly does not regard it as equally accessible to all humans.207 In this way, eudaimonia 
fails to satisfy one of the main two criteria of the moral that concern Nagel and Williams 
(equal accessibility to all humans), even as it satisfies the other (supremacy).  
In the Politics this limitation of eudaimonia to certain people is worked out more 
explicitly, with Aristotle notoriously reckoning some men to be natural slaves, incapable 
of the full use of reason, and therefore incapable of exercising practical wisdom (NE 
I.1253b15-55b15). Aristotle furthermore claims that the slave entirely lacks the 
deliberative part of the soul (τὸ βουλευτικόν), while for the woman it is “lacking 
authority” (ἄκυρον), and for the child it is “unfinished” (ἀτελές) (I.1260a12-14). And he 
goes on to argue that the virtue (ἀρετή) of each accordingly differs (I.1260a14-24). Thus 
while slaves and women can exercise practical excellence to some degree, it is of a 
limited and imperfect kind. Accordingly, Aristotle goes on to characterize the virtue of 
the ruler as “complete” (τελέος), while for the others there is only “as much as belongs to 
them” (ὅσον ἐpiιβάλλει αὐτοῖς).  
And apart from restricting the raw ability to exercise excellent rational activity to free 
adult men, Aristotle also sets what are in effect circumstantial restrictions. Thus in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines certain virtues in a way that would make it 
impossible for anyone but an advantaged adult free man able to exercise them. Thus 
magnificence consists in giving large sums of money—making this virtue accessible only 
to the wealthy—and magnanimity (µεγαλοψυχία) depends upon the mere possession of 
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worldly goods. Furthermore, if the virtues are mutually entailing, including magnificence 
and magnanimity, then one must be wealthy in order to have any virtue whatsoever in the 
strict sense.208 These circumstantial restrictions serve to distinguish Aristotle’s notion of 
virtuous activity still further from the moral. But while Aristotle regards it as 
unproblematic that certain people are (on his lights) simply incapable of fully realizing 
excellent rational activity, he seems actually concerned about, and one might even say 
disappointed by, the contingency that the dependency upon resources injects into 
eudaimonia.  
The Politics’ emphasis on the householder’s role as the manager of wealth as well as 
of his wife, children, and slaves also assumes that the householder will be in something 
like the position of power and advantage on which excellent practical activity is 
predicated in the Nicomachean Ethics. Thus Aristotle makes a limited type of wealth 
acquisition part of household management (in contrast to another kind that has no limit 
that he deems unnatural) (I.1256a1-1256b38). And such limited wealth acquisition might 
support the NE excellences of generosity and magnificence. And Aristotle also regards 
the householder’s slaves specifically as tools for action, rather than production (I.1254a5-
17). Although slaves are not directly mentioned as tools for the exercise of the particular 
excellences in the Nicomachean Ethics, the accounts of certain practical excellences 
presuppose that the excellent person will be a mature man in a position of some power. 
The crucial similarity, then, is simply that power is concentrated in the hands of both the 
householder of the Politics and also of the virtuous man of the NE, and that his virtue can 
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only be exercised effectively from such a position of power and advantage, as a manager 
of other goods and even (in the Politics) of other people. 
Interestingly, at one point in his account of generosity Aristotle does flirt with what 
might be termed a resource-relative conception of virtue, remarking: “Indeed, nothing 
prevents the one who gives less from being more generous, if he gives from a smaller 
pool of wealth” (IV.1120b9-11). On this principle, the generosity of a gift cannot be 
judged in absolute terms, but only in relation to the wealth of the one making the gift. For 
example, if a poor man gives a small gift that is significant to him, it might be more 
generous than a much larger gift made by a wealthy man that costs him little. One could 
well generalize this principle further, to make the worth of all actions purely relational to 
both the external and internal resources that the agent possesses—emotional, 
psychological, material. Virtuous activity would then turn out to be something more like 
doing the best possible thing under the circumstances, given one’s limited resources, 
whatever those might be. This, however, is decidedly not the direction that Aristotle 
ultimately chooses to go, at least in his account of excellent practical activity—since he 
both makes magnificence and magnanimity excellences, and makes the virtues be 
mutually entailing. If one looks to NE X, where Aristotle respecifies eudaimonia as 
excellent contemplative activity, however, things are different—contemplation depends 
upon external goods as the conditions for its exercise (1178b33-35), but it does not have 
the same intimate relationship with such goods that is characteristic of practical activity. 




Excellent practical activity for Aristotle thus fails to be equally accessible to all 
humans both because of its restriction in its fullest form to those with fully rational souls 
(free adult men), and also because of the circumstantial conditions required for its 
exercise (wealth, etc.). But Aristotle seems concerned only by the latter—that is, one gets 
the sense that Aristotle would at least prefer for all men capable of rational judgment to 
have the opportunity to exercise virtue. Nevertheless, he is the one who defines virtues in 
socially specific ways that make them dependent not only upon a full capacity for 
reasoning, but also upon external resources. And not only that, but in the Politics he is 
not especially preoccupied by trying to form a society in which the opportunity for virtue 
is allotted to all those who have the requisite rational capacity. Thus he does not deny that 
vulgar craftsmen are capable of reason,209 but he does regard their activities as interfering 
with the development of this capacity,210 and thus makes the best city-state exclude them 
from citizenship (III.1278a8-13). Thus there is a large but very imperfect overlap for 
Aristotle between those who qualify as having fully rational souls (non-slave adult men), 
and those who have the correct circumstances to exercise complete virtue—which does 
not overly concern Aristotle, at least when a person is born into such adverse 
circumstances for the cultivation and exercise of virtue. Thus Aristotle’s paradigm case 
of misfortune that takes away eudaimonia—Priam—is not a rational man born to 
barbarous parents or to poverty, but rather a man who was born into ideal circumstances 
for such exercise, and who probably retained considerable external goods and other 
advantages until Troy actually fell—despite his personal and political tragedy. 
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Seeing women or slaves as subject to the strokes of moral luck for Aristotle is thus 
mistaken, since Aristotle does not think of virtuous action in the Nicomachean Ethics as 
equally accessible to all, and it is not at all clear that he would regard it as a loss of any 
kind for large swathes of humankind to be unable to exercise such activity.211 As I have 
pointed out, for Nagel and Williams moral luck arises from the failed pretension of 
morality to be equally within the grasp of all as human agents. But when a category of 
value lacks this pretension—as excellent practical activity in the full sense does for 
Aristotle—it cannot be regarded as having failed to realize this pretension in this way, 
and thus cannot properly be regarded as moral luck. It is true that there is a difficulty in 
Aristotle’s position—that he both seems to attribute a rational nature to man, and to deny 
the full form of such reason to certain members of the species.212 Nevertheless, this is his 
position. The function argument notwithstanding, he does not begin with the thought that 
there is a supreme good equally within the reach of all humans.  
 
 
Previous Attempts to Assess Aristotle’s Position on Moral Luck in the NE 
 
Before turning to my own analysis of Aristotle’s categories of value in order to isolate his 
position on the possibility of moral luck, I would like to show why previous attempts to 
identify his position have been inadequate. In fact, each such attempt has been marred by 
a failure to examine Aristotle’s own categories of value on their own terms. Thus 
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Anthony Kenny’s 1993 paper, “Aristotle On Moral Luck,” takes the NE discussion of the 
dependence of eudaimonia upon luck as the main treatment of moral luck within the 
Nicomachean Ethics—without trying to distinguish eudaimonia from other kinds of value 
that Aristotle relies upon throughout this discussion or elsewhere in the NE.213 Yet it is 
not at all clear that eudaimonia is a strictly moral good for Aristotle. For one thing, as I 
have already remarked, Aristotle does not see it as a good equally accessible to all. 
Furthermore, eudaimonia is defined in at least formally egoistic terms, in a way that the 
moral is not.214 And it is possible to possess at least one kind of ethical good (character 
virtue) without possessing eudaimonia at all.215 Kenny’s approach would have been more 
reasonable for the Stoics, Plato, Epicurus, or the Cynics, since all more closely identify 
an agent’s own well-being with his achievement of ethical worth. Even in these cases, 
however, one would still need to begin by examining exactly how eudaimonia and such 
ethical value are related—accidentally or essentially.  
Most famously, Martha Nussbaum devotes the final and third part of The Fragility of 
Goodness to Aristotle’s view on the susceptibility of “goodness” to loss through 
misfortune, both in the Poetics and the NE.216 The very title of her work seems to suggest 
an interest in moral luck, and she refers to Bernard Williams from time to time,217 yet she 
rejects the moral/non-moral distinction upon which his and Nagel’s work rests. She 
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justifies this rejection by claiming, “The Greek texts make no such distinction,”218 and 
describes herself as using “more concrete and informal distinctions” in place of the 
moral/non-moral distinction.219 Yet, while it is true that Aristotle does not rely upon the 
moral/non-moral distinction as such, he does develop his own categories of value, to 
which Nussbaum is for the most part inattentive. Thus, Nussbaum often refers simply to 
goodness, without clarifying whether she means character virtue, eudaimonia, both, or 
some other notion of her own construction that has a more complex relation to Aristotle’s 
categories.220 And she also sometimes refers to “ethical assessments,” where this neither 
tracks, nor seems intended to track, Aristotle’s own notion of praiseworthiness.221 This 
issue is crucial, since Aristotle himself often directly distinguishes between the degree of 
control that an agent exercises over different kinds of goods—as, for example, when he 
remarks that action and character are both voluntary, but in different ways (NE 
III.1114b30-1115a3). Thus, to use the term moral loosely, he distinguishes different 
kinds of moral luck that correspond to different categories of value. 
In a paper published in 1992 that deals primarily with Aristotle’s Poetics, Cynthia 
Freeland at one point turns to the topic of moral luck in the NE, drawing on Nussbaum’s 
work. Implicitly contrasting her own position with that of Nussbaum, she remarks: 
“Though I believe there is some room in the [Nicomachean] Ethics for moral luck, I 
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doubt that it extends very far.”222 While Freeland draws directly on Nagel and Williams’ 
analysis, however, she too fails to explain how she thinks the moral piece of moral luck 
maps on to Aristotle’s scheme of value in the Nicomachean Ethics.223 Thus at one point, 
she seems to analyze a purely passively suffered loss as a kind of moral luck, without 
showing how such a loss would impinge upon the moral status of the agent.224 Thus 
Freeland’s analysis suffers from the same basic problem as those of Nussbaum and 
Kenny—a failure to examine Aristotle’s own scheme of value critically as a prerequisite 
to any analysis of his position on moral luck. 
Another analysis of Aristotelian moral luck by Judith Andre focuses not on 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, but simply on Aristotle’s more general interest in 
character virtue.225 The author, however, acknowledges that she is not actually using the 
term “Aristotelian” to refer to Aristotle’s exact views, but to pick out a strand in “our 
present ways of thinking.”226 Accordingly, her analysis is simply of the kind of moral 
luck that would result from taking “moral” to refer primarily to virtue of character, rather 
than primarily to action or will.227 Thus none of these studies offers an analysis of 
Aristotle’s view on moral luck that is grounded in his own scheme of value.  
Drawing on my work in the previous three chapters, then, I shall outline some of the 
interpretive problems for isolating Aristotle’s position on moral luck in the Nicomachean 
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Ethics. Unlike previous studies, I shall take Aristotle’s own scheme of value as my 
starting point. First, I shall give an overview of the different kinds of value that Aristotle 
identifies in the Nicomachean Ethics and the degree to which each can be considered 
moral in nature. As I do so, I shall also sketch what kind of susceptibility to external 
factors Aristotle supposes each kind of value to have. In some cases, this will raise 
interpretive questions that lie beyond the scope of this chapter, so that I will have to 
indicate how the problem applies to the question of what Aristotle’s position on moral 
luck is, rather than actually providing a definitive solution. In the final part of this 
chapter, I shall examine two particular discussions that bear on Aristotle’s position on 
moral luck—the NE III analysis of involuntary action, and Aristotle’s remarks on the way 
that misfortune influences both the happiness of a moral agent, as well as his ability to 
realize “the fine” (τὸ καλόν). Basically, my concern here will be to assess how exactly 
Aristotle reckons with the possibility that a good man might involuntarily do something 
that would ordinarily be regarded as wicked—except that in this case it has been done 
involuntarily rather than intentionally.  
 
 
Kinds of Value and Kinds of Moral Luck in Aristotle’s NE 
 
As I have already remarked, because Aristotle does not himself know the modern 
category of the moral, assessing his position on moral luck amounts to asking a broad 
question about the degree to which he regards each of his own categories of value as 
depending upon factors outside of a person’s control. Thus one can speak of Aristotle’s 
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position of moral luck in a loose sense, with reference to the degree of contingency of 
each of the various categories of value that he distinguishes. Here, I shall outline the 
problems posed by each category of value that Aristotle distinguishes, before turning to a 
more pointed examination of two specific parts of the NE that help to assess his position 
on moral luck. 
First, there is eudaimonia itself. To retrace some ground for the earlier part of this 
chapter, while Aristotle does reckon eudaimonia to be the supreme good, and in this 
respect it resembles the Kantian notion of moral worth, Aristotle does not reckon it to be 
equally accessible to all. This, by itself, creates a wide gap between eudaimonia and 
moral worth—either as it is defined by Kant himself, or as moral philosophers such as 
Williams and Nagel think of it. A second difficulty is that Aristotle seems to conceive of 
eudaimonia as at least formally self-regarding,228 while Kant, at least, tries to draw a 
fairly hard line between happiness and moral worth. Few would dispute this 
characterization of Aristotle, but one complication here for trying to characterize 
Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia as formally egoistic is the self-sufficiency 
requirement, which Aristotle wants somehow to apply to a group rather than a single 
person alone (I.1097b8-13). Yet this would seem to make eudaimonia an irreducibly 
social rather than a good that an individual (in some formal sense, at least) pursues for his 
own sake. While I do not want to dismiss this qualification to self-sufficiency, it is hard 
to know just how to interpret it—whether Aristotle has in mind some natural social need, 
or merely the need for others in order to engage in the full range of excellences. 
Aristotle’s ability to maintain eudaimonia as a formally self-regarding good, while 
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including social ends within it, is well demonstrated by his own analysis of true self love 
(IX.1168a28-1169b2). For Aristotle the true lover-of-self is particularly apt to perform 
noble acts that would normally be thought of as self-sacrificing, but in fact such a person 
gains nobility (τὸ καλόν) and thus distributes “the greater good” to himself (1169a27-29). 
Thus, one might say, the man of practical excellence is formally egoistic, but not 
substantively so.229 
Another difficulty, which results from Aristotle’s formally self-regarding conception 
of eudaimonia, is that he does not necessarily define it as concerned with one’s conduct 
or one’s relations to others. That is, Aristotle claims that almost all regard eudaimonia as 
the highest achievable good (ἀκρότατον τῶν piρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν) (I.1095a14-18), and 
this formal definition is perhaps in some sense more basic than his later specifications of 
it—as a kind of excellent rational activity, and then variously as practical activity or 
contemplative activity. Thus Aristotle’s method can be seen as proceeding to a more and 
more specified conception of eudaimonia, and it is only once he reaches the fully 
specified form that it is perhaps identified with excellent practical activity (but perhaps 
with contemplative activity). Thus there are a few ways in which eudaimonia differs from 
moral worth—in that it is at least formally self-regarding, in that it does not necessarily 
concern one’s conduct, and in that, while supreme, Aristotle does not reckon it equally 
accessible to all.  
Aristotle also refers to praise and blame throughout the NE, and one may abstract a 
notion of praiseworthiness as a particular kind of value or worth from these remarks. In 
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NE III, Aristotle introduces his discussion of the voluntary, explaining that only what is 
voluntary is subject to praise and blame, while what is involuntary is subject to 
forgiveness and “sometimes” pity (1109b30-35). This distinguishes a clear notion of 
assessment of the individual, which is meant to correspond to things that are under his 
own control in the specific sense that they are voluntary. Thus Aristotle’s requirement 
that what is praised or blamed be voluntary approximates Nagel’s requirement that what 
is subject to moral assessment be under the control of the agent. Nevertheless, Nagel in 
the end is far more skeptical than Aristotle about what may be assigned to an agent’s 
control—supposing that even actions that an agent brings about through negligence (such 
as running someone down while driving one’s car recklessly) depend upon factors 
outside of an agent’s control (the presence of a pedestrian near a red light).230 Nagel’s 
skepticism about whether actions that Aristotle would regard as voluntary fall under the 
control principle is driven by a desire to uncover a category of value that is truly equally 
accessible to all—a desire Aristotle does not quite share. If luck is a factor in the worth of 
some act, then (for Nagel) it violates the principle of control. Thus voluntary and 
praiseworthy acts (for Aristotle) would hardly satisfy Nagel as being equally within the 
grasp of all agents. Indeed, Aristotle’s notion of responsible control is very different from 
Nagel’s—for Aristotle, whatever an agent knowingly causes counts as voluntary 
(III.1111a22-24). 
Yet despite the fact that the praiseworthy seems more nearly equally accessible to all 
than excellent practical activity, there is no reason to suppose that Aristotle regards the 
praiseworthy as a supreme good—indeed, Aristotle reserves that distinction for 
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eudaimonia, which he regards as beyond praise (1101b10-27). And, at the same time, in 
the Eudemian Ethics (EE II.1220a4-6), Aristotle remarks that the intellectual virtues may 
be praised, suggesting that praiseworthiness has a broader scope than moral worth does, 
and extends beyond the domain of conduct. Thus the praiseworthy cannot at all be 
assimilated to the moral. 
Character virtue also seems to represent a distinct class of value. As I remarked 
earlier, constitutive moral luck consists in the factors outside of an agent’s control that 
nevertheless influence the development of his character, will, or preferences in some way 
that determines the extent to which he is capable of acting morally.231 Thus if Aristotelian 
moral character were to depend upon factors outside of an agent’s control, then this 
would be a kind of constitutive moral luck in Nagel and Williams’ terms (with the 
qualification that character virtue is neither a supreme good, nor is supposed to be equally 
accessible to all for Aristotle, and thus only approximates the moral).  
Aristotle makes conflicting remarks about whether he regards the character 
excellences as subject to forces beyond an agent’s control, however. On the one hand, 
Aristotle makes a number of remarks that suggest that the moral agent is at the mercy of 
his rearing for the development of his character excellences—especially in NE I and II.232 
And he furthermore admits of the possibility of natural character virtue—though he 
supposes that it always requires the development of practical wisdom in order to be 
brought to perfection (NE VI.1144b34). Such natural virtue, insofar as it would seem to 
make it easier either to approximate virtuous acts, or else to close the gap to achieve full 
virtue, is a kind of constitutive moral luck. Thus Aristotle seems to admit two kinds of 
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constitutive moral luck—through rearing and through natural virtue. Yet in NE III.5, 
Aristotle argues that states of character are up to the agent, apparently relying upon the 
consideration that those actions which eventually result in a state of character are up to 
the agent.233 Not only does this position contradict his remarks elsewhere about the 
importance of rearing, but the argument itself presents some difficulties. An attempt at 
resolving Aristotle’s position on this question would require extensive investigation, and 
thus lies well beyond the scope of this chapter.  
Excellent practical activity itself seems to have another distinct kind of worth. Such 
activity depends upon various things outside the control of the agent—in particular, it 
cannot be predicted in advance whether a particular action will turn out to be performed 
knowingly—as Aristotle requires of virtuous action (NE II.1105a31-33). For another 
thing, excellent practical activity in the strict sense depends upon the possession of an 
underlying state of character, so that if character excellence depends upon forces outside 
the agent, then so does virtuous activity. Virtuous action also depends upon certain 
opportunities for action (though Aristotle says little about this directly), and the 
possession of certain external goods. Finally, as I have argued somewhat controversially 
in my third chapter, such action depends upon the achievement of aimed at results. A 
further question concerns whether or not Aristotle truly regards all the particular 
character excellences as mutually entailing, as he sometimes says (NE VI.1144b32-34). If 
so, this would be a particularly demanding kind of moral luck, since in order to possess 
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any of the other virtues, one would need to possess the wealth needed for magnificent 
action, for example.234 
Another kind of value that Aristotle distinguishes is “the fine” (τὸ καλόν). Aristotle 
never directly defines the fine in the NE, but he refers to it often, and these references 
give a reasonably clear sense of what he has in mind. Again, it approximates but is not 
identical to the moral. The fine is not a supreme good, since it is not identical to 
eudaimonia, which is regarded as the supreme good. This is shown clearly by Aristotle’s 
admission of the possibility that someone could continue to realize the fine, but at the 
same time fail to be eudaimōn (on which see the final section of this chapter). 
Furthermore, the fine seems to rest in part on the external, visible aspects of an action,235 
whereas the moral tends to depend more strictly upon the will. 
Thus, to draw some general conclusions, Aristotle has no category of value that 
closely approximates the moral—as a supreme good equally accessible to all, and as 
arising through correct conduct. Eudaimonia is the supreme good, but it is not equally 
within the reach of all, since it consists in activities that Aristotle regards as accessible 
only to non-slave men who have the supply of the external goods needed to support 
excellent practical activity. Praiseworthiness seems to come closer to being equally 
accessible to all, but it does not have supreme worth, nor is it restricted to the domain of 
conduct. Character excellence is not equally accessible to all either—certainly not to 
slaves, women, or children, and perhaps not to everyone else either, since Aristotle 
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sometimes makes remarks that seem to acknowledge that nature and nurture both stack 
the deck for some over others. The fine (τὸ καλόν) seems restricted to matters involving 
conduct, in the NE at least, and in a passage that I shall discuss later Aristotle does seem 
to regard it as equally within the reach of all. Nevertheless, it arises from excellent 
activities, and Aristotle describes results as fine, even though such results clearly are 
outside of the full control of the agent. Thus, since none of Aristotle’s categories of value 
maps very closely on to the moral, one must be content with speaking of Aristotle’s view 
on moral luck in a loose sense, and distinguishing between the different kinds of control 
that an agent exerts over Aristotle’s various categories of value.  
 
 
NE III on Moral Luck? 
 
Now that I have surveyed some of the main kinds of value that Aristotle distinguishes 
within the NE, and sketched out the evidence for how each depends upon what is outside 
of the agent’s control, I shall consider some specific sources of moral luck. One obvious 
place to begin looking is NE III. Here, Aristotle analyzes involuntary acts due to force or 
ignorance, as well as “mixed” action that is partly voluntary, partly involuntary.236 I shall 
focus here on Aristotle’s analysis of a particular kind of involuntary action—action 
rendered involuntary by ignorance of a relevant particular—since it forms a particularly 
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unambiguous challenge to an agent’s control over virtuous activity. Since Aristotle 
restricts praise and blame to what is voluntary, such an involuntary act of ignorance 
ought not then be subject to praise or blame. Likewise, since Aristotle requires that 
virtuous action be done knowingly, it cannot count as virtuous action either (NE 
II.1105a31-33).  
Indeed, involuntary action of this general kind is taken as a paradigmatic form of 
moral luck for Williams in his original paper.237 While obviously he is developing his 
own view, rather than interpreting Aristotle, some classicists have been stimulated by his 
discussion. Thus Nussbaum, in the Fragility of Goodness, refers to “the situation of 
Oedipus”—using Oedipus as the paradigm case of the more general kind of bad moral 
luck that he exemplifies—that is, of action performed in ignorance of a salient 
particular.238 Furthermore, Nussbaum claims that Aristotle regards this general category 
of action as blameworthy—remarking somewhat obliquely that Oedipus’ action is “a 
hideous rather than a blameless one.”239 While it may well be hideous on Aristotle’s 
lights as well as ours, this remark implies that the act, though involuntary and subject to 
circumstances outside of his control, is nevertheless still blameworthy. Despite this claim, 
Aristotle quite clearly regards such action as blameless, insofar as actions performed in 
ignorance of a relevant particular are involuntary,240 and thus excluded from the class of 
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voluntary things that are subject to praise or blame.241 And Oedipus’ homicide in 
particular seems to have been the sort of act that would have been acceptable except for 
what he did not know.242 Thus even though Aristotle does not explicitly remark on 
Oedipus’ ignorant patricide or ignorant mother-marriage in NE III, nevertheless what he 
does say would clearly render acts of this kind as involuntary and thus not subject to 
praise or blame at all.   
Determining exactly what Aristotle thinks is bad about an involuntary act performed 
in ignorance of a relevant particular, and what kind of value is affected is difficult, 
however. Somewhat curiously, Aristotle even fails to remark on how performing such an 
act affects the eudaimonia of the agent who does it.243 This silence is surprising, given 
that actions of this kind would seem to bear directly on the NE I discussion of the 
dependence of eudaimonia upon luck and the external goods.  
One possible explanation for Aristotle’s silence on the influence of such acts upon 
eudaimonia, is that Aristotle regards them as fairly unusual, and not having any decisive 
significance for the entire life of a normal person. In support of this interpretation, 
Aristotle’s examples of ignorant acts all seem to be one-off events that take place in the 
course of a few moments—such as thinking a stone is pumice when it is not, and 
(presumably, though Aristotle does not say) using it to strike someone (1111a13). Of 
course, an event of short duration may still sometimes have wide-reaching effects. 
Accordingly, scholars discussing Aristotle’s analysis often mention Oedipus as the 
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example par excellence of ignorant involuntary action.244 Aristotle himself never 
mentions Oedipus in NE III, however. And, interestingly, the tragic example that 
Aristotle does give here, of Merope falsely believing her son to be her enemy, is an act 
intended but never carried out, since Merope apparently had a recognition before she 
could perform the involuntary act of harming her son.245 Aristotle’s use of this example, 
especially, seems to suggest a certain hesitation to admit that there can be truly life 
changing acts of ignorance.  
One might also try to determine how the fineness or baseness of such an act might be 
judged. If fineness partly rests in the full realization of virtue in action, depending both 
on the success of results, and the visibility and magnitude of those results, then the 
evaluation of the fineness of an act would seem to be diminished by a failed or 
unintended and undesirable result. At any rate, such an act might fail to count as fine, 
insofar as it would fail to bring virtue to completion, and thus not be visibly fine. Yet it is 
not clear that it would be base either, since the base, like the fine, seems to depend upon a 
certain kind of character and intention.246 Thus involuntary actions and their results may 
fail to be fine, but they do not seem actually to count as base.  
Another possibility is that such an act or its result could be evaluated as a kind of 
external evil, an extension of Aristotle’s explicitly developed notion of the external 
goods. Yet, as I have argued in chapter 2, Aristotle tends to think of the external goods as 
in-general goods that have not been specified as good by a virtuous agent—so that the 
                                                 
244
 See, for example, Nussbaum (2001) 334. 
245
 See Hyginus, Fabulae 137, for a summary of the plot of the play to which Aristotle is 
apparently referring here. 
246
 As indicated, for example, by Aristotle’s use of the fine and the base at III.1117b7-9 to refer to 
voluntarily enduring or avoiding wounds, where doing so is demanded by bravery.  
201 
 
aim of an action, or its result is good in a different and stronger way than the external 
goods. At the same time, Aristotle requires that an involuntary action be regretted by the 
agent after he discovers what he has done (III.1110b18-25). This seems to require that 
something in the action is actually contrary to the wish or desire of the agent, and in this 
respect such involuntary acts approximate vicious acts. In this way, then, describing an 
involuntary act of particular ignorance as an external evil seems inadequate. It is bad, not 
because it is bad in general, but rather because it runs contrary to correct choice. 
It is thus difficult to establish a clear Aristotelian position on the evaluative status of 
an action performed in ignorance of the relevant particulars, which brings about an 
undesirable result of some kind. Evidently such an action fails to be praiseworthy or 
blameworthy, to be fine or base, to be virtuous or vicious, or to partially instantiate 
eudaimonia. And while it might amount to an external evil, this does not seem to fully 
explain what is bad about it. Thus this only tells us what such an action is not, not what it 
is. Aristotle does say that such an action is regretted, but does not say what exactly is 
regretted or why. This evaluative silence is not so surprising as it might seem at first, as I 
shall now try to show.  
 
 
Does Aristotle Claim that Good Men Always Do Good Deeds in Nicomachean Ethics 
I? 
 
In NE I, Aristotle makes several remarks in succession that individually and jointly imply 
that the good man can always realize the fine (τὸ καλόν), even if the degree of fineness 
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possible under given circumstances varies. If this interpretation is correct, then while 
such a man depends on things outside of his control in order to achieve acts of a certain 
degree of fineness, he does not depend on things outside of his control in order to realize 
the fine as such. Since each remark is somewhat different, I shall consider each in turn.  
After Aristotle describes how great misfortunes can affect eudaimonia, in the latter 
part of NE I, he writes: “But nevertheless, even in these situations, nobility shines 
through (διαλάµpiει τὸ καλόν), whenever someone bears many great misfortunes well, 
not because of insensitivity, but because he is well-born and great-souled” (NE 
I.1100b30-33). Aristotle’s use of “shine through” (διαλάµpiει) seems to be a 
metaphorical way of referring to the fact that virtue makes itself perceptible despite 
conditions of misfortune—that is, virtue shines through misfortune, making itself 
manifest in the noble. And since virtue must be activated or realized in some way in order 
to be perceptible to others at all, Aristotle must mean that some pattern of action will 
render a person’s character virtue actual and perceptible, even in conditions of 
misfortune. For Aristotle, however, even responses that might at first appear passive can 
count as actions—such as enduring wounds because doing so is fine (NE III.1117b7-9). 
And in some misfortunes, presumably this more passive activation of virtue is all that 
would be possible. The next line makes this implied focus on the activation of virtue 
explicit, beginning: “And if the activities are in control of life…” (1100b33-34).  
What is unclear is whether Aristotle supposes that the fine can shine through even in 
cases of typically tragic action—such as action performed in ignorance of some relevant 
particular—for example, that of Oedipus or Deianeira. Oedipus kills his father and 
commits incest with his mother, and Deianeira involuntarily poisons her husband 
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Heracles, ignorant that the Centaur’s potion is poison. Actions of this kind do not 
themselves seem to express nobility in any form. On the other hand, the aftermath of such 
action clearly poses special challenges for the activation of a person’s virtue, and thus for 
“nobility to shine through.” Perhaps with this latter thought in mind, this remark that 
“nobility shines through” has been read as “extremely pertinent to tragedy.”247 And it is 
hard to deny this, but one should ask the reverse too—whether tragedy is extremely 
pertinent to understanding the meaning of the remark in the NE in its own context. 
In fact, what Aristotle goes on to say seems to exclude certain kinds of typically 
tragic action from consideration. He writes next that if the activities are in control of life, 
no one blessed will become wretched (ἄθλιος), “since he will never do anything hateful 
and wicked” (οὐδέpiοτε γὰρ piράξει τὰ µισητὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα) (I.1100b33-35). 
Aristotle’s argument is that a blessed man will never become wretched, because he will 
never do anything terrible—where he is evidently supposing that wretchedness only 
arises from doing, never from merely passively suffering. Thus wretchedness is implicitly 
defined as the opposite of eudaimonia. Whereas eudaimonia arises from excellent 
actions, wretchedness arises from bad ones. These parallel definitions are also in keeping 
with another remark that Aristotle had made a little earlier: “the actions that accord with 
virtue are in control of eudaimonia, and their opposites, of the opposite” (NE I.1100b9-
11).  
One problem, however, is whether the definitions of eudaimonia and wretchedness 
are perfectly or only approximately parallel. If eudaimonia consists in voluntary virtuous 
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actions chosen for their own sake, then wretchedness ought to consist in vicious actions 
chosen at least voluntarily, if not actually for the sake of viciousness. If this strictly 
parallel definition of eudaimonia and wretchedness were what Aristotle had in mind, then 
he would simply be denying that good men ever do terrible things voluntarily, and are 
thus rendered wretched. This interpretation makes good sense of the passage, except that 
Aristotle does not qualify the remark by saying that good men never perform hateful and 
wicked actions voluntarily.248 Thus he does not take an explicit position on how 
involuntary acts of particular ignorance influence eudaimonia here, just as he avoids 
doing in NE III.  
Aristotle’s language for those acts that render a man wretched, and which the good 
man is immune from doing, is τὰ µισητὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα (“hateful and wretched acts”). 
While Aristotle normally uses φαῦλος to refer to intentional wickedness,249 the term 
“hateful” suggests a much broader meaning. Indeed, given the requirement in NE III that 
acts of particular ignorance be regretted, “hateful” seems an apt enough description of 
such an act, at least if the unintended result that ensues from the action is of a serious 
enough kind. Yet it makes no sense for Aristotle to claim that the good man is immune 
from performing even involuntary hateful acts.250 The most reasonable interpretation, 
then, seems to be that Aristotle is simply ignoring cases of involuntary action, perhaps 
because he regards them as rare, and thus making the (inaccurate) claim that good men do 
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 He does make a qualified version of this remark at NE IV.1128b28-29, however, saying that 
the good man (ἐpiιεικής) never performs wicked acts (φαῦλα) voluntarily.  
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 Thus, for example, Aristotle contrasts φαῦλος with σpiουδαῖος at NE 1151a28, and with 
ἐpiιεικής at 1113b14. 
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 Indeed, the whole reason that acts rendered involuntary because of particular ignorance do 
count as involuntary, must be that in such cases one could not have been expected to know that of 
which he was ignorant. If one failed to do whatever was reasonable to acquire the relevant 
knowledge before acting, then the act would presumably not count as involuntary. 
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not do anything terrible. I think the positive implication is most important to the passage 
as a whole, however—that good men will always perform fine acts.  
What Aristotle goes on to say gives further support to this positive implication. He 
writes, “we suppose the truly good and sensible man to bear his fortunes well and always 
to do the finest actions available (ἐκ τῶν ὑpiαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα piράττειν), just 
as a good general makes the most warlike (piολεµικώτατα) use of his army, and the 
cobbler makes the finest sandal (κάλλιστον ὑpiόδηµα) from the leather that he is given” 
(1100b35-a5). Strictly, Aristotle is not denying that under some circumstances, it would 
be impossible to perform a fine action at all. That is, in principle, given certain 
circumstances, the finest act possible for a man might be a terrible deed performed in 
ignorance.251 Nevertheless the implication of saying that he will “always do the finest 
available things” is that he will always do something that is at least somewhat fine. Thus, 
Aristotle implies that fine action is always possible, and that it is merely the degree of the 
fineness of the action available to an agent that will vary with the attendant 
circumstances. If this interpretation is correct, then the good man always acts finely, and 
it is only the degree of fineness that varies. This is a kind of moral luck, to be sure, but it 
is a restricted kind.  
The immunity from doing anything terrible that Aristotle evidently ascribes to the 
virtuous throughout this NE I discussion is a denial of a particular kind of moral luck. In 
this respect, Aristotle seems to be taking on a modified form of a Socratic position. For 
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 Nussbaum (1992) 130 n. 43—in reference to a similar remark made by Aristotle a little earlier, 
at 1100b19-22—relies on this possibility in order to claim that Aristotle is admitting the 
possibility that “one might not always succeed in fully doing the things according to excellence.” 
But this ignores repeated statements by Aristotle that ignore this possibility and imply the reverse. 
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Socrates, the virtuous man never does harm,252 and furthermore his virtue is necessary 
and sufficient for eudaimonia, though perhaps not identical to it.253 These two claims are 
in a sense combined in his well-known remark, “I would like neither, but if it were 
necessary to do injustice or to suffer injustice, I would choose rather to suffer injustice 
than to do it” (Pl. Gorg. 469b12-c2). That is, Socrates evidently regards doing injustice as 
worse for himself, but he nevertheless says that he would prefer to avoid suffering 
injustice. Thus Socrates supposes that only by doing injustice he would lose his 
eudaimonia, but he still ascribes some significance to suffering injustice at the hands of 
another. Aristotle likewise supposes that suffering passively or having the scale of one’s 
virtuous acts reduced can remove a man’s eudaimonia, but only doing ill can reduce a 
man to wretchedness. Thus, for Aristotle, too, one is always better off avoiding doing ill. 
But for Aristotle, virtue is sufficient for realizing the fine and for avoiding wretchedness, 
whereas for Socrates it is sufficient for eudaimonia. Here, Aristotle specifically supposes 
the avoidance of “hateful and wicked” deeds to render a man immune from wretchedness, 
and that the good man can always manage this. Aristotle’s position thus rests at a kind of 
midpoint point between that of Socrates and the commonsense view that eudaimonia is 
entirely a matter of fortune.254 Furthermore, Aristotle’s willingness to admit that virtue is 
sufficient for τὸ καλόν but not for eudaimonia seems to amount to an admission that the 
realization of excellence does not always bring about eudaimonia, and thus that 
                                                 
252
 See Vlastos (1991) ch. 7 for a discussion of Socrates’ rejection of retaliation. 
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 See Vlastos (1991) 224-231 for a defense of the interpretation that Socrates claims that virtue 
is sufficient for eudaimonia, rather than identical to it.  
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one point that “man is entirely a matter of fortune” (οὕτω ὦν, ὦ Κροῖσε, piᾶν ἐστι ἄνθρωpiος 
συµφορή) (I.32.4). A closer examination of Solon’s analysis of Tellus, Kleobis and Biton as 
exemplars of eudaimonia shows some implicit regard for excellent activity within an account that 
emphasizes the part of fortune. 
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eudaimonia depends on something other than such excellent activity. This opens up a 
clear space for goods that have eudaimonic value that does not arise from making activity 
more excellent. 
Aristotle’s choice of Priam as a paradigm of the virtuous man who suffers a massive 
reversal of fortune also bears directly on the question of whether he has in mind 
obstructed or involuntary, as opposed to merely diminished, action.255 Scholars 
sometimes characterize Aristotle’s reference to Priam’s loss of eudaimonia here as 
tragic.256 And Priam’s reversal is clearly tragic in the sense that he suffers a reversal of 
fortune—to follow Aristotle’s account of the simple tragic plot in the Poetics 
(X.1452a14-16). But does his reversal involve some kind of constrained or failed 
action—either an act performed in ignorance of the relevant particulars, or a choice 
between two imperfect courses of action?257 Indeed, Priam might reasonably be blamed 
for failing to turn over Helen to the Greeks, or represented as facing a difficult choice 
between loyalty to his son Paris’ interests, and those of the Trojans as a whole. 
Nevertheless, the literary tradition most often presents Priam as facing a basically passive 
misfortune, in the sense that his misfortune is something that he suffers rather than 
something that he does or that he brings upon himself.258 Indeed, in the Iliad it is Paris 
who is blamed by Hector for the siege, with no mention of their father’s part in failing to 
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 Aristotle twice uses Priam as a paradigm case of the virtuous and happy man who suffers a 
change in fortune in the NE I discussion of the effect of misfortune and the loss of externals upon 
eudaimonia, at 1100a5-9 and 1101a6-8. 
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 See, for example, Halliwell (1998) 207 & Nussbaum (2001) 327. 
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 As far as I know, Freeland (1996) 344 is the only one to have posed this specific question 
about Aristotle’s use of Priam as an example in the NE.  
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 As White (1992) 89 n. 2 likewise argues in reference to Aristotle’s use of Priam as a paradigm 
case of misfortune.  
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end it (VI.326-331). Likewise Herodotus does not blame Priam, instead considering it 
absurd that the Trojans would wage a highly destructive war with the Greeks, which 
could easily have been averted by handing over Helen (Hdt. II.120). Yet he regards this 
absurdity as evidence that Helen was not at Troy but in Egypt, rather than as an 
indication that Priam exhibited some kind of tragically self-destructive loyalty to his son 
Paris, or some other failing. Indeed, Herodotus regards it as absurd that someone would 
fail to hand over Helen at such great cost, even if she were his own wife.  
There are some exceptions to this way of treating Priam, however. In particular, there 
is a tradition that Paris was prophesied to bring ruin upon Troy, and therefore exposed as 
a child, but that he survived being exposed and was raised by a herdsman. Later, his 
identity was revealed and he resumed his place as the son of Priam.259 This version of the 
Paris myth does not necessarily place blame on Priam for Paris’ survival, but at any rate 
it supplied grounds for raising the question of who was to blame for Paris’ survival both 
when he was exposed as a baby and also later when his survival and identity became 
known. Accordingly, in the Trojan Women Euripides has Helen blame Priam for not 
killing Paris as a baby (918-922). And the fragments of Euripides’ Alexandros show that 
the play dealt with the failed exposure of Paris, and surely also the question of whether he 
should have been killed both at birth and also later when his identity was discovered.260 
But, as I have argued, NE I shows no interest at all in actions in which a basically decent 
man fails to act properly under the pressure of circumstances—indeed, it implies that 
such cases do not occur. Thus there is no reason to think that Aristotle has Priam’s failure 
to kill Paris in mind when he uses Priam as a paradigm of the happy man whose fortunes 
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are reversed. Instead, the concerns of NE I are much more closely aligned with the 
tradition found in the Iliad, which treats Priam not as bringing about his own misfortune, 
but as managing it effectively. 
The crucial point, then, is that a misfortune that someone endures and manages, rather 
than causes, poses much less of a threat to eudaimonia for Aristotle, since it is what a 
person does that primarily determines his eudaimonia. Thus by relying on an example of 
this kind of misfortune, Aristotle also avoids evaluating how the good man’s eudaimonia 
is affected by constrained or involuntary acts—perhaps because he considers these cases 
sufficiently rare as to be unimportant. The scale and range of Priam’s virtuous action 
might be reduced, but its essence would be more or less retained. Indeed, Priam would 
have retained kingly resources for managing the crises facing Troy even as he was unable 
to prevent his city from being taken. His journey to the Achaean camp to reclaim the 
body of Hector from Achilles also serves as a perfect case of excellence in the midst of 
loss—in Aristotle’s own terms, an example of doing the finest possible thing under the 
circumstances.261  
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At NE I.1099a31, Aristotle remarks that eudaimonia “evidently has a further need of the 
external goods.” For convenience, I have called this claim “the external goods 
requirement.” The basic question that I ask in the second chapter is—on what authority 
does Aristotle make this claim? Why does Aristotle regard this claim as true? Is there an 
argument that Aristotle thinks proves this? And if so, does this argument presuppose his 
formal definition of eudaimonia, or not? Or perhaps Aristotle supposes that eudaimonia 
needs the external goods because many people believe this to be true, and he regards that 
as sufficient reason to accept it? 
Although I focus on this question in the second chapter, this is the basic question 
from which all of the other questions of the dissertation radiate. Thus even the preceding 
first chapter develops an account of Aristotle’s method in the Nicomachean Ethics that 
serves the chapter 2 analysis of Aristotle’s argument for the claim that eudaimonia needs 
the external goods. The third chapter, meanwhile, extends the work of chapter 2 by 
examining not the specific argument that Aristotle actually offers for the external goods 
requirement (as in chapter 2), but rather the kinds of arguments for the value of the 
external goods that are available to him in terms of his own account of action. Examining 
Aristotle’s account of action in this way, in order to determine what role the external 
goods might have in contributing value to action, is particularly important, since on some 
readings of Aristotle’s theory, the only value that the external goods can possibly have for 
Aristotle is in what they do to promote excellent activity. Finally, in the fourth chapter I 
draw on my findings in chapter 2 and 3 to try to assess Aristotle’s position on moral 
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luck—asking how the various things outside of an agent’s control influence his ability to 
realize not only eudaimonia, but the various categories of value that Aristotle develops in 
the Nicomachean Ethics.  
Chapter 3 and 4 extend the scope of the thesis somewhat by considering not only the 
external goods—which are defined as those things physically outside of the soul or the 
body of the agent262—but also those things outside the control of the agent. Although 
there is a distinction between the external goods and this broader class of “external 
things,” there is some textual warrant for considering them here. Thus even Aristotle’s 
formal argument for why eudaimonia needs the external goods at 1099a31-b8 ends with a 
reference to good season rather than the external goods, suggesting that he views the 
external goods as an aspect of a larger problem. Scholarship on the external goods has in 
any case tended to view the external goods simply as identical to good luck and the 
external results of actions.263 And even though this conflation is mistaken, these three 
things are related—inasmuch as all of them are to some extent outside the agent’s 
control. Thus for the sake of clarifying Aristotle’s position, it is useful to distinguish a 
separate category of things that Aristotle himself does not have a term for—the whole 
class of those things that lie outside of an agent’s control. Accordingly, I look at the 
external goods within the context of this larger category of goods in both the third and 
fourth chapters.264 In this respect, my work advances on previous scholarship. 
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Cooper (1985) 177. 
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 For what is in my view a conflation between the external goods, good luck, and the external 
results of actions, see especially Cooper (1985) and Brown (2006). 
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of the agent, as is sometimes implied. Indeed, under certain conditions, gaining, losing, and 
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But to turn back to the narrower question of the second chapter—I ask why Aristotle 
supposes that people need the external goods in order to sustain a worthwhile and 
satisfying life. In particular, I ask whether Aristotle justifies his claim on the basis of an 
endoxic or commonsense view—as at least one prominent Aristotelian has supposed265—
or whether, instead, Aristotle simply regards himself as proving the claim that he 
advances with an argument made in the terms of his own theory—as the articles by John 
Cooper and Eric Brown argue.266 I find that, although the context would suggest that the 
external goods requirement is indeed an endoxon, the language used to express the 
claim—that it is “evident”—is stronger than what Aristotle typically uses for endoxa. 
Furthermore, although Aristotle initially argues for the claim within the terms of his own 
theory, he soon gives up on proving or explaining it strictly in terms of that theory. This 
makes it hard to offer a clear answer for why Aristotle believes the claim in the first 
place—at least, within the terms of Aristotle’s method, as I interpret it in the first chapter 
of the dissertation.  
The upshot of this analysis, from the perspective of Aristotle’s definition of 
eudaimonia, is that Aristotle apparently recognizes that the external goods have some 
value that cannot be explained in terms of the improvement of excellent activity—or, at 
least, not by an improvement of the kind that Aristotle’s theory seems to demand. Thus 
Aristotle apparently recognizes a limitation of his own theory, and rather than modifying 
it, or rejecting the offending explanandum, he shrugs his shoulders—so to speak. As I go 
on to argue in chapter 3, it is trivially true that a person’s access to anything of value is 
mediated in some way by some kind of activity, but that is not enough for Aristotle’s 
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theory, since it is supposed to be the activity itself that is the bearer of value, not the 
valuable things with which it comes into contact and through which it might be thought 
to receive value more passively.  
One objection to the style of interpretation that I defend here, is that it takes the 
theory less seriously on its own terms. But I think this objection gets things exactly 
wrong—the way to take a theory seriously is not to finesse it into internal consistency or 
explanatory success at any cost to the text itself, through ingenious interpretive moves—
but to look at what the text actually says, how its different parts actually fit together, or 
fail to, how successfully it explains the various relevant explananda, and so on. In the 
case in question, because Aristotle has implicitly defined the external goods in a way that 
is not virtue-relative, it makes it impossible for his definition of eudaimonia as excellent 
activity to offer a full explanation of their value. Yet those committed in advance to 
uncovering a consistent and successful theory may ignore this inconvenient strain on 
Aristotle’s theory. To some extent the theory-generator’s attitude toward his theory is 
irrelevant to the success or consistency of the theory that he advances—that is, whether 
he regards it as consistent, or successful, or whatever. It is just that it seems particularly 
perverse to ascribe more consistency or greater explanatory power to a theory than the 
theorist himself does—when the theory itself does not justify such a judgment. 
In the third chapter, I turn from Aristotle’s own explicit argument for the value of the 
external goods, and instead examine the kind of explanation for their value that is 
available to Aristotle within his account of action. That is, I ask just how far Aristotle’s 
account of action can go in explaining the value of the external goods, by looking at what 
role such goods may play within action. Thus here I set aside the question of Aristotle’s 
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attitude to his own theory, and just see what comes out of taking the theory on its own 
terms. I consider not only the external goods as Aristotle defines them, but also the 
broader category of those things that are outside of an agent’s control.  
One crucial point here, is that by requiring virtuous action to be performed knowingly, 
Aristotle makes such action dependent upon external circumstances that are not always 
within the control of the agent. In this sense, at least, virtuous action cannot be said to be 
purely a matter of what takes place within the soul of the agent. It is, instead, defined in 
relation to something outside of the agent—both physically outside of him, and outside of 
his full control. While Aristotle’s analysis of involuntary action has a classic status, its 
implications for his account of action, and especially for action’s relation to external 
things in the broadest sense, has not been appreciated. My argument offers a strong 
reason to be skeptical of the so-called “internal use” explanation of the value of the 
external goods, according to which they derive their value purely from the activity of the 
soul that they make possible.267 Minimally, Aristotle requires that such activity of the 
soul be situated in relation to external particulars that it knows about accurately—which 
seems to exclude the possibility that Aristotle really views excellent practical activity as a 
pure good of the soul (despite his classification of actions among the goods of the soul at 
NE 1098b12-16). 
Initially, I focus on the requirement that virtuous actions be performed knowingly, 
because it offers such a clear cut case in which excellent practical activity depends upon 
what is not always within the control of the agent. In this sense, at least, excellent 
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practical activity is not a purely internal matter. I go on to argue further that this 
knowledge requirement would be mysterious unless Aristotle regarded action as 
something that happens in the world, rather than something that happens just within the 
soul of the virtuous man. Aristotle’s repeated insistence that the virtuous man acts 
correctly in relation to particulars supports this view. That is, for Aristotle a virtuous man 
acts in the right way, at the right time, in relation to the right person, and so on. In 
enumerating the particular virtues, Aristotle does not say that the virtuous man intends to 
act in the right way at the right time, but that he actually does so. Practical wisdom 
together with the knowledge requirement seems to come close to guaranteeing that this 
requirement is satisfied—since an agent who has the right kind of general understanding 
of how to act (practical wisdom) as well as the right kind of knowledge of the relevant 
particulars, will almost always get things right.268 
More specifically, I argue that the best explanation for Aristotle’s requirement that 
virtuous action be performed knowingly, is that Aristotle regards the result of an action as 
a partial determinant of its worth. This is supported especially by Aristotle’s requirement 
that involuntary ignorant acts be painful and regretted (NE III.1110b18-30). This regret 
seems pretty mysterious unless the virtuous man attaches some significance to the results 
of his actions. And furthermore, Aristotle seems to regard nobility (τὸ καλόν) as a 
particular kind of worth that is spread evenly (so to speak) over the process of 
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deliberation and choice, the bare process of aiming at some end, and the external result at 
which that act aims.  
In fact, my arguments here go further than anything else in the secondary literature to 
point out the full range of evidence that supports the inclusion of results as partial 
determinants of the worth of actions. I point to a number of distinct reasons for thinking 
that Aristotle regards results as significant determinants of the worth of action. In 
particular: 
 
(1) Aristotle’s distinction between action and production does not 
necessarily exclude results from being partial determinants of the 
worth of actions. 
(2) Aristotle’s requirement that virtuous action be chosen “for its own 
sake” does not necessarily exclude results from being the object of 
choice. 
(3) Aristotle often ascribes aims to particular kinds of virtuous action—for 
example, justice aims at the advantage of others, and friendliness aims 
at the pleasure of others. 
(4) The result at which a successful virtuous action aims and which it 
achieves has a more intimate relation to practical reason than the 
external goods—since such a result is specified by practical reason 
rather than merely being taken or rejected in whole or in part. As such, 
there is good reason to think that they might have a different kind of 
value than the external goods.  
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(5) Aristotle requires that virtuous actions be performed knowingly, and in 
particular with knowledge of “that for the sake of which” an action is 
done. He also requires that an act rendered involuntary because of 
ignorance be regretted. But it is hard to see why such knowledge 
would matter if Aristotle judges results irrelevant to virtuous action. 
(6) In at least two instances, Aristotle describes results as being “noble” 
(καλός) (NE ΙΙΙ.1115a29-35; IV.1123a7-9)—which suggests that he 
regards them as possessing the same kind of value as the features of 
action that occur under the direct control of the agent within his soul. 
(7) Aristotle often refers to conventional action types, which are defined 
in terms of their results, as actions (e.g., murder, theft). 
 
The first three points are made by Jennifer Whiting—and (less recently) by Alexander of 
Aphrodisias in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics.269 Furthermore, both use 
these considerations in order to argue that Aristotle reckons results as parts of those 
actions from which they issue. But—as far as I have been able to determine—no one else 
has gathered anything like the full range of considerations that I offer here for supposing 
that Aristotle might well regard results as partial determinants of virtuous action.  
It is also worth emphasizing the importance of this—as a ground-level question about 
any ethical theory. To put it bluntly, if the value that an ethical theory attaches to results 
is obscure, the whole theory is obscure. It is impossible to explain how an ethical theory 
would evaluate some particular action without knowing what value that theory attaches to 
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results. In the specific context of philosophical ethics, it is also particularly important to 
be able to say what Aristotle thinks about results in order to distinguish his ethical theory 
from Utilitarians, and from Kant—both of whom take explicit positions on this question.  
In the latter part of this chapter I then consider different specific roles that the 
external goods might play within action, and what kind of value they might contribute to 
excellent activity in these various different roles. My conclusion is that the value of the 
external goods as Aristotle understands them cannot be explained fully in terms of a 
contribution to action. This conclusion thus offers a possible explanation for why 
Aristotle fails to offer a successful explanation of their value within the terms of his own 
theory, and accordingly corroborates the findings of chapter 2. 
Finally, in the fourth and last chapter of the dissertation, I examine Aristotle’s 
position on moral luck. This is a notion originally developed by Bernard Williams and 
Thomas Nagel, but which has since taken on a life of its own. Moral luck picks out an 
area of moral worth that is subject to luck in the particular sense that it is not within the 
control of the agent in question. Yet strictly, since Aristotle has no notion of the moral, he 
can have no notion of moral luck either. Thus, to point out just one obvious problem with 
ascribing some notion of morality to Aristotle, Aristotle identifies no category of value 
that is at once supreme and at the same time equally accessible to all. Eudaimonia is of 
supreme worth, but it arises through the exercise of reason, and Aristotle regards this 
reason as being apportioned very differently to different kinds of people—so that not 
everyone can be expected to realize it. And virtuous action cannot be taken to 
approximate the moral either, since in its perfected form, at least, it too is accessible only 
to the fully rational agent. Thus—again—it is not something that Aristotle regards as 
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equally accessible to all. Because of this, one can only examine Aristotle’s position on 
moral luck in a looser sense—by looking at his own categories of value, and by asking 
how exactly each depends upon forces outside of an agent’s control.  
This chapter makes a particularly clear contribution to the secondary literature. 
Previous studies of moral luck in Aristotle fail to apply the concept of moral luck in a 
way that is sensitive to Aristotle’s own categories of value. Thus Anthony Kenny’s paper 
treats eudaimonia as corresponding roughly to moral worth—without offering a 
justification for why this should be.270 Likewise, in her well-known study, The Fragility 
of Goodness, Martha Nussbaum draws her inspiration from the idea of moral luck, but 
self-consciously avoids references to the moral, while failing to track Aristotle’s own 
categories of value.271  
In the latter part of this chapter, I also make a specific positive contribution, arguing 
that Aristotle regards virtue as sufficient for avoiding wretchedness, and for realizing “the 
noble” (τὸ καλόν), even if it is not sufficient for eudaimonia itself. Thus Aristotle 
supposes “the noble” as well as the avoidance of wretchedness to be within the control of 
the agent, but regards eudaimonia as falling outside of his full control. But if Aristotle 
regards the noble (τὸ καλόν) and avoidance of wretchedness as within the control of the 
agent, then this is a kind of denial of moral luck (in the loose sense of “moral luck”). 
Furthermore—and this is crucial—Aristotle’s willingness to split “the noble” from 
eudaimonia further supports the conclusions of chapter 2—that Aristotle does not, in the 
end, regard excellent activity alone as sufficient for eudaimonia, but instead admits the 
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external goods as independent goods that contribute to eudaimonia directly, apart from 
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